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ABSTRACT 
In oppressive states where legitimate opposition is outlawed 
resistance organisations often operate underground. The secret 
membership and leadership make consultation, debate and 
accountability virtually impossible. Invariably covert 
organisations tend to be undemocratic. Yet, to be effective, a 
resistance organisation needs the support of the broader mass of 
oppressed non-members (bystanders) whom it cannot consult, and from 
whom it received no mandate. This study examines the ·· question 
whether or not covert resistance organisations are entitled to 
support from bystanders. Alternatively, are bystanders justified 
in withholding support on the grounds that they had not consented 
to the aims and strategies of the movements, or that they were not 
consulted on a particular issue? Almost every major political 
programme of resistance in South Africa is characterised by a 
measure of both persuasion and coercion. School, rent and consumer 
boycotts and national stayaways, for example, are monitored closely 
by a activists and the consequences for the violators are sometimes 
perilous. critics have been quick to point out that coercive 
involvement of the oppressed in the liberation struggle is morally 
indefensible. This study concludes that the issue is much more 
involved than is suggested in the above criticism. Consent theory 
of obligation fails to account for any obligations the oppressed 
may have to support a liberation struggle. Voluntary consent of 
the oppressed is highly improbable where reprisals by the 
oppressive regime are likely to diminish or undermine the 
willingness to participate in the liberation struggle. By 
employing the theory of fair play it is argued, that in certain 
limited circumstances, coercive measures by liberation movements in 
an attempt to enlist support for specific projects and campaigns 
are justified. · However, no bystander should be coerced into 
joining a political organisation. 
The fact that formerly banned resistance organisations were 
unbanned in February, 1990 has not affected this study's findings 
materially. The · aim remains to examine to what extent an 
underground organisation can be democratic. 
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ZIITRODUCTZOB 
This essay addresses the question whether liberation is such 
an overriding imperative that the oppressed have an obliqation to 
liberate themselves, even to the point of coercing one another into 
participating in the liberation struqqle. In other words, what 
kind of moral claims do liberation movements have upon the 
oppressed, and more especially upon those who may prefer to remain 
merely sympathetic bystanders?l In many ways these questions are 
not unique. The issues raised are discussed extensively in 
literature on civil disobedience and revolutions. However, all too 
often, this is done largely in the context of democratic 
institutions of countries in the northern hemisphere where the 
poli tical atmosphere is characterised by openness, debate and 
public discussion. This study marks an attempt to engage certain 
traditional liberal concepts in an authoritarian setting like South 
Africa. Quite often when such engagement takes place it involves 
the application of undilut~d and unrestructured principles in their 
original European form in a different setting. The uniqueness of 
this study lies in an attempt to examine the question whether it is 
possible or not to maintain liberal respect for individual choice 
in a revolutionary situation against an authoritarian setting. 
What does it mean to say of people that they are under 
obligation to liberate themselves? For the purposes of this study 
a distinction is made between duty and obligation. Duty refers to 
moral benevolence. For example, a person will be said to have a 
duty to help strangers, to love his neighbour, to tell the truth or 
to feed the hungry. Obligations refer to the moral claims which 
involve corresponding rights on the part of others to enforce the 
obligation, or to defend their rights. Obligations and rights are 
correlatives. According to Hart (1967:55), rights are 'moral 
claims whose enforcement would be appropriate. There is with 
respect to rights [and therefore, obligations] a special congruity 
in the use of force, or the threat of force' 2 • A creditor is 
entitled to demand payment from debtors, in a way that the hungry 
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cannot demand to be fed. This distinction does not suggest, for 
example, that fulfilment of an obligation is morally prior to that 
of a duty or the converse. This distinction is addressed in 
greater detail in chapter one. 
If the oppressed have obligations in this sense, to whom then 
is this obligation owed? Is it to themselves? Or to their fellow 
oppressed? To future generations? Or to the liberation movements? 
Was this obligation incurred solely through their involuntary 
membership of an oppressed group? Assuming that there is such an 
obligation, then there should be an agent entrusted with the power 
and responsibility to enforce obligations and protect rights. This 
is what is generally expected of governments. The question then 
becomes whether underground political organisations are entitled to 
act as governments' in the wings', so to say, which have to 
enforce the oppressed's obligation to free themselves. If the 
political organisations have the right and duty to coordinate the 
liberation effort, what are their powers and rights? Legislators 
are said to have rights to enact laws on behalf of the people. 
What gives the movements the right, if any, to make demands on the 
people? Clearly they cannot launch the struggle without the 
support of the people. The struggle is a collective action. 
The rights and obligations of the revolutionary organisations 
in respect to the broader society of the subjugated require 
elucidation. If there are any rights and obligations pertaining to 
the two parties, what is their content? Almost every major 
political programme of resistance in South Africa is characterised 
by a measure of both persuasion and coercion. If school, rent and 
consumer boycotts and national stayaways, for example, are 
monitored closely by a group of youths, the consequences for the 
violators are sometimes perilous. critics have been quick to point 
out that people should not be coerced, but rather educated and 
persuaded to support the liberation struggle. This requirement, to 
make the means and the end commensurate, presents a dilemma that is 
widespread in South Africa. For example, does a non-racial goal 
require non-racial means, as the critics of the Black Consciousness 
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Movement (BCM) maintain? Similarly, does a democratic goal 
necessarily require democratic means? 
These two queries respecting South African resistance politics 
are pertinent as the following concrete example illustrates. The 
black consciousness organisation, the Azanian People's Organisation 
(Azapo), has been 'criticised by its chief rival, the united 
Democratic Front (UDF), on the basis that its alleged goal of non-
racialism is at variance with its black exclusivist, and hence 
'racist' means. In turn, when anti-apartheid organisations such as 
the UDF (or their known members) forcibly enlist support for their 




ends. This study is concerned with the coercion issue 
Azapo, rather than with the charges of racism against 
Essentially, in the heat of the 1984-86 township 
uprisings, Azapo criticised some anti-apartheid tactics such as 
school and work stayaways and consumer boycotts precisely because 
these were largely enforced by means of severe coercion. By 
contrast, Azapo advanced a two-phase consultation process. 
Firstly, leaflets should be issued explaining the purpose of the 
proposed action, so that debate and discussion on the issue could 
take place. The second stage would be the actual mounting of the 
campaign, following a clear mandate from the community. All in all 
Azapo's sentiments are in keeping with the ideals of true 
democracy, and reflect genuine concern over some of the coercive 
measures employed in the enforcement of certain boycotts. 
This concern raises a crucial question in political morality. 
Can anti-apartheid groups organise 
undemocratic, repressive and underground 
place, one need not be apologetic about 
democratically in an 
climate? In the first 
being concerned at the 
thought of someone having to swallow a poisonous detergent as a 
punishment for breaking a consumer boycott. Azapo's concern is 
morally well-founded and is shared by many people. At the same 
time it highlights the seeming tension between the demands of non-
consequential ism on the one hand, · and those of efficacy on the 
other. This tension is not strange to liberal theory. Basically, 
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it involves the demands of individual autonomy against those of 
group intervention occasioned by possible or real social 
consequences for individual autonomy. How realistic is Azapo in 
expecting such a neat system in a politically repressive climate? 
How does anyone in South Africa, including Azapo, consult so widely 
and obtain such a mandate? Is some measure of coercion inevitable? 
There are three possibilities. Firstly, a resistance 
organisation might give precedence to personal liberty over 
national liberation. In practice, this means halting the struggle 
if the price people have to pay is constant coercion. Secondly, 
and in contrast to the first alternative, priority might go to the 
liberation struggle, and individuals forced to participate where 
required. In this view, where the interests of the struggle are at 
stake, personal choice becomes a luxury. Thirdly, som~ might plead 
for moderation and as much consultation as is humanly possible 
under the repressive conditions. They would accept coercion only 
as an ultimate, not initial step and even then organisations would 
have to take precautions to ensure that such coercion remains 
proportionate to the circumstances. This is the position defended 
in this study. 
This is not the place to answer these questions. still, it is 
worth mentioning at the outset that Azapo' s 
democratic ' base for political initiatives 
insistence on a 
is, in normal 
circumstances, politically wise. After all, the trade unions 
derive part of their strength precisely from their democratic base. 
Collective decision-making has strengthened, not weakened the 
leadership. At the same time, it can be pointed out that the union 
model has serious limitations if applied across the political 
spectrum. South African trade unions are legal institutions with 
every capacity to call meetings and ask for ~andates. It is true 
that their leadership has not been immune to government reprisals. 
Nevertheless, the government tended to be more careful when dealing 
with unions than with political activists. This was not a climate 
within which resistance organisations operate. It can be argued 
then that adhering to the ideals of democratic practice and absence 
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of coercion within resistance groups was not feasible during their 
banning and repression. 
This study questions one of the fundamental misconceptions: 
namely, that sheer consciousness or poli tical awareness is a 
sufficient condition for collective successful revolutionary 
action. In a repressive climate, such as the South African 
society, underground organisations face a dilemma. ~t would appear 
that in order for them to be effective they may have to be 
undemocratic. Open and democratic practice in an environment of 
oppression, such as South Africa, was not a readily available 
option. Liberation movements were outlawed, and could not·· organise 
publicly and openly. It is common knowledge that underground work 
tilts towards lack of democracy. Yet, by being unaccountable and 
undemocratic, the underground movements risked becoming 
illegitimate and, ironically, ineffective. Are such underground 
organisations then entitled to cooperation and support from the 
oppressed? 
The broadness of the questions should be evident. Reference 
to obligation and entitlement already raises significant issues 
regarding rights and enforcement of such rights. Questions of 
rights are linked invariably to the subject of freedom and 
autonomy. However, this essay is rather focused and limited to a 
specif ic context. In this narrow sense, the problem is about 
aspects of political resistance in repressive systems like South 
Africa. 
Problems And Conceptual Muddles 
Certain key concepts were highlighted in the opening 
paragraph: 'obligation',' to liberate themselves', 'the liberation 
struggle' and the 'liberation movements'. The concept of 
obligation and its link with coercion are addressed in the next 
chapter. However, the remaining three phrases, which run through 
this study, are extremely problematic. They are essentially 
contested concepts that mean different things to different people 
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and therefore require different actions from different people. 
Some of the meanings contradict each other. 
For example, the theory of 'liberation before education' 
includes, amongst other things, the following obligatory 
activities: school boycotts, destruction of physical symbols of 
'gutter education', and the harassment of teachers and school 
inspectors. In contrast, the theories of 'liberation through 
education' and 'education for liberation' take school and education 
activities very seriously, and require participation in these 
activities. They require pupils to go to school, or to 
insti tutions which are not 'part of the system'. Evidently, it is 
possible for three people, A, B, and C, to accept that they have an 
obligation to liberate themselves and to contribute to, and 
participate in the liberation struqqle. However, if they hold 
different theories of what the liberation struggle entails, it is 
not evident that they would be justified in coercing one another on 
the basis of their respective theories, which are not shared among 
them. Chapters seven and eight represent an attempt to unpack 
these difficulties. 
What then is Liberation? 
It is clear that the 'struggle' is not a tidy concept with 
determinate features and boundaries. It is a process of 
considerable complexi ty. Part of the problem is that it is 
defined variously by its protagonists, and the definitions become 
tainted with sectional interests of the various constituencies in 
the oppressed community. Thus professionals (teachers, lawyers, 
doctors) claim to be involved in the struggle by the very nature of 
their work. On the other hand, students refer to 'liberation now, 
education ' later'. Who advances the struggle further? Is it a 
student frequently marching in confrontation with the police, or 
one constantly sweating it out in the library? It is hard to tell: 
perhaps in the long term both do? What is the correct strategy 
towards the struggle? Not everyone equates liberation with 
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participation in politics. Also some believe that given time and 
patience, South Africa will eventually evolve out of its racist 
policies, whereas liberation movements are led by people who want 
to end racism now. Why, for example, not help the process of 
economic development that some believe is the road to the end of 
racism? This belief may be true or false, but this is not the 
fundamental issue. The issue is whether any individual is entitled 
to hold such a view. Are individuals entitled to believe that it 
is better to make sacrifices to get their children educated than to 
make sacrifices to get them the vote? If so, they seem to be 
contributing to liberation but not in the manner that the movements 
believe they should. If the movements are entitled to continue 
with a strategy that for decades has not worked, why cannot the 
bystander take a long-term strategy that is different? 
There is a further paradox here. If liberation movements do 
not have a sUbstantial reservoir of people who can help them run 
the country after the attainment of political freedom, liberation 
will result in very little change. Some whites argue that the best 
option for whites is to give blacks the vote in a unitary, non-
racial system. This will put an end to sanctions and international 
pressure. It would also mean that for at least six decades whites 
will maintain their economic dominance which is considerable. 
After all it took the Afrikaner about sixty years to begin to be on 
par with the English in economic terms. Besides, essentially 
there are two conceptions of what liberation is. 
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(a) There is a minimal conception according to which 
liberation is viewed simply as the end of racial 
discrimination in South Africa. There would be a system 
of universal adult suffrage, the right to stand for 
elections and form a political party. In short a 
liberated society would be one in which there is no 
reference to race and all discriminatory legislation has 
been abolished. This view is common within the Inkatha 
Freedom Party and the white parliamentary Democratic 
Party. If there are any differences, they are likely to 
be in details rather than substance. In brief, this 
notion would encapsulate the values of classical 
liberalism. 
(b) A maximal definition~ includes many of the issues 
raised in (a). In addi tion, the society has to be 
socialist. According to this view, liberty is impossible 
except where there is a non-capitalist mode of 
production. Democracy, according to this conception, 
necessarily presuppo~es that the working class owns and 
controls the means of production. 
If people are indeed obligated to liberate themselves, then it is 
essential to spell out in what sense of the term, liberation, they 
are obligated. Are black individuals who support a free market 
system obligated to bring about a socialist system, even at great 
peril to themselves? This is just one of the numerous questions 
confronting a potential revolutionary. The above scenario raises 
a number of questions and problems. A distinction is made between 
pl;."oblems faced by the individuals on the one hand, and those 
confronting political organisations on the other. Although some 
have been discussed briefly already they are spelled out in greater 
detail in the next chapter. 
For now it should be emphasised that participating in, 
supporting, or being involved in the struggle . does not entail 
joining an organisation. It only requires support for certain 
specific projects or campaigns launched by organisations meeting 
certain requirements. One should guard against making an 
unthinking transition from the belief that (a) everyone ought to 
strive for liberation to the conclusion that (b) everyone ought to 
strive in the same way. In other words to accept liberation as a 
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goal does not commi t one to specif ic organisations or means. 
universal cooperation may not be required in the struggle as a 
whole, but in certain specific actions it should be required (e.g. 
rent boycotts). In fact, empirically we know that revolutions are 
successful, not because everyone participates (this has never 
happened) but because the leaders adopt sophisticated and viable 
strategies for achieving widely acceptable goals. 
Methodology - Assumptions and Approach 
The first and fundamental assumption of this study is what 
Feinberg (1973:21) calls the 'presumptive case for liberty': 
there is always a presumption in favor of freedom 
whenever we are faced with an option between forcing a 
person to do something and letting him decide on his own 
whether or not to do it; other thinqs beinq equal, we 
should always opt for the latter. 4 
This approach does not a priori rule out the possible need for 
coercion. On the contrary, it merely shifts the burden of proof to 
those who advocate coercion. As Feinberg (1973:25) points out, 
this need not necessarily be wrong: 
If social and political coercion is a harm-causing evil, 
then one way to justify it is to show that it is 
necessary for the prevention of even greater evils. 
No argument is advanced here in favour of freedom, and respect for 
a person's autonomy. This is assumed. 
The second assumption which will not be argued for is that 
oppressed people in South Africa have no general obligation to obey 
the state. Where they do it, it is despite their conviction that 
the state is illegitimate. They might do so because 'they happen to 
agree with the particular laws. The basis of their non-obligation 
is the fact that the state is not representative of all its 
citizenry. citizens are not equal before the law, nor, until the 
early nineties, was the political process open and free (see 
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Walzer:1970:47). Indeed, the struggle in South Africa is not 
essentially about civil disobedience. The whole fabric of the 
political system is in dispute. 
Thirdly, morality invariably involves both principles and 
context. South Africa, before February 1990, is used as a context 
against which the problems of coercion and obligation are examined. 
All the anti -apartheid organisations were unbanned on the 2nd 
February, . 1990 and could consequently operate overtly. For 
example, it will be argued that everyone has a general obligation 
to create a just society. However, such a general obligation can 
be as vague as the injunction to love one another. A moral agent 
wants to know what specifically needs to be done before this 
obligation is fulfilled. This depends largely on context and here 
we find that 'South Africa' is not the focus. The focus of the 
argument is any intolerant political culture where political 
dissent is forced underground. The fact that formerly banned 
political organisations were unbanned in February 1990 should not 
affect this study's findings materially. 5 The aim remains to 
examine to what extent an underground organisation can be 
democratic. 
The fourth major issue is that this study adopts a utilitarian 
defence of coercion. It is difficult to see, for example, how a 
deontological approach can be put to good use in defence of 
coercion. It seems that revolutionaries have no option but to 
adopt a utilitarian ethic. This creates a difficulty in chapter 
four where the principle of fair play is employed in defence of 
coercion. In general discussions on free riding, one finds 
innumerable utilitarian objections to the principle of fair play. 
For example, if on utilitarian grounds one argues that cooperative 
behaviour is efficient as a means to liberation, then one has to 
demonstrate that remaining oppressed does not result in a better 
outcome for the oppressed. One way of dealing with this tension is 
to argue that, even if free riding were intrinsically evil, as 
deontologists would maintain, this in itself would not justify 
group intervention. This is the thrust of the arguments in 
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chapters five and six, where legal moralism is rejected, and it is 
maintained that there are utilitarian arguments in defence of the 
principle of fair play. 
It should be emphasised at the outset that this study takes 
place exclusively within the liberal tradition. This has been a 
conscious and deliberate approach. Liberalism believes that the 
use of force against people can be, and must be justified. Two 
liberal models of obligation are employed to make a case for 
coercive measures · for participation in the liberation struggle. 
Both of them, consent and fair play, are known for their 
individualism. Liberalism places a heavy premium on ·· personal 
liberty, individual rights and individualism. It emphasises the 
moral and political priority of the individual over the group. 
This makes a liberal setting a hard case for coercion. In fact 
coercion seems to be an intractable problem for liberal theory. 
Every effort has been made to avoid any view based on the belief 
that exercise of coercion by a group over the individual needs no 
justification - the vie~ that the group is considered more 
important than the individual. This would have made the case for 
coercion relatively easy. It will be argued that even on their 
premises the models are either ineffective or require a measure of 
coercion. The paradigms are allowed to 'speak for themselves', so 
to say, and their case is made as strong as possible. Only in 
chapters eight and nine are the assumptions behind these models 
questioned, and the limitations to their explanatory strength 
exposed. It is argued that while they illuminate the South African 
problem, they do not account adequately for any obligations the 
oppressed may have towards the liberation struggle. 
Liberalism is pertinent here for another reason. Generally it 
has inspired a number of revolutions, although it often fails to 
initiate or sustain them. Revolutionaries often appeal to concepts 
like liberty, rights and equality, all of which are thematic and 
central to liberal debates. However, liberalism insists that these 
values must also be respected by the oppressed in the process of 
liberation. For example, almost all liberal organisations in South 
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Africa have opposed economic sanctions and violence, recommending 
in the process only methods whose effecti veness was at best 
dubious. Many South African liberals argue that if the 
organisations are not democratic, then they are no different from 
the government they oppose. The point of this study is to 
demonstrate that while this claim may be correct, it does not cover 
the whole story. A liberal must provide a satisfactory account of 
how one can be democratic without being able to call a meeting. 
Quite correctly, l·iberal parties have persistently called for the 
unbanning of political organisations. still liberals need to face 
the question of how any group organises while it remains outlawed. 
There is another fallacy inherent in the position that the 
means should always be commensurate with the end. For example, it 
is insane to suggest that in order to become a millionaire one has 
to look like one in the process of getting there. ·This might 
actually guarantee that the aspirant does not get there. In fact 
if one seriously wants to become a millionaire, it may be necessary 
to live like a pauper for some time! This fallacy is endemic in 
political .debates in south Africa. 
the struggle for liberation is 
Hence it is argued that because 
a non-racial struggle, the 
organisations themselves have to be non-racial. This study is 
concerned with outcomes which cannot be attained without some 
measure of coercion, and with a collective good which overrides, 
for the time being, the demand of personal liberty. It is not 
addressing an ideal situation where free choice, debate, open 
discussion and freely chosen leaders are the order of the day. 
-
Liberation movements are not political parties with stable and 
formal membership. Basically, the argument is going to explore how 
the liberation movements can claim a moral right to leadership. 
Problems and Dilemmas 
The question involves the relationship between the oppressed 
people and the resistance organisations at the forefront of the 
liberation effort. While a substantial number of people may be 
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sympathetic to the aspirations of these organisations, nevertheless 
the bulk of the oppressed are not members. Others may not even 
have heard of these groups or their leadership. On the other hand, 
these resistance organisations cannot function effectively without 
the collaboration and support of ordinary men and women, whatever 
their formal relationship with the organisations. As a result, 
political .groups have sometimes made certain demands on people in 
terms of support and cooperation. The national struggle for 
freedom is believed to require from the oppressed some sacrifices 
in return for some future political liberty. People are expected 
to forego certain benefits, or whatever is left of comfort in the 
current South African situation, in order to further the course of 
the liberation struggle. 
This raises a moral dilemma for both individuals and the 
organisations. This dilemma takes two related forms. One involves 
a situation where there is only one liberation movement fighting 
for a specific issue. This was the case in Nazi-occupied France. 
There was only one movement, the French Resistance Movement. All 
members of the resistance had only one goal - to liberate France 
from Nazi occupation. Given this simple situation: does it follow 
that non-members were obliged to support the resistance movement, 
whether they were in agreement with its goals and strategies or 
not? If so, what was the basis of this obligation? The other 
related dilemma involves a situation complicated by various 
manifestations of the liberation effort, the profiles and variety 
of rivalries among these political organisations, and their 
differing conceptions of what a liberated society should look like. 
The forms of resistance and types of action undertaken vary from 
place to place, and from time to time. Therefore, a problem for 
everyone is whether all the movements have the right to coerce them 
into supporting their specific goals and strategies, or only some 
of them. If only some, which one or ones? Further, why do only 
some organisations have this right? Similarly, if we all know that 
'participating in the struggle' is open to different and 
contradictory (and even reasonable) interpretations, then how does 
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one distinguish between coercion to eliminate apartheid and 
coercion into promoting the goals of a specif ic movement which 
wants to be the new government? Is the people's right to choose 
going to be defended or not? 
It should be noted that the difference between the first 
( , one-movement') and second (' many-movements') situation is that of 
detail rather than sUbstance. In both cases the fundamental 
problem remains - how non-members acquire an obligation to support 
activities initiated or undertaken by organisations of which they 
are not members. The second dilemma is simply a complicated 
version of the first. The 'one-movement' problem is rooted in the 
individual vis-a-vis one resistance organisation, whereas the 
'many-movements' dilemma includes groups and individuals. Why, for 
example, should the African National Congress (ANC) members be 
coerced into supporting the activities of the Pan Africanist 
Congress (PAC)? On the individual level, why should non-members 
support the programmes of any or all of the competing movements? 
Surely, no one could have an obligation to pursue contradictory 
goals and strategies or to work for contradictory goals! 
Therefore, the problem is this: is every liberation movement in 
the country allowed to expect support from individuals? Are they 
all entitled to coerce individuals into assisting them? _ The 
position defended here is that people may be obliged to support 
activities of certain extra-parliamentary organisations. However, 
coercion is unjustified in the following circumstances: 
(a) to get a bystander to join a particular movement. 
(b) where strategies contradict each other, to get a 
bystander to follow one of them. 
Forms of Resistance and possible outcomes 
The foregoing discussion raised a number of general problems 
arising from the theory and practice of liberation struggles. 
Below, a number of specific examples drawn from the South African 
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situation are provided. It should be emphasised that they are 
examples, and nothing more. There is no intention to treat them as 
case studies, with a detailed analysis of moral problems that they 
raise. In chapter eight they are used to map out circumstances in 
which coercive measures may be sanctioned by the principle of fair 
play. 
Example One 
On 16th June, 1976 a group of students joined a march in 
protest against the compulsory use of the Afrikaans language in 
black schools. It is now general knowledge that the Afrikaans 
language per se was not the sole, or even the fundamental cause of 
the subsequent explosive uprising. There were other broad national 
issues at stake. A number of people, mostly pupils, were killed by 
members of the South African Police. In the subsequent days and 
weeks the protest escalated, with a corresponding rise in material 
and human losses. 
The decision to launch a protest was taken by the students 
themselves in a mass meeting. They elected a committee to lead the 
proceedings - the Soweto Students' Representative Council. The 
committee was not elected by all, perhaps not even the majority of 
students in Soweto. Some students did not attend the first 
meeting. Others may not even have been interested in the whole 
business. Perhaps they also resented the new 'Afrikaans ruling'. 
However, they may also have chosen to proceed with their studies 
nonetheless, and earn their formal qualifications rather than to 
boycott. Whatever the diverse feelings, the result was a massive 
student boycott, a rising death toll and massive destruction of 
private and public property. 
The short and long term effects of all this were varied. 
There were gains and losses. The government relented by 
withdrawing the contentious rUling. At the time though, it was 
like bolting the stable door after the horse had galloped away. 
Government concessions did not immediately end the protest. For 
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pupils this meant the beginning of a protracted period of disrupted 
schooling, something still prevalent even a decade after the 
initial eruption. other children permanently missed out on formal 
education, and hence are condemned to unskilled and low-income 
employment. Some died in detention and others in the streets. 
Those who sought political refuge in other countries battled to 
cope with the stress of life in exile. They faced possible long 
term, or seemingly permanent separation from parents and family. 
others could not ·even be accounted for. They may be secretly 
buried somewhere in the country. 
There were gains too, though. The mere capitulation by the 
government on the Afrikaans issue was a major political gain. It 
may not be easy for some to appreciate the psychological impact 
occasioned by this crack in the hitherto monolithic ruling National 
Party. Its capi tulation was seen as an acknowledgement of 
'people's · power'. In fact, the seeds of the current political 
reforms can be traced to the 1976 uprisings. What is undeniable is 
that they are direct putcomes of grassroots pressure and 
resistance. They resulted in the split in the National Party. 
Parliamentary and extra-parliamentary groups on the left were also 
shaken. There were signs of change, however minimal, in education. 
These were by no means fundamental but merely technocratic, and 
largely invol ved improvements in buildings and equipment. A 
concerted drive for teacher up-grading followed. The private 
sector, for a long time willing accomplices in an exploitative 
system, launched or re-evaluated its social responsibility 
programme. Through organisations like the Urban Foundation, money 




There may have been some oversimplification in this 
However, this is not an essay in social or political 
an ethical-political analysis of certain political 
events and actions. The examples are intended to be illustrative 
and nothing more. Furthermore while people may differ on details, 
few deny that 1976 was a major turning point in the contemporary 
political history of South Africa. Lastly, details again 
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notwithstanding, the thrust of this descriptive account is a non-
controversial claim, namely, that 1976 saw important gains and 
serious costs. 
Example Two 
A decision is taken that pupils should boycott schools until 
the inferior Bantu Education has been replaced by People's 
Education. The latter education is not neatly defined, but enough 
descriptive background is proffered to give an idea of what is 
involved. According to its sponsors, it is education designed to 
respond to the needs of the oppressed, rather than those of the 
exploitative business class6• It aims at liberation, rather than 
domestication. Black heroes like Nelson Mandela and Robert 
Sobukwe, generally presented as criminals by apartheid education, 
have to be gi ven a special place in the syllabi. People's 
education should inculcate socialist values of sharing, concern and 
cooperation, rather than promote materialism, greed and 
competition. The oppressed community, rather than the National 




be party to 
Teachers should become accountable to the black 
instead of remaining tools of the National Party 
To participate in the present education system is to 
the enslavement of the nation. As a result, pupils and 
parents should boycott education until it is replaced' with an 
acceptable type. 
A few comments are pertinent at this stage. At the time of 
the boycott, no one had a properly worked out 'people's 
curriculum'. The issue had not gone beyond slogans. It is true 
that subsequently efforts were urgently made to put together 
something; but, on the whole, this hardly took off. Soon the 
government had most people involved with the People's Education 
Movement behind bars. Yet even without government intervention it 
is still doubtful if anyone would have been in a position to 
deliver 'people's education' at short notice. Anyone involved in 
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education knows that to implement a uniform syllabus effectively 
for millions of pupils would require years of thorough preparation 
and consultation. Moreover, teachers need to be involved through 
every stage of the innovation. All in all, the clarion call 
'Freedom NOw, Education Later', if taken literally, could not have 
been based on an informed and serious assessment of the situation. 
It was largely to be a cost without tangible benefits. It may be 
that this campaign was largely a propaganda offensive, 
conscientising people against schoolbook brainwashing and spreading 
revolutionary ideology through the school component of the 
oppressed. still, one might ask if at that given moment, · the cost 
was proportionate to the propaganda value. This is not an easy 
question to answer. The conclusion in chapter eight is that this 
was one area where coercion was highly questionable. 
Example Three 
In 1985 a 'rent-boycott' was launched in soweto and other 
black townships. There were two distinct but related motives, one 
local and the other national. The local reason had to do with the 
increase in rents, a phenomenon that had escalated since township 
management was taken from white administrators and handed over to 
black councillors by the government. The government presented this 
as another instance of reform. Blacks viewed it as an attempt to 
impose ' stooges' on the black communi ty , and let them do the 
government's dirty work. On the whole, the black councillors did 
not get financial backing from the government on the scale 
previously given to the white administrators. As a result, their 
source of revenue was supplemented through increased rent, rates 
and service charges. The boycott was designed to contest this 
increase. The second motive had a broad national thrust, namely to 
disrupt the much-detested community or town council system. This 
was part of a broad political strategy of making the townships 
ungovernable by state functionaries. Diminished revenue would 
either compel the government to spend more on blacks, or cripple 
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the councils. For the government, the black local authorities had 
an important practical and symbolic appeal. In practice, the 
government hoped that they would provide blacks with a false sense 
of political power. Symbolically, they would represent another 
milestone in the reform process. What were the consequences? 
Rent defaulters were evicted and harassed by the police. 
Midnight raids, confiscation of movable property and violent 
evictions became the order of the day (n fact - of the night). New 
occupants of the emptied homes were prevented by the 'comrades'? 
from occupying the homes, and previously evicted people were urged 
to defy the Council and re-enter their homes. There were fights, 
involving various claimants to the homes, and also between the 
community and the police. Invariably, there were deaths as well. 
The Council ran out of funds to the point where it could hardly pay 
its own workers properly. A strike by municipal workers followed. 
On the 20th November 1988, the Appeal Court in Bloemfontein made a 
ruling that prevented the Soweto Council from evicting people, and 
from collecting rents from certain people. There were even reports 
that the Council might be willing to write off the rent arrears and 
stop rent evictions. It is argued later that this is an example 
where coercive and collective action produced beneficial results 
for the oppressed. The strategy was vindicated in 1990 following 
an agreement between a Soweto community delegation, Electricity 
Supply Commission (Escom) and the Johannesburg municipality. 
Consumer Boycotts 
These tactics began in the mid-eighties. Essentially, they 
involved the boycott of white businesses and those of local 
community councillors. They were almost always issue orientated. 
They were linked with specific demands such as the release of 
detained pupils, getting the army out of the townships, and the 
resignation of the community councillors. People were required to 
buy in the local shops. In the early stages, local black dealers 
took advantage of the situation to raise prices. Subsequent 
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boycotts were coordinated in better fashion than earlier ones. 
Enforcement mechanisms could be particularly · brutal. 
Violators were sometimes forced to swallow dangerous detergents 
that they bought in the cities. others had their grocery 
confiscated and thrown allover. Some were also assaulted. At the 
same time, it had some effect, forcing some small businesses to 
close down, and getting business to put pressure on the state for 
reforms. 
From time to time there will be reference to the above 
examples in the course of this study. However, their detailed 
evaluation is only undertaken in chapter eight. 
Common Features 
1. The decision to launch a boycott was taken by a group of 
people. It was seldom, if ever, a one-person decision. Yet, more 
often than not, neither was it a joint decision of all affected 
parties either. People were simply told what was planned and what 
was expected of them. In most cases, the rationale for proposed 
measures was provided. Before the state Of Emerqency in 1985, the 
information was disseminated through the media. S~bsequently, it 
became largely a matter of pamphlets or rumours. The pamphlets 
might be anonymous, or attributed to unidentifiable committees. 
2. All campaigns involved a degree of risk. Nolan (1988:161) 
limpidly captures the implications: 
To participate fully in the struggle you need something 
more than commitment, you need heroic couraqe. There is 
always the risk that you will be detained, interrogated, 
beaten up and tortured. There is also a real danger that 
you might be kil~ed. 
The 1976 uprisings, as was pointed out, involved deaths, detention, 
jail sentences and exile. Rent boycotts involved loss of homes for 
some, humiliation, evictions and arrests for others. School 
boycotts have resulted in loss of learning hours or even permanent 
prohibition from schools. At some point there seems to have been 
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an irretr ievable breakdown in the learning environment. There were 
other invisible social and psychological costs such as an increase 
in pregnancies, a widening of the generation gap, and a loss of 
parental and teacher authority and self-discipline. 
3. There were gains as well. The government capitulated in 
some cases. The rent boycott in Soweto particularly was ultimately 
a success for the residents. In education, students' voices are 
increasingly being taken seriously. Teachers and parents have 
begun to reassess their educational and political role. The 
monolithic political structure of the country shows signs of 
stress. 
4. Benefits applied across the board, to those who were 
passive observers, those who voluntarily took risks and supported 
the campaigns, and to others who may have been coerced into 
participation. On the other hand, direct losses were suffered and 
carried solely by participants and their families. Indeed, a 
utilitarian calculus would cast costs more widely than is done 
here. 
5. Campaigns were not intended to be voluntary or optional. 
The entire group, students or workers, was expected to take part. 
Threats were both explicit and implicit. 
6. Some goals of the campaigns were clear and straight-
forward. Others were murky, ambitious and unrealistic. Example 
one is relatively straightforward. The withdrawal of the Afrikaans 
ruling was the focus. Similarly rent boycotts were designed to 
bring down the rents, and undermine the councils. The second case 
was vague and visionary. The Bantu Education system as a whole is 
not something to be . overthrown in a year or two. It can die 
altogether only with . the demise of the entire apartheid system and, 
even then~ its effects might outlive legal apartheid. This does 
not mean that an interim piecemeal approach is neither possible nor 
desirable. All that is implied is that there is little to be 
gained by tying implausible demands to political resistance 
measures. 
Sometimes goals are muddy for other reasons. The anti-
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apartheid struggle does not have a neat set of goals. For example, 
one cannot simply wish the end of apartheid without also working 
towards some al ternati ve social order. The death of apartheid will 
not simply be followed by an interim vacuum. It must necessarily 
coincide with the beginning of another type of social and political 
system. The only effective anti-apartheid organisation might turn 
out to be one whose policies are not particularly attractive. For 
example, there may be people who support the ANC even though their 
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sympathy lies within the PAC. However, they argue, the latter is 
ineffective, leaving them no option but to join the ANC. 
Similarly, those with more acceptable long term policies might 
simply be incapable of lifting the struggle off the ground. There 
may therefore be confusion about precisely what people are supposed 
to support. Is it the organisation with whose goals they identify, 
or one whose strategy is considered effective? In short, clarity 
is required about precisely what people are supporting. It cannot 
simply be an ill-defined 'struggle'. It may be necessary, 
especially in the early stages, to identify some specific and 
targeted goals. 
7. Cooperation on some of the programmes was essential here. 
The campaigns would have hardly taken off without general mass 
support for the organisations. It is not sufficient that all 
formal and registered members throw their weight behind the groups. 
Contributions and support from 'bystanders' are equally 
essential. 8 The political leadership is often influenced by the 
atti tuc;le of the bystanders. It must be remembered that the 
struggle is waged in the name of 'the people'. 
8. The legitimacy of leadership and authority is problematic. 
Often it is not even elected by the entire formal membership of the 
organisation, but only by some representative delegates. Yet, such 
leadership would see its mandate as covering quite a wide spectrum 
of society, including non-members. In South Africa the problem has 
been comp~icated further by the fact that political organisations 
other than those sympathetic to apartheid were outlawed. The few 
that were not, like the UDF and Azapo, were subject to constant 
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harassment. They could not organise and operate democratically in 
an undemocratic and repressive climate. All in all then, the 
consequences of resistance in the face of oppression are unpleasant 
at the mildest, and perilous at the worst. They involve important 
social and human costs, such as death, detention without trial, 
police harassment, loss of jobs and homes. These are not mere 
theoretical possibilities but highly probable or assured outcomes. 
Consequently, people do not willingly participate in these 
activities. They. would rather let someone else take the risk 
instead. This is understandable. It requires an exceptionally 
high level of selflessness, or life-or-death commitment, to invite 
the type of state reprisals certain to follow any .act of resistance 
to government power. Indeed at times the value of such bravado may 
even be questionable. As Olson (1971:64) notes: 
••• selfless behaviour that has no perceptible effect is 
sometimes not even considered praiseworthy. A man who 
tried to hold back a flood with a pail would probably be 
considered more of a crank than a saint, even by those he 
was trying to help.9 
9. The' cost-benefit' problem results in an ambivalent 
attitude among potential partners in the struggle. People are 
seldom totally averse to or fully enthusiastic about boycotts. 
Often they welcome the benef its but resent the costs. This results 
in a number of reasons why people refrain from supporting a 
struggle. The following list of possible bystanders is purely 
descriptive, and there is no intention to form value-judgments on 
any of their activities. An essential assumption of this study is 
that coercion cannot be justified in terms of the moral character 
of the coercer or the coerced. Nevertheless it is important to 
understand why some people remain bystanders, rather than 
activists. 
a. A person may be a qovernment functionary and 
collaborator. He might feel that under a new 
dispensation he will at best lose the benefits he already 
enjoys, or at worst, even lose his life through 
retribution. There is no doubt that black security 
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policemen, ex-ANC and PAC renegades, Bantustan chiefs and 
a whole host of collaborators are not looking for~ard to 
the new dawn. 
b. The nervous cooperator is willing to share the costs, 
provided there are good grounds for believing that the 
scheme will take off. Such persons do not wish to 
contribute to a lost cause. In practical terms, they are 
willing to participate in the struggle but fear that it 
is poorly organised, ~nd that it is doomed to failure. 
They would not expend energy on a lost cause and have no 
confidence in the leadership's ability to bring about a 
new order. 
c. A tremblinq cooperator dreads the thought of 
participation. Fear is a possible and genuine deterrent. 
The South African government has a well-established 
reputation of brutality, on which the police pride 
themselves. This has resulted for some time in a climate 
of fear, distrust and resignation. This might have 
changed in time but, while it lasted, it was a real and 
genuine consideration. 
d. A reluctant cooperator participates on condition everyone 
else does. She wants neither to exploit nor to be 
exploited (See Arneson:1982:623). 
e. Weak-willed cooperators are people who feel, better the 
devil they know than the one they do not. This attitude 
is prevalent among black professionals who feel that, 
despite apartheid, they have cut a piece for themselves 
from the economy. It might also be found among senior 
members of the community. The latter need not be 
privileged at all. They might just consider life too 
short to be 'wasted' on political adventures. They may 
even·be caught up in the 'look at the rest of Africa' 
syndrome. They fear that they might lose the little for 
which they worked so hard. They display 'a preference 
for smaller, earlier rewards over greater, delayed 
rewards' (Elster:1985:143). Liberation might appear too 
remote to people long under the yoke of oppression. 
f. Free-riders want the benefit without the cost. They take 
others for a ride by simply living off their efforts. 
g. An enthusiastic slave does not want to be bothered with 
the demands of a 'responsible life'. He might also take 
slavery as the natural order of things. He is commonly 
known as an 'uncle Tom'. He is completely deferential 
.a~cepting ~he racial hierarchy as divinely ordained. H~ 
s1mply bel1eves that he needs to be led by whites, that 
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by nature blacks are incapable of self-rule. This is the 
result of years of indoctrination. This attitude, 
prevalent in the older generations is slowly dying, 
perhaps as a result of the unionisation and education of 
many workers. However, it is also common among certain 
conservati ve professionals, especially those who owe 
their appointments to some type of benevolence on the 
part of whites. 
h. A confused cooperator is an avowed capitalist, who would 
like to see justice and the end of apartheid. However, 
because the struggle is about a socialist order, he will 
have none of it. While he will not frustrate the 
struggle, he will not assist it either. 
i. A benevolent struggler insists on her autonomy. She is 
committed to the abolition of apartheid and is also 
involved in proj ects and programmes that demonstrate this 
commi tment. She is sincere, and is prepared to make 
sacrifices, like contributing to the bursary fund, and 
educating underprivileged children. She believes that 
only through education will people be able to enjoy the 
fruits of liberation. She is not opposed to boycotts, 
but would rather work for a post-apartheid society. 
One lesson to be gleaned from the above classification is that 
I blacks I, or the I oppressed I, do not form a homogeneous group. 
They are people with different interests who support different 
organisations and strategies. 
The thrust of this argument - An overview 
It should be evident from the foregoing that this study raises 
a number of difficult questions. To simplify issues, focus will be 
on the obligation to support certain specific forms of protest, 
rather than to support organisations as such. For this reason, 
examples of rent, school and consumer boycotts are examined in some 
detail. The argument here is essentially that it is illegitimate 
to coerce bystanders into supporting a general call to participate 
in the struggle. Such general calls are typically fuzzy and open 
to alternative interpretation. Other specific calls such as 
education boycotts are contestable to put it mildly. For example, 
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what advances the course of liberation: 'liberation before 
education', or 'education for liberation'. Further, the obligation 
to support a liberation struggl~ should not offend against the 
general obligation to be rational and reasonable. This means that 
no person should be under obligation both to attend and boycott 
schools. In short, the focus of this study is on protest actions 
rather than resistance orqanisations. 
Nevertheless, it will be argued that organisations may be 
justified in adopting coercive measures. However, such 
justification is based on the recommended course of action, rather 
than any moral attributes of the organis~tion. The credentials of 
the coercer are not the essential determinants of the legitimacy of 
coercion. After all, even a popular, efficient and elected 
government is not at liberty to coerce people into any and every 
type of a~tion. There is a false assumption that the better an 
organisation, the greater its claim to legitimate coercion. This 
study adopts the line that what matters is the quality of what is 
to be achieved, rather than the structural virtues of the potential 
coercer. 
It will be argued that the principle of fair play is 
applicable only in certain specific cases. This work is divided 
into three main sections. Chapters one through three comprise the 
first section. They are largely concerned with the analysis of key 
concepts: obligation, consent and liberation. The second section, 
chapters four to seven, establishes the basis of non-consensual 
obligations. In section three, the principles of obligation are 
applied in a concrete south African situation. It should be 
emphasised that, in this section, the issue is simply which 
coercive measures are justifiable or not in terms of the principle. 
The study. is not concerned with whether certain strategies are 
'correct' or not. 
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BOTBS 
1. In fact, the issue is what kind of claims does anyone h~ve on 
bystanders in respect to the liberat,ion. struggle., It wl.II be 
noticed as the study progresses that l.n fact the rl.ght to coerce 
may be claimed as much by liberation movements as by ordinary 
citizens. 
2. Emphasis added. 
3. The allegation of racism levelled at Azapo is addressed 
elsewhere (Maphai:1986). 
4. Emphasis added. A presumptive case for liberty does not 
necessarily rule out a legitimate overriding of personal autonomy. 
5. In fact, this fact strengthens some of the arguments in this 
study. To a certain extent, coercion has enabled the liberation 
movements to attain some of their immediate goals, like being 
unbanned. . On the other hand, coercion continues to make it 
difficult to move towards a democratic approach to membership and 
decision-making. 
6. This statement has not gone unchallenged. There were already 
comments from groups and organisations that those who passed the 
National Education Crisis committee (NECC) resolutions were largely 
an urban bourgeoisie, and that their demands were for an academic 
education of the kind that middle class people allover the world 
advocate. Rural and working class people's needs were neither 
represented nor considered. Be that as it may, the description is 
left to stand, and is examined further in chapter eight. 
7. This term gained currency during the township unrest in South 
Africa. It loosely refers to a group of young people, who 
virtually controlled the townships and imposed and enforced a 
number of anti-government political activities. 
8. Reference is made to 'bystanders', as opposed to simply, 
'members'. This term is borrowed from Turner (1973) to describe 
those who are 'neither members nor opponents of the Movement.' The 
concept of what makes people members of a group needs to be spelled 
out clearly. 
9. It is possible that an isolated heroic act might have the 
effect of inspiring others to follow suit. However, the opposite 
might occur. The ruthlessness of state reprisals might subdue 
others for a long time, as the aftermath of 'Rivonia' has 
demonstrated. 
SBC'lIOB on 
obligations. Rights and consent 
chapter one examines possible sources of obligation in 
general. It surveys key concepts like authority, autonomy, 
freedom, rights and obligations. It studies the problem of consent 
in relation to other concepts like authority, duty, rights and 
freedom. The thru~t of the chapter is that obligations and rights 
are prima facie grounds for justifiable employment of coercion. It 
is further argued that, ·even in the absence of rights and 
obligations, coercion may still be legitimately employed. 
Chapter two examines two questions: Who is responsible for 
bringing about liberation? Are the oppressed, qua oppressed, 
obligated to liberate themselves? The conclusion is that although 
the state of being oppressed per se imposes no obligation on the 
oppressed, it might do so contingently. 
Chapter three examines the contention that only voluntary 
consent of the individual is a legitimate source of obligations. 
contemporary proponents of this view include Wolff (1968) and 
Nozick (1972). This approach fails to give an adequate account of 
those situations where consent is impossible to obtain, and yet 
where there appears to be a prima facie case for obligations. 
Various versions of consent theory are examined in chapter three 
with specific reference to the revolutionary organisations. 
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CDPTBR on 
Introduction - obligation, Rights and Freedom 
This chapter deals with the concepts of right and obligation 
and addresses the question: Why would any person insist upon 
consent as a ground of obligation? One way to justify coercion is 
by demonstrating that a bystander has an obligation to support .a 
liberation struggle. However, it will be demonstrated in chapter 
seven that such obligation could at best be prima facie, that 
obligation is neither a necessary, for sufficient condition for 
coercion. The discussion begins with a general analysis of the 
concept of obligation, its implication for personal liberty, and 
how it presupposes the rights of others. 
Obligation, Rights and Duties 
An examination of certain typical features of obligation 
should explain partly why philosophers such as Wolff (1976) insist 
upon consent as the sole basis of obligation. An obligation is a 
moral requirement which, in the absence of exonerating factors, has 
to be discharged, regardless of the inclinations of the person 
under the obligation (Simmons:1979:7). Therefore, it places 
significant demands on the individual. It limits personal liberty 
by giving a third party the right to demand the fulfilment of that 
obligation. There is also a close relationship between rights and 
obligations. In fact, they are two aspects of the same coin. For 
example, to say of someone (x) that she is under an obligation 
implies that somebody else (y) is entitled to a certain, usually 
specific, performance from (x)l. This is an entitlement and not 
simply a vague expectation. (Y) would be entitled to enforce the 
performance of the act. In short, an obligation is a requirement 
that is morally enforceable. This position should not be confused 
with crude positivism, according to which something is not a right 
unless it can actually be enforced. What is maintained here is 
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that an obligation is legitimately enforceable, even if in practice 
this may not be possible. A robber has an obligation not -to steal 
from a paraplegic person even if such a patient may not be in a 
physical position to enforce such an obligation. 
The implication of the foregoing is that rights and 
obligations are conceptually linked to pressure and coercion. The 
link with coercion establishes another essential feature of 
obligation and rights. As was noted earlier, both are freedom 
limiting concepts.- According to Hart (1967:60), to have a right 
amounts to 'having a moral justification for limiting the freedom 
of another person and for determining how he should act'. -- To have 
a right, therefore, is to be entitled to override another person's 
liberty in respect of the alleged right. Similarly, to accept an 
obligation is to surrender one's liberty to act in a specif ic 
sphere covered by that obligation. 2 By acts of consent, a person 
communicates to others his readiness to act in a certain way. He 
creates expectations. He entitles them to expect things of him, to 
rely on him, to plan their lives with him in mind as a friend, a 
colleague, an ally or merely as someone committed to a course of 
action: 
Consents, then, are commitments to other people, or they 
are commitments to principles or parties or political 
institutions that arouse expectations in other people. 
For this reason, obligations ~re often compared to debts: 
they are other people's resources. And all social 
organisations are funded, as it were, through commitments 
their members make to one another 
(Walzer:1970:xi). 
This explains why obligations and rights require justification. 
They are important debts involving some loss of personal freedom, 
and any violation of freedom requires justification. In the light 
of the foregoing it is now possible to give a provisional answer to 
the question posed earlier: Why would any person insist upon 
consent? Obligation is a liberty-limiting -concept. Personal 
liberty is a fundamental requirement for a morally tolerable 
political society. The presumptive case in favour of liberty 
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suggests that the optimisation of individual freedom is the raison 
d'etre of any political society. It is precisely because 
obligations imply some restrictions upon liberty that their sources 
ought to be beyond moral dispute. It seems only fair to conclude 
that only conserit is a legitimate source of obligation. Evidently 
people should not be burdened with obligations and ~he consequent 
loss or limitation of freedom, unless they undertake willingly and 
intentionally such obligations. This concern cuts through the 
social contract theories, central to which is the belief that the 
transition from the state of nature to civil society should follow 
a unanimous decision of the community. 
obligations and Duties - A worthless distinction? 
Of more immediate concern than these questions is the problem 
of how obligations are incurred (Simmons:1979:34). Generally, it 
is believed that duties and obligations are acquired through 
different routes. consent .is the basis of obligation, while duties 
may be acquired by nature. Does the distinction between a duty and 
an obligation serve any useful analytic purpose? 
For the purposes of this argument, it is tempting to dismiss 
this contrast. However, there are quite a number of writers who 
want to draw some kind of contrast. For example, Hobbes 
(Peters:1956:184 - 188) makes a distinction between duties which 
people have just because the law of nature imposes them, and those 
acquired by consent. It is true that sometimes Hobbes refers to 
them as obligations because they derive from the law of nature 
which everyone ought to obey. However, essentially an obligation 
is self-imposed - acquired by an act of consent. It is a kind of 
covenant. This view is ~choed by Simmons (1979:14-15) who regards 
obligations as generated by the performance of a voluntary act3 • 
In contrast, the natural law injunction to 'seek peace' is neither 
an obligation nor a covenant. It is a natural duty. According to 
this account, what separates duties from obligations is their 
source rather than their content. 
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Rawls (1971:333-342) makes an even more energetic distinction 
than Hobbes does, which carries some quite radical implications. 
He maintains that the average citizen has no obligation to obey the 
laws, whereas politicians, civil servants and the American Congress 
have. This is because the latter undertake office. They 
voluntarily acquire public office and in so doing they assume some 
special kind of obligation. However, according to Rawls (1971), it 
does not follow that because people have not consented, then they 
have no good reason to go along with what the government says. 
There may be sound reasons for doing so. They have a duty to keep 
the peace, to make social life proceed harmoniously, and to obey 
the laws most of the time. All these duties are imposed upon them 
derivatively. They do not have the special legal and formal 
obligation which politicians have when they put their hands on the 
Bible, and promise to uphold the constitution. 
There are other differences, not directly linked to sources. 
For example, unlike duties, obligations require performance of a 
specific action. In addition, while obligations are owed to 
specific persons by specific people, duties are owed by all to 
everyone else. If duties correlate with anything, then they 
correlate with rights in rem, that is, rights against everybody 
else. An obligation is generally regarded as an institutional 
arrangement, some outcome of consent and agreement. Yet 
contentions such as these run counter to common intuitions 
especially in respect of the seemingly natural and non-
institutional demands of morality. People often talk of 
obligations to assist others, including strangers. A person might 
rationally feel obliged to give food and assistance to the poor, or 
to save an infant from drowning. In this case, there is no 
previous commitment on the part of the potential donor or life 
saver. What would be the basis of such an obligation? If any 
obligation is involved here, clearly it would not be of a legal 
type. Other examples come to mind: the duty not to harm others, 
or inflict suffering on them, and what Rawls (1971:333) calls the 
natural duty to support and obey a just state, children's 
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obligation to look after their ageing parents, and the obligation 
to tell the truth, to promote human welfare and to act justly and 
fairly. 
The distinction between obligations and duties is partly 
designed to resolve such difficulties. The correlatives of natural 
rights, that is rights not based on any social convention or 
agreement, would then be duties instead of obligations. This then 
makes it possible to retain the consent thesis of obligations 
without denying the validity of certain intuitive or natural 
duties. . The distinction between duties and obligations is 
intended, among other things, to circumvent the problem of consent 
in areas such as these where obligations appear to exist without an 
explicit agreement. One can then argue that whereas obligation 
requires consent, duty does not. In short, duties may be incurred 
by nature. Beran (1987:21) refers to such duties as natural 
obligations because for him duties and obligations are products of 
institutional morality. They result from promise, consent, 
agreement and contracts. In contrast, natural obligations include 
injunctions such as telling the truth, promoting human welfare and 
acting justly. These are demands of natural morality. Natural 
morality gives rise to natural obligations, some of which may be 
institutionalised. The obligation not to harm others is one such 
case: 
If obligation and duty are restricted to commitments and 
roles, then we cannot say that we have an obligation or 
duty to help total strangers simply because without such 
help they would die. (Beran:1987:21). 
However, renaming concepts in this fashion seems only to 
obfuscate issues further. Ultimately, it really does not matter 
what appellation is fixed to these concepts. There are far more 
fundamental distinctions that should be made. What is the moral 
status of such duties in relation to 'obligations proper'? Which 
is morally more significant than the other - duty or obligation? 
The distinction would be fundamental if one could argue, for 
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instance, that ceteris parib~s obligations enjoy moral priority 
over duties, or vice versa. Yet, this cannot be done. Sometimes 
obligations may be overridden by duties as defined. It is 
considerations such as these which might explain Beran's (1987:21) 
conclusion that, in the realm of natural morality the concepts of 
duty and obligation can be used interchangeably. 
These concerns are serious, but apparently do not constitute 
an insurmountable obstacle for consent theorists. The latter might 
argue that values -like truth telling, promotion of human welfare, 
acting justly and fairly are all results of tacit consent. They 
are obligations based upon an implicitly accepted social morality. 
In other words, they are perceived to be obligations because they 
are logical constructs of an already accepted moral system. 
otberwise, people would simply be at liberty to ignore such 
'obligations' if they so desired. They could simply maintain that 
strangers need to fend for themselves, or let a drowning baby die 
a Spartan death. This is a possible though poor way out for 
consent theorists. From the mere fact that people 'feel' an 
obligation towards someone, it does not follow that any such 
obligation exists, any more than a chronic sense of guilt 
necessarily vindicates the rightness of a certain moral system. 
People do feel guilty at times, even when there is no sound reason 
for doing so. 
The purpose of this brief diversion. was to underline why 
someone like Rawls makes the obligation-natural duty distinction. 
For present purposes a similar distinction is not necessary since 
it is not intended to sort out the obligations of governments and 
natural duties of citizens. The issue here is to demonstrate 
whether or not there is an obligation to give aid to covert 
liberation movements. If so, how was this obligation incurred? 
Further, if the 'duty-obligation' distinction can be made, it is 
useful only to the extent that its practical and moral implication 
can be illustrated. Is it an obligation, or simply a natural duty 
in the Rawlsian manner? It follows that one must talk about the 
fierceness of natural duty, to establish whether there is something 
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stronger than the proposition that those who support the struggle 
ought to be praised either for their good nature or their 
benevolence. Is the claim stronger to the effect that they have 
some sort of obligation to join in? According most moral theories 
people have a duty to be charitable, or helpful, or cooperative, 
though not an obligation with respect to anybody in particular, or 
any particular occasion. Here, without prejudice to what a full 
theory of obligation and duties looks like, obligations in the 
stronger sense of- obligatoriness will be discussed. For this 
purpose duty will refer to the weak sense of moral injunctions. On 
the other hand, obligation refers to the strong version which 
involves a correspondingly enforceable dimension. Failure to 
honour a duty results only in moral condemnation. However, those 
under obligation may be coerced into fulfilling that obligation. 
In effect there is a two-stage argument. First, this chapter 
is about obligations in the Rawlsian sense which assigns them to 
certain people. Second, this chapter asks: What is the basis of 
the natural obligation to assist liberation movements? Is it 
strong enough to justify coercive measures? This is a difficult 
problem which involves another important distinction between 
general and specific injunctions. Thus, if there is an obligation 
to support liberation movements, is this obligation general or 
specif ic? Further, do people have an obligation to heed the 
general as well as the specific injunctions of a covert liberation 
movement, or do they only have to heed its general injunction? 
Here is a common illustration. 
A marriage service is a contract into which partners 
voluntarily enter. It involves specific and general commitments. 
Generally, partners undertake to love each other; specifically, 
partners have to refrain from extra-marital relationships. 
Clearly, each is at liberty to interpret the general requirements 
of love implicit in the marriage contract. Yet, none is free to 
interpret specific prohibitions such as adultery and infidelity. 
Similarly, ]01n1ng a liberation movement entails both general 
(liberate yourself, destroy apartheid, or promote the aims of the 
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Freedom Charter) and specific (boycott school and rent, support 
sanctions) injunctions. It involves a measure of liberty4. 
certain activities such as spying on the liberation movements 
obviously " preclude one from claiming to be supportive of the 
liberation effort. Others are not as transparent as that. For 
example, opposing disinvestment campaigns or sending children to a 
private school could be acts of betrayal only if not engaging in 
these activities is a specific condition of supporting the 
struggle, or membership of a resistance organisation. 
It should already be evident why this distinction is 
problematic. Clearly, neither marriage nor a liberation " struggle 
can survive or grow solely on the observation of general 
injunctions. At some point people have to commit or abstain from 
certain specific activities. The general level presents fewer 
problems than the specific. In South Africa, all resistance 
organisations were united in their general condemnation of 
apartheid. Yet, this common basis has not prevented disunity, at 
the mildest, or fratricida.l warfare at worst. It will be contended 
that, if the struggle is to take off, any obligation incurred 
should involve much more than simple general exhortations. 
Otherwise, it remains a (politically) worthless injunction. It 
remains to be seen how this condition is fulfilled where there are 
serious differences of opinion regarding strategies and tactics. 
Besides, fulfilment of the obligation to support the struggle 
requires that a proper criterion should be mapped to determine 
which specific activities may be coerced while others are not. 
Furthermore, which political organisations have this right? Is it 
all of them or only some of them? Clearly, it cannot be all of 
them, given ex hypothesis that the movements have different if not 
contradictory strategies. If flagrant totalitarianism is to be 
averted, it should be possible to distinguish between coercing 
people into fighting apartheid and coercing them into membership of 
a movement which aspires to become the new goyernment. The 
individual's right to political choice, so sacred in liberal 
theory, needs to be addressed. 
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To conclude provisionally, two distinctions are crucial in 
this study: One involves a strong and weaker sense of obligation 
and duty, while the other addresses the general and specific forms 
of injunction. These issues are addressed in greater detail below. 
For now, it is necessary to return to the subject of obligations 
and, more specifically, how obligations are incurred. 
Sources of Rights and obligations 
It is not always difficult to give an account of how 
obligations are incurred. This is particularly the case ·· when the 
attention is on inter-personal transactions. However, ~hen the 
focus is on society as a whole, and especially on political 
obligation, then the issue looks intractable. Political obligation 
refers to a citizen's being strictly bound to obey laws and legal 
directives issued by a government. Similarly, obligations towards 
resistance organisations involve a corresponding right on their 
part to issue political decrees to the oppressed. The crucial 
issue is to give a satisfactory account of the organisation's right 
to support and a citizen's obligation to assist the movement. To 
answer this, it will prove useful to give a broad account of how 
obligations in general are incurred. 
Hart (1967:53-66) gives a number of possible sources of what 
he terms 'special' and 'general' rights. Special rights arise 'out 
of special transactions between individuals' or 'out of special 
relationships in which they stand to each other'. The identity of 
the persons involved is crucial. A special right is a specific 
right owed by person (x) to person (y). Naturally, it may also 
include a group of persons. The crucial point is that it is not 
based on a relationship obtaining among an amorphous mass of 
people. There are several sources of special rights: 
~. pr~misinq ~s a, classical example of the voluntary 
l.ncurrl.ng obll.gatl.ons. Through promises people 
voluntarily become obligated to others in respect of 
objects or services promised. 
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ii. consent, too, creates special rights. Through 
consent person (x), for example, accords to person (y) 
the ri~ht to interfere in matters which (x) would 
otherwise and ordinarily be free to determine for 
himself. (X) voluntarily surrenders rights to (y). This 
is of course the crucial point in the next chapter, and 
a revisit will be necessary. 
111. Mutuality of restrictions. This is only mentioned 
to complete Hart's account. He deals with it in a 
sketchy fashion because it really does not form the focus 
of his paper. Since it is a subject of intensive 
examination in subsequent chapters of this work, it will 
not be pursued further here. Suffice it to point out 
that it refers to what is now known as the principle of 
fair play, according to which people are obligated to 
contribute towards . the costs of maintaining and 
supporting a mutually beneficial scheme. 
According to Hart's (1967:64) analysis, general rights are not 
products of special transactions or relationships. They are not 
restricted to specific, identifiable people, but apply to all 
humans capable of choice. They generate obligations upon all not 
to interfere with one another. They seem to be correlatives of 
what Simmons calls duties. This is an ~mportant point for the rest 
of this work. If there can be natural rights, that is, rights that 
have not resulted from some specific transactions, then similarly 
there could be natural obligations or duties which are not be 
products of consent or agreement. What is the basis of general 
rights? According to Hart (1967:64), 'the assertion of general 
rights directly invokes the principle that all men equally have the 
right to be free'. This is the basis of Hart's conception of 
natural rights. He argues that if there are natural rights, then 
their basis would be the natural right each person has to equal 
freedom. The acknowledgement of natural or general rights would, 
in principle, account for obligations not based upon consent. This 
immediately creates problems for those who regard obligations as 
strictly products of some voluntary and intentional act. There are 
fears that people might suddenly be subjected to Obligations 
invented by those in power. 
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Hart seems strikingly confused on this fundamental issue. He 
claims on the one hand that 'special rights are not only those 
created by the deliberate choice of the party on whom the 
obligation falls ••• ' and again, 'not all obligations to other 
persons are deliberately incurred' (1967: 61). On the other hand he 
concludes 'all special rights ••• arise from previous voluntary 
actions'. This is a very untidy formulation, especially when it is 
considered that this subject has been, and remains, a focus of 
debate. What he pl:obably means may be illustrated as follows. (X) 
voluntarily hurts (y), and (y) sues (x) for damages. Although (x) 
voluntarily hurt (y), he did not deliberately incur a debt to (y). 
It was not part of his intention to incur this debt. 
obligation and ought 
Even where there is no dispute about the existence of 
obligation, there may be other problems. Having an obligation is 
not a sufficient reason for acting in accordance with that 
obligation: 
To say that an individual has an obligation or a duty is 
never, by itself, to offer conclusive reason for his 
acting in a certain way (Simmons:1979:10). 
This is what essentially separates an obligation from what ought to 
be done. To say of a person that 'she ought to do x' is to imply 
that there are conclusive reasons for her doing x (Beran:1987:13). 
This question may be approached from a moral, prudential or 
economic viewpoint. This understanding is crucial for the rest of 
this work since it will be argued that, although people do have 
obligations to support the liberation struggle, this consideration 
alone does not constitute sufficient reason for their doing so, or 
being coerced into supporting the cause. To have an obligation 
does not necessarily imply that one ouqht to discharge it. This is 
the point of Socrates' dialogue with Cephalus about the obligation 
to return a dangerous weapon to its insane, but lawful owner 
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(RepublicI:331). Even though one is under obligation to return 
property to its owner, there m~y be other overriding moral "concerns 
why this should not be done. Such an obligation is simply one of 
the factors to be weighed before taking an autonomous decision. 
Similarly, people may perceive a need to obey political 
organisations even if they are not obligated to do so. 
For instance, on "the basis of the consent theory, the 
disenfranchised in South Africa have no obligation at all to obey 
the government. Yet, this does not imply that they should never 
under any circumstances obey. There may be other overriding moral 
considerations requiring them to obey. They might feel that 
greater loss of life is likely to ensue if the government, at a 
given moment, was flagrantly disobeyed. In the same way, although 
people may question the authority of certain anti-apartheid 
organisations, they may still continue to cooperate and support 
such organisations on other grounds. They might feel that although 
they have not consented formally to such groups, the latter 
nonetheless represent the only hope towards a greater good like 
liberation from oppression. Such a decision is made independently 
of the legitimacy, or otherwise, of a government or anti-apartheid 
organisation. 
In this work, the reader is not provided with a blueprint of 
what to do if required to join the struggle. Nor is this a piece 
of strategic counselling to assist certain liberation movements. 
It establishes only one claim - namely that an obligation to 
participate in the liberation effort exists. Naturally, the nature 
and scope of this obligation needs to be spel t out in greater 
detail. This is done in chapter eight. Of course, there are cases 
where obligations to support the struggle may conflict with or be 
overridden by other obligations or moral considerations. 
Nevertheless, that is not an issue for this study since it raises 
a different question, about the relative force of such political 
obligations. It does not query the existence of the obligation per 
se. The practical implications cannot be discussed in vacuum. For 
example, two people with conflicting convictions regarding the 
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obligation may nonetheless agree 
liberation. Similarly, people might 
an obligation to support the struggle 
this entails in practice. 
on a common strategy of 
share similar perceptions of 
and yet fail to agree on what 
It will be' argued later that although the oppressed have an 
obligation to support the struggle, it may be prudent on 
utilitarian grounds to 'let others off the hook'. If the cost of 
liberation is high, as suggested in the introduction, then it 
follows that sacrificing the entire society for which one ,claims to 
be fighting hardly makes sense. 
Freedom and Authority 
Assuming that the oppressed have both the right and obligation 
to liberate themsel ves, such an obligation would be owed by 
everyone to everyone else. An important question becomes, who has 
the right to enforce this obligation? It seems that without the 
ability to protect rights .and enforce obligations, there would be 
no point in having the rights. This is where authority comes in. 
such authority should ensure that society's rights are protected 
and its obligations fulfilled. For now, the issue is the nature of 
the authority of a liberation movement which may at best have the 
status only of a government 'in exile' or 'in waiting'. 
What typifies authority, especially . political authority? 
There is a distinction between de facto and de jure authority. De 
facto authority refers descriptively to one who exercises power, 
whether legitimately or not. The National Party government in 
South Africa is a de facto government. This is not a morally 
problematic interpretation of the situation. In contrast, de jure 
authority involves 'the right to command, and its correlate, the 
right to be obeyed' (Wolff:1976:4). This authority presupposes 
possession of power, although the converse is not true. For the 
purpose of this chapter, only the normative sense of authority is 
important. Authority implies legitimate use of power, or coercion; 
or a legitimate expectation of obedience. Authority and power are 
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intertwined concepts. Power is simply the ability to compel, while 
authority is 'the right to command, and conversely, the right to be 
obeyed'. Authority presupposes power, although the, use of power is 
not the sole prerogative of authorities. In fact, thieves and 
murderers employ power, but can hardly be said to exercise 
authority. If authority means the right to command, it follows 
that people have an obligation to obey. On the other hand if 
autonomy refers to 'the refusal to be ruled' as Wolff suggests, 
then it is incompa.tible with authority. 
In this study, the relevant conflict is between 'authority and 
liberty' and not between 'authority and autonomy'. Wolff's notion 
of authority is unnecessarily stringent. It makes the demands of 
authority morally definitive and overriding so that decision-making 
and deliberation by the moral agent are ruled out. The weaker 
notion of authority is defended here. It does not refer to the 
unquestionable right to be obeyed. It certainly involves some 
right to obedience and the right to make decisions binding on 
people. To have authority over people is to claim moral competence 
to make decisions which are binding on them. This competence or 
right creates an exclusionary rather than overriding reason for 
action. It does not override or outweigh other considerations - it 
merely discounts ' them in calculating what ought to be done 
(Beran:1987:13). It does not refer to a de facto ruler, but rather 
one whom people have significantly weighty reasons for obeying 
rather than disobeying. The notion of authority involves the 
legitimate employment of coercion in order to enlist submission. 
Normatively speaking, 'authority' and 'legitimate authority' are 
synonymous. 
It is clear that even without Wolff's strong account authority 
is not a light issue. Any account of authority must involve, at 
the minimum, the right to compliance or obedience. Here it is 
contended that (contrary to Wolff) this authority may be challenged 
or defied without any contradiction. This authority does not 
dispense with the need to question or reflect on what that 
authority commands. At the same time, the authority's commands may 
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not be defied simply because they are inconvenient. 'Exclusionary' 
means that there is room for rejecting the demands of authority. 
However, it is understood that such a rejection requires 
justification, which should include something more serious than 
mere inconvenience or minor loss of utility. For example, if (x) 
marries(y), then (x) cannot justify not living with (y) because it 
is inconvenient or boring. However, (x) can justify not living 
with (y) because their careers require them to be in different 
cities. They are free to choose between (a) having an arrangement 
which allows them both to pursue their careers and (b) having an 
arrangement in which one sacrifices his or her career for- the sake 
of living together. 
In this sense authority would still limit freedom, in much the 
same way that, by definition, governments limit freedom. The 
demands of such authority are in no way morally overriding in the 
sense suggested by Wolff. The individuals retain the right to 
question and reflect on the demands of such an authority. In fact 
there are moral limits to exclusionary reason. Even a legitimately 
elected government has no right to demand the performance of 
atrocious and mindlessly ruthless activities from its citizens. 
Even more to the point, it does not have the right to stop its 
citizens from supporting any opposition party. 
Autonomy and the liberation struggle 
It was argued earlier that the fundamental conflict here is 
between authority and liberty, rather than between authority and 
autonomy. still, there may appear to be a problem about the role 
of autonomy in respect to the struggle. How should autonomous 
adults view the struggle and the demands made upon them? It has 
been noted already that this problem takes many shapes, notably in 
the transition from (a) the admission of a general obligation to 
support the struggle to (b) the conclusion that such an obligation 
involves political participation in the sense of supporting a 
specific political organisation or adopting a certain strategy. Do 
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organisations have a right to coerce people into specific 
liberation activities? 
In South Africa, the goals of the different movements were 
seen to be hardly identical, except in their condemnation of 
apartheid. The general concern about possible violation of freedom 
is based on the conception of a person as an autonomous agent. 
This has been an explicit tradition since Kant, and was recently 
restated strongly by Wolff (1976:12-19). By autonomy Wolff means 
that people are 'metaphysically' free and 'responsible for their 
actions'. This responsibility is based upon the fact that a person 
is a rational agent, a creature with the capacity to 'reason about 
choices'. · The influence of both Sartre and Kant is evident in 
Wolff's account of responsibility and autonomy. What does autonomy 
mean? According to Wolff's radical anarchism, the notions of 
autonomy and authority are mutually incompatible (1976:18): 
The defining mark of the state is authority, the right to 
rule. The primary obligation of man is autonomy, the 
refusal to be ruled. 5 
Autonomy can be understood in terms of the nature of a 
person. Biologically normal adults are capable of satisfying 
certain minimal requirements of rationality. They have the ability 
to review their beliefs and goals in the light of reason. 
Autonomous people not only make decisions but ·also act on those 
decisions. They are responsible for what they make of themselves 
and what . they do to others. To be autonomous is not to be 
indifferent to others. People are neither perfectly self-
interested nor completely altruistic (Beran:1987:27). They can and 
do act from a moral viewpoint, by taking the interests and views of 
others into account. They can make binding moral commitments, even 
if such commitments are not ultimately in their self-interest. 
There are moral constraints to choice but ultimately, and this is 
crucial, an autonomous person 'alone is the final judge of those 
constraints' (Wolff:1976:13)6. Such an agent is not subject to 
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the will of others. He gives laws unto himself. 
It is largely on the basis of such accounts of persons as 
autonomous agents that consent is considered essential for the 
generation of obligations. The requirement of consent is neither 
logical nor conceptual, but rather a normative prescription. 
People have a natural right to freedom and autonomy in certain 
areas vis a vis authority. This right is possessed by all people 
qua rational agents and is not a product of some voluntary act. 
People waive this natural right by specifically declaring the 
intention to enter into political society and incur civil 
obligations. In the light of this conception of autonomous 
persons, political bonds must be freely assumed. Obligation, then, 
is based upon the person's will. 
Wolff's account of autonomy has important implications for 
responsibility. It is logically impossible to renounce 
responsibility, even after a person has surrendered autonomy to 
another. After such a renunciation of autonomy, a person remains 
responsible for what is done in her name. Wolff goes further. 
Autonomy is not simply a state of being, something that we are by 
nature. It is a moral goal, a refusal to be ruled. 'The moral 
condition demands that we acknowledge responsibility and achieve 
autonomy wherever and' whenever possible' (Wolff:l976:l7). Again, 
'the autonomous man, insofar as he is autonomous, is not subject to 
the .will of another. He may do what another tells him, but not 
because he has been told to do it'; 'moral autonomy is a 
combination of freedom and responsibility; it is a submission to 
laws which one has made for oneself' (Wolff: 1976: 14 )-. This 
explains why authority and autonomy are mutually exclusive and 
incompatible. 
This account of autonomy is fairly standard. However, it does 
not do the work that Wolff designs for it. Part of the problem is 
that Wolff confuses moral autonomy with freedom or liberty. It is 
true that there is conflict between freedom 7 and authority. 
Wolff's autonomy is something else. It is simply 'the power to 
decide' and this is not the primary concern of this essay. Given 
46 
this account, Wolff's juxtaposition of autonomy and authority is 
bizarre at best. Consider an autonomous bystander deliberating on 
whether to join the struggle or not. He might ask: What do the 
liberation movements offer me? Do they allow me to choose whether 
I support them or not, or do they intimidate me? He might answer 
his own question thus: 'I support a liberation movement, the ANC, 
not because it is legitimate but because what the ANC asks me to do 
coincides with my beliefs about what should be done. I do not do 
it simply because ·I was allowed or commanded by the ANC'. 
This is a perfectly legi timate and mature form of 
deliberation. The individual's right to maximum autonomy is 
assumed throughout this study although it is not clear what is 
sal vaged in so doing. There is no suggestion whatsoever that 
autonomous persons should delegate their power to decide and 
reflect to the liberation movements. still it does not follow that 
" society should act only in conformity to the demands and wishes of 
each and every individual. Consequently, an autonomous individual 
could, as a matter of principle, refuse to obey the laws of an 
elected government. While this decision is morally consistent, it 
does not follow that no action may be taken by the government 
against such a person. In other words, from considerations of 
moral autonomy alone nothing follows about the rights of 
governments or political organisations8 • 
that Carr (1983:473) concludes that: 
It is for this reason 
It is only in moral matters that the agent can be assumed 
to have the insight necessary to make possible an 
effective and adequate review of his actions. 
To conclude, it will be argued that neither Wolff's sense of 
autonomy nor Hart's concept of 'equal freedom' implies the 
bystander's right to refuse to participate in a liberation 
struggle • . What requires further elucidation is whether or not such 
a bystander is at liberty to decide what she will contribute to a 
particular liberation movement. 
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obligations and Liberation 
What then is the relationship between obligations and 
liberation? Put differently, why is participation in liberation a 
moral problem? Part of the problem was mapped out in the 
introduction. Suppose a person is invited to support the 
liberation effort along the lines of the examples outlined in the 
introduction. What response is morally acceptable? Similarly, 
what can political organisations reasonably or justifiably expect 
and demand from such a person? Many of the possible answers may be 
subsumed under two broad responses. Firstly, there is a view that 
people are obligated only to contribute after they have voluntarily 
agreed to perform or refrain from performing certain actions. 
Secondly, and in conflict with the first position, is the belief 
that the consequences of people's action will underscore the 
presence or otherwise of obligations. Here, results rather than 
intention are important. Yet, while these positions have some 
merit, they oversimplify the situation. The issue will be shown to 
be much more involved. 
What seems unmanageable are the following two positions. The 
first involves a non-formal 'member', that is, a member of the 
oppressed, though not a formal or registered member of a liberation 
organisation. For example, not all black people are members of or 
even support the major resistance organisations in South Africa. 
Yet in both concrete and symbolic terms they are members of the 
black community, or more generally, of an oppressed group. This is 
what is meant by 'social group' in this context. Membership of 
such a group is not voluntary and may be resented because of its 
political consequences. Nonetheless, such membership is more than 
simply conceptual. Race classification in South Africa is the 
cornerstone of everything else. It makes a difference between a 
decent and nightmarish life. In fact, as far as the government's 
racial policies are concerned, a person is fundamentally and 
essentially a member of a group, and everything else follows from 
that classification. 
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That there are political implications with respect to 
membership of a group needs no restating. The issue, however, is 
whether there are corresponding moral consequences arising from 
such sheer passive membership. Is being black ultimately not as 
seemingly neutral as being taIlor male? Does sheer membership of 
the oppressed class confer rights and impose obligations? It is 
true that on one reading, mere membership could carry moral 
consequences, because the government has attached moral and legal 
consequences to being black as such. This issue is examined in 
greater detail in chapter three. For now it is sufficient to note 
that members of the oppressed group may be neutral about, 
indifferent to, or completely resigned to the repressive status 
quo. Such people, referred to as bystanders, may become convinced 
that they should not participate in specific political activities. 
Are there any obligations and rights arising from mere membership 
of a group? If so what are those? 
The second position is that of 'political rivals'. These are 
registered members or formal supporters of rival liberation 
organisations. This is another hard case. There is something 
worrying about the suggestion that PAC or Inkatha members have an 
obligation to support or heed ANC directives. It should be noted 
that the distinction between the first and second positions is not 
as great as it might appear. Both the bystander and the political 
rival raise a fundamentally similar moral problem, namely, how do 
people incur obligations towards organisations of which they are 
not members? Both stand to be coerced by an organisation to which 
they do not belong. What is their relationship vis-a-vis anti-
apartheid organisations demanding their support? 
To conclude, this study is not concerned with the obligations 
of registered members of the anti-apartheid organisations, or of 
black collaborators. It is bystanders and rivals who raise 
difficult moral questions. Given that they have not assented to 
membership of such organisations, what claims could these groups 
have on them? Should they lend support to such efforts? If so, 
what precisely can be claimed here? It will be argued that 
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everyone has a general obligation not to harm others. Further, 
injustice and oppression constitute direct harm to the oppressed. 
What needs to be addressed now is whether the oppressed stand to 
one another in any special moral relationship and whether they are 
obliged to liberate themselves. More specifically, are they 
obliged to liberate themselves by participating in, or obeying, the 
strategies of a specific liberation movement? 
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IIOTBS 
1. This is not simply an interesting qualification, as will be 
evident later. The less specific the entitlement, the more 
difficult it is to decide whether or not an obligation has been 
fulfilled. There was an allusion to this earlier in the 
introduction. People may have an obligation to love one another 
but the only clear cases are negative - not to kill without good 
reason. 
2. This limitation applies, strictly speaking, only to freedom to 
act. An autonomous person retains throughout, freedom to make a 
moral judgement, even in the face of authority or obligations in 
conflict with his desires. 
3. Emphasis added. This is a contentious issue in subsequent 
chapters. Part of the investigation undertaken is whether or not 
people may incur obligations without actual or implicit consent. 
4. This excludes certain organisations, like the Broederbond whose 
members swear to obey every command. 
5. Emphases added. 
6. Emphasis added 
7. What comes to mind here a typical liberal notion of negative 
liberty, defined simply as non-interference or doing what one 
desires (Berlin:1969). 
8. On the contrary, from considerations of personal liberty 
something does indeed follow about the limits of a government or 
political organisation's demands on a person. There are at least 
three obvious inferences: (a) If persons are free, then their 
right to choose which parties to support should be respected; (b) 
Where governments or organisations override personal choice, any 
consequent coercive measures need to be defended and justified; 
respect for personal liberty makes it possible to object morally 
against apartheid. It is simply true (though irrelevant) that 
black South Africans have a general standard of living that is 
higher than that which obtains in many other countries where there 
may be democratic governments. The only successful defence of 
apartheid is that it treats blacks like children, that is, it 
denies them their liberty. 
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CDPTBR TWO 
Self-regarding obligations - Are the oppressed obliged to 
liberate themselves? 
A Kantian theory about respect for persons would run as 
follows: You have got an obligation to liberate yourself because 
you have to respect mankind in your own person as well. Moreover, 
if I am to respect myself I have to respect you. In order to 
respect you I have to take your liberty as one of the ends of my 
actions. Wolff (1976) would presumably concur. He says ·· that the 
fundamental obligation of people is to aut.onomy, which he defines 
as a refusal to be ruled. Wolff does not explain why autonomy as 
defined should be regarded as an obligation rather than simply a 
necessary condition for people to be moral (and perhaps political) 
agents. However, perhaps an argument turning autonomy into an 
obligation could be formulated along the following lines: If I do 
not have to be autonomous, then I do not have to be moral. Why? 
I can be held accountable for only what I choose to do. I have an 
obligation to try to be moral because, if I do not, then nobody 
does and the institution of being moral breaks down and we are back 
to the state of nature. 
Clearly, to non-utilitarians, there is something morally 
repugnant about the claim that people are at liberty to choose 
slavery, if they so desire. Are people obligated to liberate 
themselves? Hill (1979:134) defends the view that there could be 
self-regarding obligations, that is, obligations that people owe to 
themsel ves. His Kantian approach maintains that people have a duty 
to avoid being servile, that willingly opting for slavery is 
morally defective. His argument is based on three premises 
(1979:142-144): 
i. All humans have equal basic human rights. The 
sources and status of these rights differ. Not all are 
earned. Some may be renounced and others not. However 
the ·right to equality cannot be legitimately and 
autonomously renounced. Those who attempt such 
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renunciation do so out of ignorance or fear and as such 
not autonomously. 
ii. Servility is a result of lack of understanding of, 
and absence of concern for the right to equality. 
111. 'Morality, as a system of equal fundamental rights 
and duties, is worthy of respect and hence a completely 
moral person would respect it in word and manner as well 
as in deed' (Hill:1979:144). 
These points are pertinent for what Hill calls 'Uncle Toms', 
those blacks with unhealthy deference for whites. Uncle Toms 
refuse liberation, not out of fear, but out of conviction. Fear 
can be a legitimate motive for not taking on a heavily armed 
government. The fearful are not Hill's targets. The point argued 
is not that it is always a duty to insist upon one's rights. If a 
person 'shuffles and bows to keep the Klan from killing his 
children, to save his own skin, or even to buy time when he plans 
the revolution', then, strictly speaking, he is not an Uncle Tom. 
What is insisted upon is that a minimal right to liberty cannot be 
waived. consent to slavery renders such assent worthless. And 
when it is maintained that slaves have an obligation to liberate 
themselves, it is also recognised that sometimes it might be unwise 
to do so • . 
This argument stands or falls largely on the third premise. 
It is one thing to suggest that people should respect the sphere of 
morality, and another to suggest that they have an obligation to 
themselves. What does it mean to say that they owe it to 
themselves to be free? This is not contentious at all and in fact 
there are also other sound arguments against voluntary and 
involuntary slavery (Hare: 1989) . For example, slavery regards 
people as means rather than ends, it maximises pain and 
dehumanises. 
utilitarian. 
However, Hill's argument is 
He essentially argues that the 
expressly non-
source of the 
oppressed's obligation to liberate themselves is 'their right to 
equality' (1979:146). Suppose though, that the oppressed were not 
Uncle Toms. They acknowledge that there are certain basic equal 
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rights, regardless of race and gender. Are they bound to liberate 
themselves? One way in which they may be obligated is on the basis 
that people - all people - have an obligation to fight injustice. 
The argument could take the following form: 
i. I have an obligation to try to create a more just 
society. 
ii. A society in which I am equal under the law is a 
more just soqiety than one in which I am not. 
iii •. Therefore, I have an obligation to try to create a 
society in which all are equal under the law. 
If liberation means the achievement of equality under the law, then 
I have an obligation to liberate myself. It ~s noteworthy that 
this formulation says nothing about what those obligations 
specifically are and how they should be fulfilled. 
oppressed people, and others for that matter, may also have an 
obligation to disobey, or to refrain from cooperating with an 
oppressive system. This need not be taken in a radical sense that 
an oppressive government must be opposed in everything. Although 
a system may be fundamentally unjust, this in itself does not imply 
that every rule emanating from such a government is necessarily 
unjust as well. In repressive states, cooperation with non-
discriminatory traffic or health regulations might be essential, 
even for · the disenfranchised group. It is also feasible to 
maintain that civil disobedience is a right, rather than an 
obligation. It is now a commonplace belief among non-utilitarians 
that people are entitled to maximum freedom, compatible with 
similar freedom for others. To say people ought to, or must pursue 
freedom is a much stronger claim. What would be the basis of such 
an obligation? One could argue that people have a natural duty to 
pursue justice. This is akin to the injunction that I non-
cooperation with evil is as much a moral obligation as cooperation 
with the goodl. Debates regarding I co-operation I with the system 
are endemic in political discourse in South Africa. For example, 
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'non-collaboration' with ruling class institutions is one of 
Azapo's cardinal tenets. _In the past, within the united Democratic 
Front the debate surged occasionally about 'participation in state 
structures', a euphemism for the much-disparaged collaboration. 
What is involved before a person is labelled a collaborator? This 
is not a neat term, and its application produces some difficulties. 
For some it refers to those involved in the implementation of 
apartheid. Such a general injunction leaves very few people out of 
the net. Teachers, uni versi ty personnel , civil servants, the 
business sector, religious ministers and foreign diplomats are all, 
in one way or the other , involved in the implementation of 
apartheid, whether voluntarily or not. Strictly speaking, any 
'law-abiding' citizen in that situation would be collaborating. 
For the sake of clarity, this group is referred to as the non-
voluntary participants. However, it is obvious that this is not 
what is meant by collaboration. 
A likely connotation is that of people who collaborate with 
what is expressly oppressive, and whose explicit mandate is to 
implement apartheid. The situation becomes clearer where such 
collaborators are heavily rewarded by the government. This would 
include Bantustan functionaries, black community councillors and 
security police. The ordinary uniformed 'criminal' police branch 
is much more difficult to classify. For one thing they too 
implement apartheid, especially in the enforcement of laws such as 
Influx Control and the Group Areas Act. They have also been used 
in dubious political roles like disrupting peaceful protests. On 
the other hand they are also doing work ordinarily done by police 
allover the world. 
It is helpful to conceive of a class of 'voluntary 
collaborators', which includes people who, in principle, can avoid 
doing those jobs in a way that an ordinary person cannot avoid 
'collaborating' with the Group Areas Act by living in Soweto. If 
Martin Luther King's non-collaboration exhortation is directed at 
the voluntary participants, it makes sense to maintain that they 
have an obligation not to collaborate. This obligation is based on 
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the amount of suffering their actions inflict upon their fellow 
. citizens. People have a moral right not to be harmed. King's 
injunction is also sound when addressed primarily to the privileged 
members of an oppressive society. No person can be blamed for 
having been born white, any more than being black per se is 
intrinsically good. However, where unjust privilege is attached to 
natural features, this presents moral challenges to those who have 
profited on the basis of race at the expense of others. People who 
voluntarily live off the fruits of oppression, those who strive to 
maintain the system, or fail to oppose it, do indeed seem to have 
an obligation not to collaborate, on King's injunction. 
If this is all that can be said about the obligations to fight 
an evil system, this does not carry the issue far enough. It is 
necessary to revert to the question about ordinary members of the 
oppressed - the reluctant co-operators. What could it mean to say 
they are under an obligation to liberate themselves? The above 
account of 'non-collaboration' deals with a small fraction of 
'sell-outs', and those who are politically privileged, rather than 
with the reluctant co-operators who are the focus of this study. 
In contrast to Hill, Singer (1961:311-318) dismisses any 
theory regarding self-regarding obligations for two main reasons. 
First, it makes little sense to maintain of a person that he is 
bearer of both a right and its correlative obligation. He denies 
that there could ever be self-regarding obligations. Such 
obligations, he contends, involve a self-contradiction. A duty 
against oneself necessarily implies a right against oneself and 
this is plainly nonsense. Second, one of the essential features of 
an obligation is that someone has to release you from it. A person 
under obligation cannot release himself from it. An obligation 
from which a person can readily release himself is no obligation at 
all. People can fail to meet their obligations, they can break 
promises, but they are never in a position to release themselves 
from such obligations. Consequently, he maintains, all talk of 
self-regarding duties is purely metaphorical. It refers to the 
strong determination people have to do something for themselves. 
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It means either that one has a right to something, or that he ought 
to do it in a prudential sense. In the same way, to say ' that the 
oppressed have a duty to liberate themselves is simply to suggest 
that they ought to do so, or that they very strongly ought to do 
so. 
Singer makes a great deal of the claim that an obligation can 
only be one if it is binding, and only if somebody else can release 
you from it. He presents this requirement as if it. were self-
evident. In fact .it is not and is one of the points in dispute. 
It is not logically inconsistent to maintain that obligations 
simply bind - and they might even bind in such a way that nobody 
can actually unbind the obligated. Imagine a judge who has to 
impose a mandatory sentence. This is how he might explain the 
situation to an accused pleading for clemency: 
I am afraid that the mandatory sentence is part of the 
law and I am obliged to find you guilty and sentence you 
to death. There is no way I can release myself from this 
obligation. There is nobody who can release me from this 
obligation. Nobody has the power to change these rules -
they are just rules. Under these rules we have fierce 
obligations and that is all we have got. 
To make freedom an obligation (in the sense that it is enforceable) 
is to suggest that people can be forced to be free. 
Metaphorically, it is . perhaps possible to do so, but literally 
'forcing people to be free' is hardly an intelligible notion. It 
is part of the concept of autonomy that people should be at liberty 
to make their own decisions, even where their judgement is 
considered faulty or ill-advised. When workers in South Africa 
take a pro-sanctions position, it appears to be irrational. 
Indeed, it even looks suicidal that people might opt for measures 
that make life even more intolerable for themselves than had 
hitherto been the case. However, ultimately it is their choice. 
Some people might even choose to be slaves: '[Rousseau] is wrong 
if he means that men cannot place themselves voluntarily in a 
position of servitude and mindless obedience' (Wolff:1976:15). Of 
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course Rousseau did not mean anything of the sort. This too 
remains their choice, however pathetic. 
It is difficult to give a non-metaphorical account of 'the 
obligation of the oppressed to liberate themselves'. For now it 
must be concluded that the obligation to liberate themselves cannot 
be explained simply in terms of what they owe to themselves. 
Possibly such obligations can be incurred by the oppressed if, for 
example, they make such an undertaking to one another. The 
undertaking can be express or implicit. It is a type of social 
agreement, and not an obligation arising from the nature of 
persons. As a result, whether people have such an obligation or 
not is an empirical, rather than a logical issue. The Kantian 
doctrine of obligation (and Hill's version of it) strikes a 
sympathetic note. In fact in chapter eight some arguments are 
provided support the claim that slavery is morally repugnant 
regardless of how content the slave might feel. still, for the 
purposes of this work, this version of self-regarding obligation is 
unhelpful. It simply states that a person would be morally 
enriched if he were to liberate himself. In short it merely 
illustrates that people have a duty (the sense of the term 
suggested here) as opposed to an obligation. The present argument 
requires something stronger. Two features of Obligation pertinent 
to this argument are worth restating - correlative rights and moral 
enforceability. In other words, do obligations to myself involve 
aright on the part of anyone to coerce me into meeting those 
obligations? Kant does not address this question. In effect 
Kant's theory is highly anti-paternalistic. 
Ultimately, as it is argued later, the Obligation people have 
to liberate themselves turns on the obligation all have to refrain 
from harming one another. Every person has a right not to be 
harmed. Although this obligation holds between all peoples, only 
the oppressed are the target group of this study. Jaspers 
(1978:32) captures the essential notion of this overriding 
obligation not to harm: 
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There exists a solidarity among men as human beings that 
makes each co-responsible for every wrong and every 
injustice in the world, especially for crimes c~mmitted 
in his presence or with his knowledge. If I fa11 to do 
whatever I can to prevent them, I too am guilty. If I 
was present at the murder of others without risking my 
life to prevent it, I feel guilty in a way not adequately 
conceivable either legally, politically or morally 
One could therefore argue that injustice, such as apartheid, is 
injurious to the oppressed's right not to be harmed. The 
liberation struggle is thus conceived of as a self-defence 
mechanism requiring collective action of all the oppressed1 • In 
principle, the duty to liberate the oppressed lies squarely on 
everyone's shoulder, although in practice the primary role is 
likely to be played by the oppressed themselves. In short, 
negatively the oppressed have an obligation not to harm one another 
and, positively, they have the obligation to bring about justice. 
The rest of this study is an attempt to sustain this thesis. 
Do the oppressed, qua oppressed, stand in any special 
moral relationship to one another? 
In an obvious sense there are moral obligations which apply to 
people solely as people. They are acquired by mere membership of 
the human race (Hart:1967). These are not targets of this study, 
which is c.oncerned with the obligations and rights people are said 
to acquire simply through inevitable membership of a group within 
the human race. That group may be linguistically, geographically, 
racially, sexually or ethnically determined. In this sense, is 
blackness2 a way of drawing a morally significant line (rights and 
obligations) whereas tallness and obesity are not? This study 
defends the view that it is possible for groups (the oppressed in 
this case) to have obligations towards one another, precisely on 
the basis of their blackness. This position depends on a crucial 
difference between blacks as 'blacks' and blacks as the 
'oppressed'. The argument is based on a teleological approach. 
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However, to begin with, it is necessary to consider certain 
arguments regarding group rights and group obligations. There are 
several possible approaches, the first of which depends on a 
certain conception of society. 
Two concepts of society 
In the first place, reference is made to an atomistic 
conception of society. It portrays individuals as rational, free 
and autonomous. As autonomous creatures they are personally 
responsible for what they do. As a result they should be held 
personally responsible only for what they do, rather than what they 
are. As far as society is concerned there is nothing more to it 
than simply an aggregate, a sum total of individuals. This 
atomistic model of individuals underlies much of the social 
contract theories of Locke (1966) and Hobbes (1968). According to 
this view, society is not a metaphysical entity with an independent 
existence or rights over and above those of individuals comprising 
it. In particular, the state is a voluntary creation of autonomous 
agents following a social contract to opt out of the state of 
nature. The basis of obligations according to this theory is 
consent, a concept addressed in greater detail in the next chapter. 
In contrast to this position, there is a view that people are 
essentially members of a group with obligations and rights attached 
to that group. For convenience, this is referred to as a 
collectivist conception of society. Such thinking is often, though 
not necessarily, the cornerstone of racism and tribalism. In fact 
in South Africa this philosophy will be the last bastion of 
apartheid. Many other things have to go before the National Party 
capitulates on the dogma of the political and moral priority of 
groups. 
At first sight, it seems difficult to conceive how being 
black, Jewish or female per se should engender obligations within 
members of those groups. This does not suggest that such 
obligations cannot, in principle, arise. In fact, it will be 
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argued that obligations could arise from the contingent fact .of 
being black, female or Jewish. However, the basis of such 
obligations would have to be something much more significant than 
sheer natural features like race or gender. In other words, it is 
not necessary to ontologise such features. The same applies to 
being oppressed. For example, no black South African chose to be 
black. Membership of the black group is entirely involuntary. It 
is true that the oppressed might begin to interpret their blackness 
and oppression and give them political · significance. This is 
partly what the black consciousness movement in South Africa is 
about. It attempts to transform blackness into a signif icant , 
political factor. still, this would not alter the fact that the 
blackness as such is something over which the oppressed have no 
control. 
The atomist model rejects any account of the ontological 
priority of groups. If blacks are obligated by nature towards 
other blacks, why not the same with females, short and tall people, 
blonde women and so on? Besides, there are black people who resent 
being seen as blacks. They insist on being simply human and 
nothing else. This seems only fair. For one thing, blackness and 
whiteness are categories of racist institutions. They a~e 
indicati ve of a distorted political culture rather than of the 
nature of persons. They refer to nothing inherent in people's 
nature. To base obligations upon blackness as such is prone to 
engender some irrational reactions. This might restrict the 
people's choices, and their outlook. People, it would appear, are 
individuals and should be treated as such. 
Central to this view (significantly shared by various anti-
apartheid organisations) is the belief that people are equal and 
that characteristics such as colour and gender are as morally 
irrelevant as height and weight. What makes these features morally 
irrelevant? It is because 'people cannot by their own voluntary 
choices determine what skin color, sex, or IQ they shall have, or 
which hereditary caste they shall enter' (Feinberg:l973:l08). 
Differences among people are morally relevant ' ••• only if they are 
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differences for which their possessors can be held responsible'. 
Similarly, natural qualities or properties can be grounds "for dis-
crimination 'only if those persons had a fair opportunity to 
acquire or avoid them' (Feinberg:1973:108). 
Misgivings about using colour and gender as moral criteria of 
social policy emanate from what Patterson (1986:80) calls 'a 
profound reluctance in the Anglo-American moral and legal tradition 
to accept the principle of group rights and claims'. Such concern 
seems understandable. Obsession with 'groups' rather than 
individuals easily leads to irrational and sometimes immoral 
policies like racism. After all, apartheid and nazism are based on 
a certain conception of the nature of groups and the consequent 
rights due to such groups. However, the moral equality of persons 
demands that people be treated as autonomous and responsible 
individuals. 
That there may be moral and political implications for non-
voluntary membership of a group is beyond dispute, and South Africa 
is a case. in point. The issue, however, is whether or not there 
are moral rights and obligations resulting from sheer passive 
membership. As was pointed out in the previous chapter, the 
oppressed may be neutral about, indifferent to, or completely 
resigned to the oppressive status quo. They may also be non-
sectarian in the sense of being politically committed to the cause 
of liberation though not necessarily to particular resistance 
organisations. Such people might choose to exercise political 
options through other channels such as religious or economic 
institutions. 
Alternatively, they might reserve for themselves the right to 
decide which activities they will support in the various politic.al 
organisations without pledging their loyalty to organisations as 
such. They might feel that choosing orga~isations is something for 
the next phase of the liberation effort, or believe that the 
organisations are in fact divisive. Such people are by no means 
unique. On the contrary, they may be representative of a multitude 
of persons. If there are any obligations arising from their mere 
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membership of a group, by virtue of, say, gender or race, what are 
they? It will be argued that although obligations could arise 
within groups, their basis and scope extend beyond the group as 
such. They may be part of moral obligations obtaining between 
people qua people, which happen to apply contingently to a 
particular group in specific historical circumstances. For 
example, from the moral obligations not to harm others or to 
establish and promote just social orders, may follow an obligation 
for the oppressed to cooperate in fulfilling this general 
obligation within their singular situation. In other words certain 
obligations may be confined to a group only in a derivative sense. 
This. issue is developed further below. 
In respect to involuntary membership, it should be noted that 
the position of the oppressed is not significantly different from 
that of ordinary citizens . citizens simply are born into societies 
and states. Membership of states and societies is involuntary. It 
may be true that people may voluntarily choose to live in 
particular states, but tJ'ley are not at liberty to be outside 
states. 3 Similarly, siblings do not choose to belong to the same 
natural family. It is partly on the basis of such considerations 
that the social contract theorists insist that until individuals 
meet in a convention, they have no positive obligations to one 
another. Positive rights and obligations are the result of this 
specific agreement. 
If the foregoing analysis is correct, it follows that 
blackness as such should not be a moral category and therefore no 
obligation should arise from sheer membership of the oppressed 
class. Is the issue as simple and straight-forward as these 
arguments suggest? It would appear not. There are several 
instances which are said to militate against an inflexible 
commitment to individualism and its consequent distrust of the 
group rights notion. 
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A case for group rights and obligations 
There could be non-controversial notions of group rights , 
(Patterson: 1986: 81). For example, states are considered legitimate 
actors in the international arena and are accorded certain rights 
under the united Nations Charter and International Law. Corporate 
groups like firms and trade unions enjoy similar rights. The 
problem is largely with non-corporate organisations like blacks, 
females and Jews. 4_ They are not considered legitimate holders of 
rights and claims. Patterson argues that this creates some tension 
in social policy as, for example, in respect to freedom of 
religion. To grant a group such freedom is to confer some -rights 
upon a non-corporate body since, by definition, religion is a 
shared activity in a community: 
When we say that Jews have the right to practice their 
religion, we recognize the existence of a non-corporate 
group of believers. 
This argument is useful only to the extent -that it demonstrates 
that the notion of group rights is not conceptually absurd. 
However, nothing can be derived from this about the existence or 
otherwise of the obligation of the oppressed to liberate 
themselves. 
There is another version of group rights and responsibility. 
This is l?articularly common in cases of social and political 
injustice. sometimes the guilty group might even take collective 
measures to make amends. This is how, originally, the grounds for 
affirmative action programmes were formulated. Arguments for this 
version might run as follows: The apartheid system has dis-
criminated unfairly against blacks and continues to do so. In this 
way, it violates their rights and does them injustice. On the 
other hand, whites have unfairly profited from' the system that 
historically favours them. Consequently, this situation requires 
appropriate means to restore the balance. By preferring blacks to 
whites, society compensates blacks for past (and present) suffering 
and similarly punishes whites for the gratuitous advantages they 
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have enjoyed in the past. S 
On the face of it, there is something plausible about this 
approach which appears to conform to the demands of natural 
justice. 
advantages. 
Legal systems impose penalties for undue and unfair 
Similarly, civil law prescribes compensation for 
unlawful harm caused. However, the aim in these cases is that only 
the guilty party is penalised and only the harmed person receives 
compensation. Does affirmative action, in this sense, meet these 
requirements? Obviously not. The problem here is that whereas 
affirmative action concerns classes (blacks and whites, males and 
females), its policies have to be applied with respect to 
individuals. The result is that blacks who may now benefit from 
affirmative action policies need not be, and often are not the same 
persons who have suffered in the past. Not all blacks suffered in 
this way. The converse is also true of whites. 6 A question 
raised is whether, for example, a white individual is obligated if 
his group decides it is going to repent by taking affirmative 
action. 
contingent and contextual group obligations: 
A consequentialist account 
Suppose that, during a school boycott, the 'comrades' 
approached their teachers with this ultimatum: Either they all 
join the boycott or they will all be 'necklaced'. The boycott 
supports a demand for the dismissal of a headmaster who had just 
acquired a Mercedes Benz, and therefore betrayed the 'workers' 
struggle'. The comrades insist that such 'bourgeois' tendencies 
could easily subvert the values of 'people's education'. This 
necklace will be applied to all teachers even if only one of them 
fails to support the boycott. It should be noted that the 
ultimatum is flagrantly unreasonable and totally immoral even if 
restricted to those teachers · who fail to meet the students' 
demands. It is even more outrageous if it is extended to those who 
comply. Why should they be held responsible for somebody' s 
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'misbehaviour' . The ultimatum is also irrational because it 
provides no motive for others' observing the boycott once a single 
dissenter has been identified. However, this is not the crux of 
the matter. The issue is that the demand is morally reprehensible, 
regardless of whether it is efficacious or not. Suppose though 
that one teacher decided to resist the pressure and proceed to 
work. Assume further that the sole reason behind his behaviour was 
a personal conviction that, as an autonomous agent, he had the 
right to decide for himself whether or not to join the boycott. He 
was not going to surrender his autonomy to a bunch of immature 
youths. He finds the cause of the boycott particularly abominable. 
He chooses to die with pride rather than live with dishonour. He 
is willing to die and his family shares his idealism even though 
they would rather he lived. How would a consequentialist respond 
to this situation? 
Let us assume that very few if any people would challenge his 
consternation over the ultimatum. In fact dismay is widespread 
both in the community and among the teachers. This much conceded, 
it would appear that, on consequentialist grounds, he nevertheless 
has the responsibility to other people who may not share his vision 
and courage (some would not call this courage but he deserves the 
benefit of the doubt). If other teachers were subsequently 
necklaced the culpability lies primarily with the comrades. There 
should be no doubt about that. On the other hand, it is not 
obvious that the heroic teacher is altogether innocent. It seems 
that he had an obligation to take into account the other members of 
the group, even though he had not entered into any formal treaty 
with them. He has chosen knowingly and voluntarily a path 
extremely injurious to others. The demands he rejected were both 
irrational and immoral. Yet he had an obligation to meet them only 
to save others. He had nothing but his personal pride and honour 
to lose. The others lost their lives as a result of his refusal to 
capitulate. 
This argument proves something. much broader than might appear 
at first glance. It demonstrates that the teacher in question had 
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an obligation not to harm anyone, including his fellow teachers. 
It does not prove that he should not harm the teachers simply 
because they are his fellow teachers. The obligation would have 
remained even if the potential victims were nurses or pupils from 
a foreign country currently visiting his school. At the same time 
this situation illustrates some important features of group 
obligations. Ideally, teachers' professional duties and 
obligations a~e restricted to those outlined in their conditions of 
service and nothing else. They stand in no other moral 
relationship to one another. They cannot dictate to one another 
political and moral views. Contingently, they may have to intrude 
into one another's private domains as is evident from the above 
illustration. This is commonplace. Travellers in an aircraft form 
an involuntary membership and owe one another nothing except what 
is provided in the rules. Thus, for the comfort of fellow 
travellers, they may not smoke in a non-smoking area. These 
conditions are explicit. However during a hijack a new moral 
situation arises which demands their sensitivity to one another's 
interests. One could worsen the situation for himself and for 
others simply by taunting or insulting the hijackers. 7 
The next section examines the context of oppression in South 
Africa, and possible obligations that may arise from this 
contingent situation. 
Contingent obligations of the Oppressed 
The debate whether blackness (or gender) are moral categories 
is endemic in South Africa. The South African situation is an 
obvious example of the moral relevance of both colour and gender. 
The challenge is how to give an account of group solidarity without 
simultaneously embracing such irrational attitudes as 'my country 
right or wrong' or 'my black brother right or wrong'. Black 
consciousness movements exclude whites simply because they are 
white. Affirmative action also giv~s preference to blacks or 
females precisely because they are black or female. critics of 
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black consciousness and the affirmative action programmes argue 
that these positions simply amount to inverse racism and sexism and 
should therefore be condemned as forms of prejudice. 
It will be argued that blackness is a contingently but 
significantly morally relevant category. This is not how things 
should be · ideally. Such moral relevance is an empirical rather 
than a conceptual imperative. Al though blacks are accidentally and 
contingently classified as such, in a racist situation they have to 
deal with one another morally. Similarly, there is essentially 
nothing wrong with ethnicity, but in South Africa this is a 
significantly dangerous notion because it has been used to divide 
and rule the oppressed. In contrast, whereas religious aff iliation 
is not politically significant in South Africa, it is so in 
Northern Ireland. In South Africa a person is first a member of a 
'population group' and everything else follows from that. This is 
the thrust of the population Reqistration Act whose function is to 
classify South Africans according to race and tribe. Indeed many 
argue that only when this.Act is scrapped could one begin to talk 
of the end of apartheid. In short, if there is a government that 
distinguishes people on the basis of colour, then this invariably 
creates groups with potential moral significance. If blackness has 
been made the basis of an important political distinction, then it 
does make a moral and political difference. 
This means that race and colour in South Africa are not merely 
morally neutral. On the contrary, they are highly poiitically and 
morally significant. For that reason, race and colour may be bases 
for political obligations within the oppressed. This is 
underscored by the liberation movements who persistently call for 
the unity of the oppressed or, as the BCM refers to it, black 
solidarity. It is too slick to dismiss such calls as simply 
reverse discrimination as critics tend to do. Both black 
consciousness and affirmative action programmes are under constant 
criticism precisely on these grounds. 
Still, if blackness is the basis of moral and political 
rights, so whites should unite in supporting the status quo. After 
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all, the National Party government is precisely at pains to argue 
that groups are the basic political entities with rights and 
obligations. It has been argued earlier that gender and race per 
se are indeed morally insignificant. However, the present argument 
is that these categories can be contingently significant from a 
moral point of view. Wasserstrom (1980) provides powerful 
objections to the liberal analysis that racial discrimination is 
morally wrong because it is based on the 'irrelevant' criterion of 
skin colour. He . argues that race (or gender), far from being 
irrelevant or tri vial, is in fact often highly socially and 
politically relevant. He goes on to hold that discrimination is 
wrong for a different reason altogether, namely, because it is a 
form of oppression. Race and gender can be morally significant 
criteria of association and admission, especially in areas which 
have important social implications. So, in the programme of 
affirmative action, it would not be blackness per se that is being 
rewarded but rather what blackness has come to signify. Blackness 
and gender are 'reactive,' as opposed to 'technical' 
qualifications, that is, abilities and characteristics 'which 
contribute to job effectiveness by causing or serving as the basis 
of the appropriate reaction in the recipients' 
(Wertheimer: 1983: 100) . For example, a woman may legitimately 
prefer a female to a male gynaecologist. Similarly, when blacks 
and women insist on greater black or female representation, they do 
not glorify race or gender. They simply insist on an end to 
discrimination. 
It is tempting to equate affirmative action with racism 
because, in both cases, colour and nothing else is the deciding 
factor. A moment's reflection, though, should demonstrate that 
this comparison is misleading. While it is true that colour is the 
common factor, the picture al ters when the intentions behind 
affirmative action and racial discrimination are taken into 
account. According to Wertheimer (1983:107), 
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••. it is not always illegitimate to respond to purely 
innate characteristics ••. a preference is less legitimate 
if it is based on hierarchic judgements about social 
groups. A preference for racially segregated bathrooms 
is objectionable, not only because it is irrational, but 
because it is rooted in unjustifiable hierarchic beliefs. 
Preference for sexually segregated bathrooms may also be 
irrational but seems relatively unobjectionable because 
it is not rooted in hierarchic beliefs. s 
Affirmative actioI:J, makes no claim as to the racial or gender 
superior~ty of blacks and women. What is at issue is simply that 
at this stage choosing a black or female would be more helpful than 
choosing a white male (see also Meyerson-Taylor:1984). 
To conclude, mere passive membership of a certain group does 
not necessarily involve obligations although it may. Where 
obligations exist they are not based solely on the _involuntary 
membership of a group. Involuntary membership per se creates 
neither rights nor obligations and is morally irrelevant. What is 
morally relevant is what that membership has come to represent 
within a political culture. Where rights and obligation might 
arise within these groups they will be accounted for by some factor 
other than sheer passive and involuntary membership of a group. 
The rights and obligations themselves are not logical constructs 
from mere membership. They may be products of negotiation, 
convention or moral considerations. For example, if people 
implicitly or explicitly resolve to end their oppression, then they 
might incur obligations to support institutions and organisations 
that bring about that liberation. Even more important, such rights 
and obligations will be backed up by a type of teleological 
justification. They may be required if an important social goal is 
to be achieved. The oppressed might argue that if the liberation 
effort is to be effecti ve people have to support it. The 
obligation is owed by everyone to one another. It has been shown 
that the issue is much more complex than is suggested in this 
argument. 
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Thus it is possible for the oppressed by virtue of being the 
oppressed to have an obligation to one another. However, it is not 
necessary to refer to group rights as though these were some kind 
of unpolluted, ideal, non-contextualised, moral universe. Such an 
attitude can at best look very suspect. To say that blacks can 
have obligations to one another is not to reveal one of the deepest 
moral truths in the universe. It .is simply to express contingently 
and importantly significant facts about a particular oppressive 
(South African) situation. Such measures are what Wasserstrom 
(1989:52) calls instrumentalities, that is, 'permissible and 
appropriate ways by which to alter the social reality in ·· order to 
bring about a greater congruence between it and the relevant social 
ideal' • The professed social ideal in black consciousness, 
affirmative action and the liberation struggle in general is a non-
racial society. Black consciousness and affirmative action should 
not become ongoing or permanent features of society. They are 
merely temporary means designed to bring about an effective and 
fair move from the existing state of affairs to a closer 
approximation of this ideal. In an angelic moral universe such 
measures would be unnecessary (and presumably so would be morality 
as a whole). 
Obligations of solidarity and collective action may obtain 
within the black community. such obligation would be based on the 
contingent fact of blackness and 'being oppressed' as equivalents 
in a singular South African situation. 
Possible sources of obligations obtaining 
within the oppressed communities 
The previous chapter focused on general sources of obligation. 
This section looks at specific sources of obligations which the 
oppressed may owe to one another. There are several: 
i. The oppressed may decide to form liberation movements 
and overthrow a repressive regime. If the resultant 
organisations are products of consensus within the 
oppressed, then they have an obligation to support the 
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groups. Such obligations would be based on consent. 
This is examined in chapter three. 
ii.Liberation may be viewed as a public good requiring 
collective action. Because certain indivisible benefits 
will be available to all and sundry in the event of 
liberation, it sounds only fair that all should carry the 
costs towards the production of such benefits. This is 
the thrust of the principle of fair play discussed in 
chapter four. 
iii. People have a natural obligation not to harm one 
another. Those who fail to support the production of an 
essential benefit could be causing harm to society. More 
relevantly, the oppressed who fail to support the 
liberation struggle may harm other fellow-oppressed~ 
iv. If a liberation organisation is stable, organised, 
fair and displays some structural virtues, then the 
oppressed may be obliged to support it, even if they have 
not elected it or consented to its demands. This is akin 
to what Rawls (1971) calls the 'natural duty of justice'. 
This line of argument will not be pursued. An important 
thrust of this study is that obligations have nothing to 
do with moral virtues of the coercer or coerced. 
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IIOTBS 
1. Naturally the means employed might sometimes push the 
liberation struggle beyond self-defence. For the moment I am 
concerned about the principle of self-defence, not its possible 
abuse. 
2. The . term 'black' covers all people who are politically 
disenfranchised, that is Africans, Coloureds and Indians. 
3. Perhaps this last constraint is purely practical rather than 
logical (See Beran:1987). 
4. It is true that in South Africa the ruling party insists on 
group rights. This is only because black tribes and whites a~e. not 
merely social non-corporate groups; they are legal and pol1t1cal 
entities. 
5. It is difficult to sustain the argument that affirmative action 
is required by natural justice (See Maphai:1989). 
6. These issues have been extensively analysed in the American 
literature, especially Dworkin and Wasserstrom, and also by 
Meyerson-Taylor in South Africa (See bibliography). There are 
plausible utilitarian arguments in favour of affirmative action. 
However, it is a major flaw of many positions to explain 
affirmative action in terms of rights (Maphai:1989). 
7. It should be emphasised that these arguments make sense only 
from a consequentialist viewpoint. A rule-based morality (Kant and 
Rawls) will not readily condemn the teacher's refusal to comply 
with the students' demands. They may argue that the 
consequentialist arguments similarly lead to the condemnation of 
Christ 'whose stubbornness led to the suffering of the Jews', or to 
Nelson Mandela 'whose initial refusal to compromise resulted in 
many years of incarceration and sUffering for himself and his 
family'. Similarly, the Israelis have adopted a non-utilitarian 
attitude to hijackers - 'We don't negotiate with terrorists'. In 
most cases they win, even if they take enormous risks. If they 
loose, they will certainly be responsible for the death of hostages 
but it is not obvious that their stance would similarly be wrong. 
The above non-utilitarian concerns are not idle talk. still, 
this is not the place to discuss the relative merits and demerits 
of consequentialist and deontological ethical theories. The point 
was simply to demonstrate that on utilitarian grounds, individuals 
may have obligations towards others in terms of how they conduct 
themselves. 
8. Meyerson-Taylor (1984) effectively makes the same point when 
she says: 
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There is a relevant difference between excluding somebody 
on grounds of an unalterable characteristic he has which 
society deems no use to it, and excluding somebody on 
grounds of an unalterable characteristic he has which 
society deems contemptible. 
This issue is also discussed extensively by Maphai (1989) 
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COPTER TllRBB 
What is consent? - An analytic-historical Survey 
To recapitulate: This inquiry is concerned with the 
obligations people may have to liberate themselves, and the claims 
covert liberation movements may have on bystanders. Chapter two 
addressed the first part of this concern. This chapter deals with 
possible claims by -liberation movements for support from bystanders 
who may share the broad goal of liberation, without explicit (or 
even implicit) adoption of party manifesto or code of -- conduct. 
Where reference in this chapter is to the 'legitimacy' of the 
resistance organisations, or to 'legitimate authority', this should 
be read as a shorthand for the considerations that entitle covert 
resistance organisations to demand support from bystanders. In 
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other words, under what circumstances, if any, is consent a 
feasible basis of obligation towards resistance organisations? It 
is worth repeating that any such obligation excludes the obligation 
to join a specific organisation, or to promote aims and objectives 
exclusive to that group. The question is then reduced to this: 
When are bystanders obliged to give their support? A possible 
answer, examined in this chapter, runs as follows: If bystanders 
consent to supporting a resistance organisation, then such consent 
creates obligations on their part to render support. 
One way in which the fact of covertness or undergroundness 
raises an interesting moral issue would be if consent were 
considered a particularly important, central and basic way of 
getting people under obligation. This is so because overt, 
publicly-discussed, genuinely voluntary ways . of getting people 
under obligation look like self-evident paradigm cases of incurring 
obligations. Conversely, membership which is clearly covert, 
coerced, insecure, undiscussed or uncertain looks like a prototype 
violation of freedom of association. In other words, consent 
theory presupposes that an organisation which operates openly, 
which can recruit members and discuss its concerns publicly, would 
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have an easier task securing consent for its projects, and would 
thus be a ·genuinely voluntary organisation. If one takes consent 
seriously, the obligation of the members to go along with projects 
to which they have consented would be quite strong. This is in 
contrast to an underground organisation whose members and leaders 
are in constant danger of being attacked or arrested. In short, if 
an organisation is above ground, it can meet more of the 
requirements than if it were underground. Government critics, for 
example, insisted on the unbanning of the resistance organisations 
so that they could be legitimated by the consent of the population. 
Clearly then, secret organisations raise questions about 
obligation which overt organisations do not. Besides the question 
of efficacy there is also a question about their moral grip on 
their membership, or their constituency. This is captured by Van 
Zyl Slabbert's (1987:93) portrayal: 
A party or movement in exile or underground is forced 
into a different style of politics than one which 
facilitates participation in a process of negotiation. 
Exile politics is bound to generate more uncompromising, 
militant, charismatic and less accountable leadership 
than the kind which is bound to the ritual of 
constituency politics. The very fact of being able to 
communicate and discuss ••. must have a different impact on 
the style of leadership than under conditions of 
persecution or violent confrontation. 
There is a sense in which it sounds frightfully unfair to say of a 
secret organisation that its moral claim on its constituency or 
membership is weaker than it would have been if it were not a 
secret organisation, when the secrecy is forced upon it by 
governmental oppression. They may rightly retort that it is not 
their fault that they have to operate secretly, that sometimes they 
have to cut moral corners. An obvious of argument is that covert 
arrangements form a weak basis on which to claim the clear, 
unforced, unfeigned, deep consent of an organisation's potential 
constituency.! 
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This argument requires careful examination. It may be that 
belief in the importance of consent is inflated to the point that 
one could not possibly do any thing, no matter how haFd one tries. 
Some theorists, such as Wolff (1976), set their standards for 
consent so high that no organisation, or even government will meet 
them. Wolff contrasts autonomy (refusal to be ruled) and authority 
(the right to rule). Against this proposition, it will be argued 
that if consent is a route to obligation, then neither is it the 
only one, nor even the most persuasive. It is worth emphasising 
that in any theory of obligation there are likely to be questions 
about covertness that cause trouble for the moral claims of covert 
organisations. The most obvious theory, and one which causes a 
great deal of trouble, is the consent theory. If consenting is all 
that obligation is about, then covertness is naturally a disaster 
because all the criteria for legitimate consent are going to fall 
on their noses. However, the question to be asked is how plausible 
consent is as a route, even where it is overt and public. It would 
help if the answer to this question is preceded by a brief survey 
of the social context of covert organisations. 
The social context of resistance organisations 
South Africa has not had one single overriding liberation 
movement, commanding the overall support and loyalty of the 
oppressed. The African National Congress, the Pan Africanist 
Congress, the United Democratic Front, and the Azanian People's 
Organisation are currently the notable actors, with varying degrees 
of influence and support. The first two were banned in 1961 in 
terms of the Suppression of Communism Act. It was illegal for 
anyone to be a member of these organisations, or to further their 
aims and objectives. They were only unbanned in 1990. Azapo and 
the· UDF have always been legal although since 1987 they could not 
function or pursue the aims for which they were founded. From that 
time, they did not differ substantially in legal status from the 
other organisations. . Two other important groups were the South 
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African Students Organisation and the Black People's Convention. 
Both were instrumental in the major internal rebellion in South 
Africa in 1976 and subsequent events. Both were outlawed in 1977. 
A feature common to all of them is strident opposition to 
racial discrimination, and a commitment to its downfall. This view 
was generally shared among other oppressed people, even though not 
aligned to any of the groups as card-carrying members. Underground 
resistance groups are typically not born out of referenda and 
voting. They issue from the ini tiati ve of a handful of people, who 
increasingly cast their nets further in an effort to boost their 
strength through numbers. They do not, and in practice cannot, 
seek a mandate from everyone before beginning to function. The 
nature of the struggle being waged does not permit this type of 
openness. Organisations simply establish themselves and only 
afterwards begin to campaign for legitimacy. If consent is the 
necessary condition for obligations, then clearly only a handful of 
people, the registered members, have an obligation to place 
themselves at risk. 
Bystanders might be sympathetic to the cause, and be willing 
to support it. Where there is only one major organisation, they 
might find it easy to channel their effort through this 
organisation. However, where there are a number of groups 
competing for support, the issue becomes foggy. Which of the 
groups can legitimately make demands upon people? This becomes 
even more frustrating when people find themselves under pressure 
from all sides, that is, the government and its opponents. As a 
result, it is possible for people to deny obligation to anyone 
group. 
Underground work is inherently undemocratic. Its security and 
success depend precisely on ensuring that strategic plans evade 
police surveillance. Secrecy, at least in some important 
campaigns, is vital. This rules out a democratic consultation 
which would be tantamount to the advance release of war plans. 
Communication networks became sophisticated, and conducted by 
stealth. Pamphlets are distributed at night, while 'Radio Freedom' 
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beaming from foreign countries plays its part. However, such 
pamphlets and bulletins are not designed to get opinions from 
people, or even to provoke debate about the merits of their 
exhortations. They are meant to enlist support, to mobilise people 
into action. 
Consultation is virtually impossible, except within a secret 
cell. The best the leadership can do is to keep an ear to the 
ground and attempt to capture the mood of the people. However, it 
could not enlist consent in any meaningfql way. Yet, at the same 
time, its programmes have to continue, through the participation 
and support of the very people who have not consented. Related to 
the question of secrecy is the identity of the leaders themselves. 
If people are obligated, then they owe obedience to people whom 
they have hardly seen, or are unlikely to see. It is true that 
certain key political figures may be known, but these do not move 
from village to village testing opinion. They are not within 
reach. While the groups functioned legally, the leadership was 
known. However, even here there were severe restrictions on the 
leaders. After the declaration of the state Of Emerqency in 1985, 
it was, until recently, impossible to hold political meetings 
without inviting the police armed with dogs and teargas. 
The anonymity of leadership creates serious obstacles to 
consent. In a situation of confusion and upheaval, people receive 
all types of messages and instructions from unverifiable sources. 
Some emanate from criminal opportunists who collect money for 
alleged political causes. others seem to issue from government 
supporters and are designed not only to cause confusion and 
discredit resistance organisations but also to unravel civilian 
support for the movements. Selous Scouts in Rhodesia were 
particularly adept at masquerading as guerrillas and terrorising 
people. The effect of this has been to discourage people from 
tacit or express consent to political obligation. 
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consent theory and resistance organisations 
The insistence upon consent as a uniquely valid basis of 
obligations stems from a fundamental moral belief - the belief that .. 
autonomous adults ought not to be coerced into actions at variance 
with their desires or convictions without justification. Such 
justification takes various forms but, on the whole, involves 
appeal to another value of equal or more fundamental order. 
Indeed, one can autonomously, and for sound reasons, surrender 
liberty in respect of many areas of life. This in essence is what 
the social contract theory is about. It will be recalled that for 
Hobbes (1968), rational creatures in the state of nature were 
willing to surrender all their rights to an absolute monarch in 
return for security. Similarly, Locke (1966) argues that people 
were willing to give up part of their rights and freedom, in return 
for protection to life and property. There is another 
consideration, namely that 'power corrupts'. Unless authority is 
elected or accountable it is likely to become tyrannical. 
The fundamental tenet of classical liberalism is that consent 
ought to form the basis of a legitimate authority. In other words, 
'no man is obligated to support or comply with any political power 
unless he has personally consented to its authority over him' 
(Simmons:1979:57). This is a 17th century doctrine. Before that 
the Pauline doctrine held that all authority of governments, 
especially kings, derived from God. At its inception, consent 
theory, so taken for granted today, was a major revolution in 
political thought. It finds explicit philosophical formulation 
with Hobbes (1968), Rousseau (1973) and Locke (1966). Variations 
of the theory still enjoy currency among contemporary western 
philosophers like Rawls (1971). In fact it forms the philosophical 
basis of contemporary democracies. 
What does it mean to maintain that a person has consented to 
the authority of a covert resistance organisation? What counts as 
a commitment? How do we recognise such commitments? According to 
Walzer, consent is signified by what people do or say. 
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Tacit consent is portrayed by silence or passivity (1970:xi): 
Consenting acts can signify a variety of commitments: 
our intention to obey this or that rule or set of rules, 
our authorization of some persons or group of persons to 
act on our behalf, our belief in or readiness to stake 
our lives on 'these truths', whatever they are. We can 
signify any or all of these things by saying 'yes', or 
signing our names, or repeating an oath, or joining an 
organisation, or initiating or participating in a social 
practice. 
On this account consent would signify the willingness to 
participate in the struggle when invited, or simply the choice to 
participate. However, this account of consent is not relevant to 
this discussion, which is concerned with bystanders - people not 
affiliated to, nor even intending to ]01n a resistance 
9rganisation. What kind of liberation movement is entitled to 
their cooperation? What if anything legitimates this movement to 
demand their participation and support? There are various theories 
of consent. Each will be outlined broadly and its limitations with 
respect to covert organisations exposed. 
Radical Anarchism 
According to Wolff's (1976:18) radical anarchism, the notions 
of autonomy and authority are mutually incompatible: 
The defining mark of the state is authority, the riqht to 
rule. The primary obligation of man is autonomy, the 
refusal to be ruled ... there can be no resolution of 
the conflict between the autonomy of the individual and 
the putative authority of the state. 2 
Wolff (1976:23) recognises a theoretical solution to the dilemma of 
authority and autonomy: 
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a political community in which every per~0!l votes on 
every issue - governed by a rule o~ unan1m1ty ••• ev7ry member ... wills freely every law . .. he 1S confronted ..• w1th 
laws to which he has consented. 3 
Wolff maintains that the only legitimate exercise of power is in a 
unanimous direct democracy, where each individual is 'the source of 
the laws which govern him' (1976: 22). In this system, every person 
votes on every issue. As Wolff is quick to note, this requires the 
imposition of intolerably restrictive conditions and requires 
consensus on every issue. For example, one person's veto 
invariably undermines the entire decision (Simmons: 1979: 7-1) • Even 
those who voted for a specific measure may ultimately refuse to 
carry it out on the grounds that the authority was then 
illegitimate. After all, only unanimous consent would legitimate 
an authority. One would have expected Wolff to say that it also 
requires perfect harmony in society. In fact he does not go that 
far. He thinks that this is compatible with a society where there 
is 'sharp, even violent opposition' (1976:24). All that is 
required is that citizens should agree unanimously on laws to be 
adopted. It seems then that Wolff thinks that legitimate authority 
is in principle possible, but hopelessly improbable in practice. 
He finds the possible likelihood of its application in communities 
united by an all-absorbing and secular ideal, or where rationally 
self-interested people are convinced that the benefits of 
cooperation outweigh those of conflict. 
There is no need to be detained by long textual analysis of 
Wolff's exposition. 4 Nevertheless, it raises issues crucial for 
this study. Firstly, if consent means literal agreement of each 
and every autonomous adult, then no resistance organisation, or 
worse still, no government can in practice be legitimate. 
Secondly, it would appear that where such consent is practically 
possible, then legitimate authority is loqically impossible. This 
needs to be demonstrated. To begin with, it is worth recalling the 
moral problem that consent theory is designed to solve: 
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whether we can preserve in it the political authority 
that- is essential to the existence of any government, at 
the same time devising some way to insure that its laws 
and policies somehow express the will of the governed 
(Taylor:1983:466) • 
Taylor concludes that these two cannot be reconciled. Actual 
democratic government is impossible: 
Government will rest on the will of the people, but the 
price of that will be abolishment of government itself. 
By introducing the requirement of literal consent of the 
governed, we have thrown people back into the very 
condi tion of anarchy wi th which we began 
(Taylor:1983:461). 
This is really the crux of the matter. When people literally 
rule themselves, then strictly speaking they are not subject to any 
authority at all. What they might need is a type of bureaucracy, 
a civil service to implement their decisions, but not to legislate, 
or to issue commands. This would not be authority as wolff, or 
anyone for that matter, conceives of it. Authority is 
characterised by the right to rule and issue commands, to act on 
behalf of everyone else, whereas the civil service implements the 
commands. Although civil servants ultimately become a powerful 
empire, they are ideally commanded by the political authority and 
are therefore ordinary subjects of the country. Although Wolff 
regards a unanimous direct democracy as a logical possibility, his 
own theory demands that he rejects it. He cannot accept it unless 
he fundamentally alters his concepts of authority and autonomy. 
There are other problems with Wolff's exposition which need 
not be considered here. However, its greatest merit is a reminder 
that if the will of the people is that which authorities claim to 
represent, then it is essential that' they do just that. His 
account implies, though, . that they cannot, logically and 
practically. In short, there is no sUbstitute for the will of the 
people if the concept of consent is to make sense. The choice is 
stark: Either all governments are illegitimate, or consent is 
abandoned as a criterion of legitimacy. 
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What are the implications for underground movements? 
Unanimous direct democracy is a non-starter for these 
organisations. If it applies at all, it would cover only the 
minority of the people - those who have formally joined the groups 
(a class excluded by definition from consideration in this study). 
Yet, even for this group, it is highly improbable that such a 
cumbersome, inefficient and ineffective procedure would be adopted. 
Organisations mobilising in conditions of secrecy and alertness 
might have to restrict the flow of information for security 
reasons. Besides, they need to seize any initiative that presents 
itself, and if they wait till every member has been consulted they 
are likely to be ineffective. 
For a bystander the situation is even less promising. For one 
thing such a person is not even a member of the organisation. The 
question of unanimous vote simply does not apply. If the limited 
class of formal membership is already faced with ponderous logistic 
problems, then the larger class of the oppressed must plainly be 
unmanageable. Furthermore, the class of bystanders is 
heterogeneous and includes potential informers, unmotivated members 
and even honest, but fearful members. It is not a monolithic group 
with an overriding common goal. In short, this type of consent is 
at best a theoretical possibility, and establishing revolutionary 
strategies on theoretical possibilities is hardly politically 
astute. 
To conclude, unanimous direct democracy is, in fact, 
practically and conceptually impossible. That is why in practical 
politics people aim only at an approximation of the democratic 
ideal. It is time to turn to those approximations. An important 
point must be stressed at the outset. For the purposes of this 
chapter there is only one overriding concern: To demonstrate that 
the following instances are not genuine cases of strict consent. 
It should not, however, be inferred from the following analysis 
that these are, therefore, regarded as worthless political 
mechanisms. In a practical sense, they are probably more helpful 
than Wolff's unanimous direct democracy. 
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Democracy by representation 
In practice a sUbstitute for unanimous direct democracy is 
representative authority. There are various types. First there is 
strict agency, which involves a specific mandate to an agent or 
delegates with explicit instructions on how to vote on specific 
issues. In fact, it amounts to voting by proxy. People issuing 
such a mandate would incur an obligation as if they were present at 
the time of the vote. Total agency is seldom encountered. Legal 
political organisations in South Africa such as the united 
Democratic Front and the Azanian Peoples's Organisation have a 
hierarchical and decentralised authority structure. Usually the 
highest policy-making body is the annual general congress. This 
consists of affiliates from regions which may comprise a number of 
branches. Participating bodies usually send delegates to annual 
congresses with a broad mandate. If an issue is particularly 
important and is referred beforehand to the regions, then delegates 
are often instructed on how to vote. This makes it look like an 
example of genuine democracy. In fact it is not. There is a 
fundamental objection to representation by agency. Just as was the 
case with unanimous direct democracy, there is no authority to 
speak of. The said delegate is just that - a delegate. She 
carries no greater authority than that of a messenger. Once more, 
it is evident that strict agency abolishes rather than legitimates 
authority. 
Representative democracy takes forms other than democracy by 
delegation as described. Representatives may be elected for a 
period bya roster of voters. They are virtually armed with broad 
party principles. contact between representatives and voters may 
be slight. For example, in South Africa, parliamentarians report 
back once or twice a year to their constituencies. They can seldom 
be recalled prior to the next election. They may defect to other 
parties and still retain their seats • . In that case, whose will do 
they represent? It is difficult to talk of the will of the people 
if alleged leaders can vote independently, and sometimes take 
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secret decisions. Indeed, it is difficult to understand how 
elections can in a literal sense be said to represent the will of 
the people. 
For underground organisations the prospect can only be worse. 
Delegates might simply disappear or be arrested, detained, or 
killed. In the case of resistance organisations still operating 
publicly, it is easy for the government to identify and eliminate 
their leadership. The leadership is hardly stable. Often, it 
operates from hiding, making representation even of the formal 
membership a farce. The broader society of the oppressed is 
unrepresented altogether. If it is difficult to maintain dialogue 
and consultation within the organisations, it will be doubly so 
where bystanders are concerned. On these accounts, representative 
democracy is not a particularly useful model for underground 
organisations. 
Majoritarian Democracy 
This is a widely advocated type of democratic practice, and is 
generally considered unproblematic. It hardly occurs to some that 
this form of authority too requires some form of justification. 
Its rationale runs as follows: Unanimous decision-making remains 
an ideal, but one on which only a chronic visionary would insist. 
Consequently, in the absence of unanimity, majority rule is the 
next best option. It is based on the belief that it is better to 
satisfy many rather than fewer people. This system is supposed to 
work even better in a society within which sub-groups have open 
membership. This will ensure that certain persons are not 
permanently disadvantaged or advantaged. In short majority rule 
saves society from two burdens: That of being deadlocked because 
no consensus was reached, and that of having to use violence to 
settle disagr,eements. Furthermore, the majority is assumed to 
advance the common welfare where minorities would not. It is a 
fair system, according to its advocates. An individual who is in 
a minority on a certain issue has the opportunity to be in the 
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majority on another. There are chances to be both a winner and a 
loser. 
These prudential and moral arguments are compelling and 
possibly conclusive. However, they are irrelevant to the point at 
issue. They do not establish the legitimacy of authority on the 
basis of consent. Majority and representative systems do not, 
strictly speaking, constitute government by the consent of the 
ruled. People's affairs might similarly flourish under a 
b~nevolent dictator (Wolff: 1976:40). More importantly, they do 
not distinguish majority rule from any other type of dictatorship. 
For a victim of robbery or domination, ul timately it -does not 
matter whether the robbery or domination was inflicted by a group 
of people, or by only one person. Insofar as majority rule 
involves suppression of freedom for some, it cannot be an instance 
of consent. Majority rule may be fair to the extent that people 
unanimously accepted in advance that this would be a process of 
settling disputes. Any person who enters a soccer pitch does so on 
the understanding that the rules apply, regardless of his personal 
attitude towards them. However, if it is merely the fact that a 
person promised to abide by majority decisions that legitimates 
this type of authority, then a simple undertaking to obey a tyrant 
would similarly legitimate such a dictatorship. - To appeal to a 
promise is to suggest that majority rule par sa has no inherent 
virtue. 
At best, the alleged advantages of majority rule provide 
reasons why autonomous people might support an illegitimate 
government. They do not transform such a government into a 
legitimate type. Similarly, people from neighbouring states in 
southern Africa might decide to work in South Africa. They might 
even think that this government must be supported in fighting Aids 
or protecting wild life. It may even be that the South African 
government had done an admirable job in these fields. To 
acknowledge this has absolutely nothing to do with the legitimacy 
of the South African government, at least not in terms of the 
consent theory. In short, there is nothing inherently good or evil 
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about majority rule, nor is it in any wayan instance of literal 
consent to authority. 
On the basis of this system, bystanders have absolutely no 
obligations to the liberation groupings. It is worth repeating 
that the discussion of the various types of democracies was 
intended to highlight only one factor - that these are not 
instances of consent. Nothing more was intended. Specifically, no 
value judgement about the various types of government is intended. 
To say a government is illegitimate (on the basis of consent 
theory, or any other theory for that matter) is not to suggest that 
it must be disobeyed or otherwise. 5 This point has already been 
established in chapter two. Obligations per se are not morally 
overriding, nor are they the sole motive for moral action. 
Sometimes in the light of ather important moral values people may 
have to disregard their obligations. In the next section, the 
notion of tacit consent is examined. Typically, consent theorists 
seldom, if ever, insist upon literal consent for obligation. 
Reference is often to the.tacit type. 
consent by Implication 
The problem of consent ultimately involves a satisfactory and 
credible account of what consent is, or what actions or inactions 
must count as consent. The demands of literal consent are too 
stringent to meet in an average political society. Various signs 
of consent have been suggested, and it is the .purpose of this 
section to examine these. For example, Plamenatz (1967) and 
Raphael (1970) regard participation in democratic elections as a 
sign of consent. In general, the demands of consent in political 
theory are often expressed in terms of taci t consent. Taci t 
consent is not a second rate consent. It is consent and 
consequently considered as no less binding than express consent. 
What separates it from explicit consent is the manner in which it 
is expressed. Tacit consent is normally in~erred because it is 
generally expressed by silence or inaction. Context is crucial 
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here; it is the setting rather than the action itself that defines 
implicit consent. 
According to Tussman, consent is exemplified in accepting 
membership of a state. Most recently, Rawls (1971) and Hart (1967) 
treat the acceptance of state benefits arising from law abidingness 
as an instance of consent. Pateman (1979) regards participatory, 
rather than representative democracy, as a sign of consent. In 
practice this includes activities such as travelling on roads, or 
owning a house. This in effect implies that a person might consent 
unintentionally and unawares. It was Locke who dealt 
systematically with the notion of tacit consent (1966:119). 
According to him, tacit consent is presumed in the person who owns 
possessions in a country and enjoys the benefits of government. 
This stretches the concept too wide, and makes it liable to abuse. 
His definition of consent is so ~ide as to make consent virtually 
automatic, even through sheer residence under a tyrannical rule 
(Simmons: 1979: 85). The point of this comment is not that enjoyment 
of such benefits does not raise important questions regarding the 
possible obligation of the beneficiary. It might well do, and this 
issue is treated fully in subsequent chapters. All that is claimed 
at this stage is that these alleged benefits and activities cannot 
reasonably be lumped together under consent without trivialising 
this fundamental moral notion. Binding consent should not, and 
cannot be given unintentionally. 
What · would constitute tacit consent to the authority of 
resistance organisations? This is likely to happen where people 
collaborate with one of the movements by offering them moral or 
material assistance. By definition, such people would not be 
members of the organisation since a member's consent would be 
express rather than tacit. An important assumption here is that no 
threats or duress are involved. The acts signifying consent must 
be 'freely chosen, freely carried through, not imposed on me by 
anyone else or coerced or compelled in their course' 
(Walzer: 1970 : xiv). A person behaving in this fashion over time 
creates expectations. Rights and obligations may result from 
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expectations, from habit or recurrent behaviour. For example, 
workers who have enjoyed a cer'tain privilege over an extended 
period, like free lunches, cannot be blamed for going on strike as 
soon as the privilege is withdrawn. They may have known throughout 
that it was a privilege, but the longer such a privilege persists, 
the easier it ' translates into a right. 
There are other possible signs of taci t consent to the 
authority of one of the movements, namely, the enjoyment of 
benefits arising from their risky actions. If rents are reduced as 
a result of a prolonged boycott, then everyone enjoys such 
benefits. Bystanders do not renounce these privileges. Similarly, 
if the UDF, or Azapo, negotiates a deal for black students to study 
overseas,even non-members apply for such benefits. Is this a type 
of consent? Clearly not. These people may enjoy these benefits 
without knowing who was responsible for the reduction in rents, or 
the establishment of scholarships. Even if they knew, nothing 
follows about their consent. People cannot be said to have 
consented merely because they enjoyed a benefit imposed on them. 
It must be noted that this is not a denial of possible obligations 
arising from enjoyment of those benefits. This is an important 
issue that occupies a central place in this work. For now, it is 
merely argued that none of those actions symbolise tacit consent. 
In the light of the foregoing comments, it is difficult to see 
what meaningful role consent plays in the relationship between 
oppressed persons and the resistance organisations. For one thing, 
the only people who have consented are 'the formal members of such 
groups, who invariably turn out to be a minority. They joined the 
party, enjoy certain membership benefits and stand to enjoy 
privileged positions if the party wins. They take part in the 
elections of office bearers. 
given a mandate to the party. 
They can ordinarily be said to have 
They incur obligations through their 
pledges of support and activism. They may occasionally disagree 
with, or even disobey the leadership but this should have no 
bearing on the organisation's fundamental claim to their obedience. 
Insistence upon consent tends to immobilise these groups. 
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Frightened and cowed people do not simply consent to resistance 
activity likely to provoke severe state reprisals against 
themselves and their families. 
The role of consent has been examined in the case of 
governments and resistance organisations. The point was to 
illustrate that, if it works at all, it has to do so in the case of 
government. It has been shown to be problematic there as well. 
The aim is not to discard the role of consent - that would be 
fatal. Rather, it-must be pointed out that consent alone does not 
seem adequately to account for possible sources of obligation. 
On the basis of consent theory as set out above, it must be 
concluded that neither the existence nor the actions of resistance 
organisations in South Africa have been legitimated by the consent 
of the oppressed bystanders. Worse still, it seems that, given the 
repressive climate under which these organisations operate, it is 
unlikely that they will ever be legitimated, except by a different 
criterion altogether. What are the implications of this situation 
for the liberation struggle as a whole? 
consent - An obstructive Concept? 
As was demonstrated, in the absence of consent, bystanders 
would be under no obligation whatsoever to support the 
organisations. At best they may render support as a matter of 
benevolence. In practice, this implies a severe inhibition of the 
liberation struggle. A consent theorist might simply retort 'so 
much the worse for liberation if the price for liberation is the 
surrender of my already limited personal liberty to decide and 
choose'. While consent theory of obligation is internally 
consistent, as a cure it looks worse than the disease. Dictators 
must find such a moral theory not only convenient but also 
reassuring because it enables them to muzzle all opinion, make 
canvassing impossible among resistance groups, and still insist 
that such groups lack legitimacy because the silent majority has 
not consented. For a long time this was the attitude of the 
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National Party government. It questioned the base support of the 
anti-apartheid movements, while not even letting them ·organise 
openly. It seems then that insistence upon consent without 
qualification is dangerously counter-productive. Ironically, 
it is the repressive regimes who normally insist upon consent and 
democracy when dealing with resistance movements. They adopt what 
Ullman-Margalit (1977:44) calls 'norms for keeping people in a 
prisoner's dilemma situation,.6 At the same time, it is precisely 
those governments ·which will not hesitate to act in a repressive 
fashion against the people. They will not take heed of the wishes 
of the people. Those who insist upon strict consent will have to 
furnish the resistance movements with an open forum, and let them 
organise openly. In that case the demand for democratic practices 
will be justified. In an oppressive environment, unqualified calls 
for a democratic practice could easily become an invitation to 
ineffectiveness. In what way can insistence upon consent serve as 
a norm designed to keep the oppressed in the 'prisoner's dilemma' 
situation? 
When the South African government blames 'intimidators', it 
seems to be on fairly high moral ground. After all, democracy, 
consent and freedom .are the moral and political catch-words. 
However, as far as the government is concerned, these values are 
designed only to keep blacks in the prisoner's dilemma situation. 
Such norms are intended to keep the oppressed 'in a state of 
affairs which, while disadvantageous to them ... is considered 
beneficial to [the National Party supporters] as a whole' (Ullman-
Margalit:1977:44). The government knows better than anyone that in 
the absence of some coercive means, the oppressed might be 
politically immobilised and harbour no urge to join the struggle. 
Political organisation becomes impossible. This is the function of 
the provisions of the Internal security Act and the various states 
ot Emergency. Officially they are designed to ensure 'law and 
order', and the prevention of 'black on black' violence. However, 
their real motive is to prevent anything like organised political 
power on the part of blacks. 
92 
consent theory also engenders a paradox, not dissimilar to 
that in the Hobbesian state of nature. It puts a major premium 
upon individual liberty. That is why it insists upon personal 
agreement before obligation is incurred. In the situation of 
oppression, people enjoy little or no liberty at all. Ironically, 
the insistence upon consent can, as it has been illustrated, serve 
only to stifle the struggle for political freedom. And yet the 
absence of consent might subject people to the whims of underground 
actors. In the social contract tradition, this paradox of freedom 
necessitated the formation of political society where part (Locke) 
or all (Hobbes) personal freedom was surrendered to the · state in 
return for political benefits. Similarly, it seems, resistance 
movements may be formed after people have surrendered part of their 
freedom. They would therefore have to pursue freedom and security 
for all in return for this trust. 
Of course the parallels are not as neat as this account 
suggests. A consent theorist might accept this and argue that, 
provided, as in the case qf a social contract, people unanimously 
take part in the formation of these movements, then some obligation 
would result. However, none of these groupings is a result of mass 
democratic and unanimous decision. They almost always issue from 
the initiative taken by a few committed people. In fact this 
procedure applies to open and legal political parties as well. The 
American constitution is a good example: Jefferson and his party 
drafted this in a less democratic fashion than the Freedom Charter 
was drafted. Thus this problem of consent is not peculiar to 
covert liberation movements only, and yet it is they, rather than 
overt movements, that are frequently called upon to demonstrate 
their legitimacy through consent. The suggestion that ordinary 
bystanders among the oppressed have no obligation at all towards 
the liberation struggle runs counter to ordinary intuitions about 
fairness. It seems inherently unjust to expect only a handful of 
people to give up their lives, and subject their families to untold 
miseries, in order to bring about a mutually desired benefit. In 
fact there are limits to the explanatory force of consent theory. 
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According to Walzer (1970:9): 
contract theory clearly applies best to those sects, 
congregations, parties, movements, unions, and clubs in 
which choices are made explicit, acted out in public 
fashion. 
In short, consent theory in the sense of autonomous agents 
making informed decisions and obeying only themselves is an 
illusion both in principle and in practic'e. Its approximation is 
possible and workable. The cost for such effectiveness is partial 
sacrifice of consent, and the willingness to live with certain 
personally-undesirable decisions if this is what it takes to 
protect greater values in society. This much conceded, it means 
that the mere absence o,f consent does not rule out the need for 
compliance on the part of individuals, whether such compliance is 
with a government or a liberation movement's decrees. Yet, this 
does not mean that any claims can be made upon the individual. 
Whatever the claims, they require justification. 
While genuine consent is ruled out altogether the values it 
tries to sustain should be protected. Organisations need to earn 
their claims. No government or group of resisters must be given a 
free hand to decide privately and autocratically on fundamental 
issues which affect society . Ultimately, the people's interest and 
wishes should be the focus of any political programme, whether 
initiated ' by the government or by underground organisations. If 
consent were really the route to legitimacy then one could see why 
covertness is such a problem. Consent is 
overtness, publicness, knowledge and autonomy. 
about openness, 
If this is what 
obligation is all about, then covertness is a disaster. It has 
been argued that consent is not the only relevant consideration. 
Although this takes the weight off the problem of covertness, it 
does not eliminate all problems of covertness. 
To conclude, consent is not a usable general condition of 
either obligation or coercion. This applies in the case of 
legitimate governments as well as liberation movements. This is 
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because, however democratic a political system might be, the 
constitution which defines democratic procedures is itself not 
dependent for its authority on the actual consent of everyone 
living under it. still, there are certain values which the 
theories of consent sustain which need to be taken seriously, for 
example, informedness of decision, -autonomy and accountability. 
This requires the utilisation of an ideal related to consent, which 
can be outlined as follows: Even if people cannot choose their 
basic system of government and are for the most part born into it, 
the system is legitimate only if its structure is one which they 
should accept if they are reasonable and suitably respectful of one 
another's interests. 
This ' includes those aspects of the system which determine how 
ineliminable disagreements are to be resolved (e.g. by majority 
vote) and when and under what procedures coercion is to be 
employed. This is as close to freedom under involuntary 
institutions as one can get, and it is supposed to be expressed in 
the hypothetical, as opposed to actual, contract tradition. For 
now, it must be pointed out that if established states have the 
right to coerce those who do not accept their policies or try to 
circumvent them or break the law, it must be on some grounds such 
as this: Whether the people actually agreed to the basic system or 
not, it would have been unreasonable for them to refuse agreement 
if they had been in a position to do so. 
What remains to be seen is whether a parallel criterion can be 
developed for non-governmental organisations (including liberation 
organisations) . For now, it should be emphasised that consent 
cannot be such an exclusive, central and unique basis of 
obligation. People wanting to argue about the dubiousness of the 
moral claims of a covert organisation would be well advised to rest 
the case on more than the fact that few had consented to its 
authority. This study will examine alternative bases of the 
legitimacy of resistance organisations. Such legitimacy would 
naturally involve obligations of cooperation on the part of the 
oppressed. Before this is addressed something needs to be said 
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about the" obligations of the oppressed to liberate themselves. 
This is the subject of the next chapter. 
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BOTBS 
1. The term 'constituency' is misleading because it suggests that 
those whom liberation movements have identified as potential 
supporters have links with the movement. Strictly, a member of 
parliament's constituency consists of those who support his party, 
not everyone in the neighbourhood. However, in this context the 
term is not designed to cover a wider area than potential support. 
2. Emphases added. 
3. Emphasis added-. 
4. For one thing, the juxtaposition of 'autonomy' and 'authority' 
is particularly untidy. Autonomy refers to 'the power to -decide', 
rather than simply freedom. The concern here is not with the moral 
right to reflect critically on the demands of political authority. 
What is at issue is whether demands may be legitimately placed by 
liberation organisations without infringing upon people's freedom. 
5. It does not follow that a government is illegitimate because 
consent theory breaks down. All that this argument is designed to 
demonstrate is that consent theory is unable to legitimate a system 
of government. 





The focus of chapter four is the principle of fairness. 
Essentially, it is argued that the oppressed have an obligation to 
participate in, and support the liberation effort. By withholding 
their support, they harm the community by depriving it of an 
essential benefit.. Besides, the success of the struggle carries 
potential benefits for everyone. possible objections against this 
model are introduced at the end of the chapter. The rest of the 
work is largely a response to those criticisms. 
Chapter five examines coordination problems facing 
utilitarians. The choice between fairness and utilitarianism is 
studied closely. The chapter also constitutes a study of the 
generalisation argument. 
The problem of harm and benefit is treated in chapter six. 
Although harm and benefit are intertwined, it does not follow that 
harm and non-benefit are identical. Only non-benefits of certain 
essential goods could possibly constitute harm. The point is also 
made that although harm is a violation of interest, not every type 
of harm justifies interferences with liberty. 
Chapter seven spells out in greater detail, the condition, 
limits and · nature of coercion sanctioned by the principle of 
fairness. 
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Liberation: Whose responsibility is it then? 
Three theses have been established so far: 
i. A common experience of oppression among people as 
such does not necessarily create a special moral bond 
between them although contingently it may do so. Solely 
in virtue of their shared experience of oppression, the 
oppressed may owe one another natural duties though not 
necessarily obligations to cooperate in their liberation . 
.. 
11. If the oppressed have a natural duty to liberate 
themselves, this in no way implies a corresponding 
natural obligation to do so. If such obligations exist, 
they · may have arisen from commitments made to one 
another, often implicitly. 
111. While consent is an important source of obligations 
(some would say the only one), it cannot be the basis of 
possible obligations where people may have to support an 
underground liberation struggle or to collaborate with 
the liberation movements. 
Nothing declared so far leads to the inference that there are 
no obligations obtaining within the oppressed group. Nor is it 
suggested that the quest for liberty is unimportant. On the 
contrary, a fundamental premise of this study is that liberty in 
society is a value to be cherished by all. Therefore each one has 
an obligation to maximise liberty and minimise oppression. Every 
person has a duty to participate in the liberation effort for his 
sake and that of others. A society in which slavery is the norm, 
even with the consent of the enslaved, is morally impoverished. 
The assumption here is that liberty is the minimum a person can 
expect from society. This is in keeping with the postulate of the 
contract theorists, especially Locke (1966) and Hobbes (1968). 
They insisted that in a state of nature, people would give up 
liberty only in return for greater liberty and security. Hobbes 
may have curtailed indi vidual liberty, but it was because he 
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considered security an important public good. 
insisted on the surrender of minimum liberty. 
Similarly, Locke 
If liberty is so fundamental a value, whose responsibility 
then is it to ensure that people are liberated? Ordinarily, this 
is the function - indeed, the raison d' etre - of governments. This 
is the central theme in Locke and Rousseau (though not Hobbes): 
governments are designed to maximise liberty by limiting some 
liberty. In principle, all things remaining the same, a government 
which fails to g-uarantee liberty for everyone must lose any 
semblance of moral legitimacy. However, this study assumes a harsh 
situation in which the majority is disenfranchised -and the 
government is elected by the minority. The government itself is a 
threat to, rather than a guarantor of liberty to the bulk of its 
populace. Consequently, in practice the responsibility, "if any, to 
regain liberty must lie elsewhere. There are at least two possible 
loci of -such an obligation. If . one takes an altruistic 
perspective, and also believes that freedom is indivisible, then, 
by implication, the quest for liberty is everyone's obligation to 
one another. 
In contrast if self-interest is the moti ve then the most 
obvious agency for liberation seems to be those who will benefit as 
a result of emancipation. This distinction is important and this 
study examines the responsibility emanating from considerations of 
self-interest. It raises the question whether the oppressed may 
enforce this obligation against one another. A possible answer is 
that, on the basis of their collective group interest, they may be 
entitled to do so. This is the contention under examination. 
Similarly one may ask: Given t -hat everyone has an obligation to 
bring about a free society, could all South Africans collectively 
and coercively enforce this obligation upon one another? As far as 
the privileged in South Africa are concerned, one would not appeal 
to self-interest, since they perceive their self-interest precisely 
in the perpetuation of discriminatory inequality. Mutual coercion 
within the oppressed may be explained in terms of the principle of 
fair play, whereas coercion against the privileged could be 
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justified by appeal to the principle of self-defence. Therefore, 
although the obligation of the privileged to bring about justice in 
South Africa is acknowledged, it is not the focus of this study. 
Rather, it is asked whether, out of self-interest, the oppressed 
could coercively involve one another in the liberation struggle. 
The principle of Fair Play 
At its barest·, the principle of fair play maintains that, in 
a situation where benefits are attained as a result of some effort, 
those who enjoy them should contribute to their attainment. This 
is how Hart (1967:61) expresses this principle: 
When a number of persons conduct any joint enterprise 
according to rules and thus restrict their liberty, those 
who have submitted to these restrictions have a right to 
a similar submission from those who have benefitted by 
their submission. 1 
It is noteworthy that Hart seems to regard mere reception of 
benefits as a ground for obligation. This of course is extremely 
problematic as will become obvious from the study of Rawls and 
Nozick. The question of 'similar submission' is also unexplicit as 
far as the liberation struggle is concerned. It would have to be 
distinguished from that of 'uniform submission' in the sense of 
acting uniformly and adopting identical means to liberation. Rawls 
(1964:9-11) essentially accepts Hart's position although he adds 
two further requirements: 
Suppose there is a beneficial and just scheme of social 
cooperation, and that the advantages it yields can only 
be obtained if everyone, or nearly everyone cooperates. 
Suppose further that cooperation requires a certain 
sacrifice from each person, or at least involves a 
certain restriction of his liberty. Suppose finally, 
that the benefits produced by cooperation are, up to a 
certain point, free: that is, the scheme of cooperation 
is unstable in the sense that if anyone person knows 
that all (or nearly all) of the others will continue to 
do their part, he will still be able to share a gain from 
the scheme even if he does not do his part. Under these 
101 
conditions a person who has accepted the benefits of the 
scheme is bound by duty ot tair play to do his part ·and 
not take advantaqe of the free benefits by not 
cooperatinq.2 
The two Rawlsian additional requirements are that, firstly, 
the insti tution in question must be just: that is, it should 
'satisfy the [Rawlsian] principles of justice,.3 Secondly, one 
should voiuntarily accept the benefits of the arrangement or have 
taken advantage of the opportunities it offers to further her 
interests. In short, the justice and voluntariness are 
preconditions for the generation of obligations under the principle 
of fair play; 'it is impossible to be bound to unjust 
institutions, or those which exceed the limits of tolerable 
injustice,.4 Rawls (followed later by Simmons 1979:125) makes an 
important distinction between accepting and receiving benef its. 
For Hart the principle seems to generate obligations, whether or 
not a person has solicited those benefits or even consented to 
them. Rawls's reference to 'accept' suggests that mere receipt is 
not enough. One has to seek the benefit actively. While this 
distinction is important and useful, nevertheless its significance 
should not be overstated. It will be maintained that the 
distinction helps in limiting cases in which enjoyment of benefits 
creates obligations. The contention that only benefits accepted, 
and not merely received, create an obligation will be questioned. 
A thesis defended here is that consent cannot account for 
certain obligations, especially where enjoyment of benefits cannot 
be accepted or rej ected. To demonstrate this contention it is 
necessary to distinguish between types of goods. 
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What is a Public Good? 
The easiest and least controversial are private goods. 
According to Buchanan (1964:50) private goods have the following 
characteristics'. Each unit produced is equivalent to a unit 
consumed by one person. Its production or consumption has no 
relevant spillover effects on persons other than the direct 
consumer. For example, it is impossible for two people to consume 
the same loaf of bread. Further, the distribution of private goods 
is controllable and can be restricted to those who have paid for 
them. This means that they are often voluntarily and deliberately 
enjoyed. For example, if people enter a restaurant and order 
meals, they are obliged to pay. After all, they specifically and 
voluntarily took measures to acquire the meals on commercial terms. 
Consequently, in this case the obligation to pay is based upon 
consent. 
collective and public goods constitute the second and third 
types of goods. Common to both are two attributes, namely 
jointness of supply and impossibility of exclusion. Olson 
(1971: 14) lumps common, collective and public goods together, 
def ining them as: 'any good such that, if any person ••• in a 
group ••• consumes it, it cannot be feasibly withheld from the others 
in that group'. Fundamentally the problem of public goods is not 
whether it is logically or empirically supplied by all or one, but 
rather that it makes no sense for an individual to supply it. It 
means that whether people pay for a collective good or not, such a 
good cannot be withheld from them. It is impossible to exclude 
them from consumption. The benefit is 'inseparable and 
generalised'. The provision of public goods is largely, though not 
exclusively the state's function. Such public goods must be 
available to everyone if they are available to anyone. Examples 
are defence, internal security, law and order (Olson:1971:14), and 
economic infrastructure. 
Although Olson lumps them together, a useful distinction can 
in fact be made between collective and public goods. Collective 
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goods correspond to Simmons' (1979:128) open benefits which 'while 
they can be avoided, they cannot be avoided without considerable 
inconvenience'. For example, a neighbourhood provides a system of 
publ~c entertainment through a loudspeaker, such that this can be 
avoided only if one remains indoors and seals the windows to 
prevent oneself from hearing the sound (Nozick:1974:95). other 
potential consumers can avoid these goods only at a considerable 
expense. There is a sUbsection of collective goods, namely 
'readily available' benefits which can be avoided without 
considerable inconvenience. An example is that of special personal 
and property protection by the police after some explicit threats. 
In contrast a public good is such that if it is supplied to 
anybody, then its enjoyment cannot be withheld from anybody. This 
is the crucial element. It has to have these features if the 
problem Olson encounters is to emerge. Persons cannot be charged 
individually as they consume it. For example a lighthouse at sea 
warns all navigators, including those who have not contributed 
towards its maintenance. It could be substituted with a coded 
beacon in which cases navigators have to buy a receiver. 
Similarly, a television set holder can watch all programmes on 
South African television without obeying the requirement to buy a 
license. However, M-net requires special subscription. What makes 
public goods interesting is that they defy the standard selective 
incentive for a good: 'if you don't pay for it, you don't get it'. 
On the face of it liberation seems a pertinent example of a public 
good. Once achieved, it is available to all and sundry, including 
those who actually impeded its achievement. 
Co-ordination problems for large Groups 
This section deals with coordination problems and public 
goods. The relationship between the two concepts is best captured 
by Hardin (1982:20): 
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The central relationship between the analysis of public 
goods and the problem of collective action, then, is that 
the costliness or de facto infeasibility of exclusion 
from consumption of a collectively provided good usually 
eliminates any direct incentive for individual consumers 
to pay for the good. 
One explicit lesson to be derived from the 'prisoner's dilemma' is 
precisely the difficulty of coordinating the actions of just 
persons. Securing agreement between them may prove to be an almost 
intractable problem. The situation must be even more difficult 
with a large, anonymous and indeterminate community such as the 
, oppressed', who are not a static and closed communi ty~ It is 
characterised by the coming into being and the passing away of 
members • . These considerations make it different and similar to the 
prisoner's dilemma model. Size is important not only in terms of 
physical volume, but also according to perceived effectiveness and 
noticeability. In a large group size can cause a rational person 
not to contribute towards the goals of the group, especially where 
actions of other members are noticeable. Unlike Olson, Sweeny 
argues that actual size per se is irrelevant to the ability of the 
group to reach optimal results. What is required is simply that 
the individual should be aware of the presence of others. It is 
not necessary that he sees them, or they him. A group is large if 
individual contributions to it make no perceptible difference. For 
Olson size as such is crucial as will become evident below in the 
discussion of public goods. 
In a large community, unilateral deviation is not as injurious 
to the community as in the micro model exemplified by a two-person 
prisoner's dilemma. If one person, or even more, evade tax, this 
does not necessarily result in a harmful situation. This is 
explained fully by the principle of individual insignificance 
according ' to which no individual dominates the system, and 
contributions from persons are more or less equal (Ullman-
Margalit:1977:28). This is how Olson (1971:44) describes this 
condition: 
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•.• in a large group in which no single individual's 
contribution makes a perceptible difference to the group 
as a whole, or the burden or benefit of any single member 
of the group, it is certain that a collective good will 
not be provided unless there is coercion or some outside 
inducements that will lead the members of the large group 
to act in their common interest. 5 
This condition of individual insignificance has important 
consequences for the resistance movements. It is prone to generate 
free-riding. This temptation to evade participation is based upon 
a simple consideration that evasion does not seem harmful at all. 
The impact of individual action is such that non-participation 
would make no difference whatsoever to the production of the 
benefit. Consequently it does not harm anyone. Besides, in a 
large group non-participants are not likely to be noticed. 
Detectability carries harmful consequences because it can easily 
undermine the morale of others. It will be recalled that both a 
nervous and reluctant cooperator are willing to support, but only 
on condition that everyone else or most people do. 
It is possible for people not to take the trouble of bearing 
costs they can avoid. It was pointed out earlier that the motive 
need not always be ignoble. Honest and rational pe?ple may not be 
keen to get involved in schemes which are either doomed to failure, 
or in which they will be taken for a ride, or that they do not 
believe are the best strategy. The most striking exception seems 
to be in religious organisations. People tend to contribute and 
cooperate selflessly, regardless of what others are doing. Even 
this limiting case is not decisive. For one thing, such people may 
be encouraged by God's omnipresence and omniscience. However, 
secular organisations do not enjoy this prerogative. Even a state 
which enjoys maximal patriotism cannot survive without compulsory 
taxation. 
While there are differences between a large society and the 
two-person game, the dilemma remains essentially the same: how to 
protect a - jointly beneficial, yet unstable state of affairs from 
deteriorating (Ullman-Margalit:1977:28). The best solution is that 
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which successfully eliminates the temptation to deviate. It must 
be a strong deterrent or a strong positive incentive, especially 
where the costs are high. Of course the matter is much more 
complex than this, as will be illustrated. The crucial point is 
that the Olson problem comes about where each person gets more from 
his share of the public good than each · person would have to 
. . 
contribute to create the public good if each person were taxed on 
some equitable basis for the good's production. Only in this case 
does the following puzzle arise. The puzzle is: How can these 
people, for each of whom the good is a good bargain, fail to 
provide it? 
The answer is: Because it is impossible to discriminate 
between who gets it and who does not. Each person can then say to 
himself: If the others produce it I shall get it, so I am better 
off without c,ontributing. If on the other hand the others reason 
like me and do not contribute I will be irrational to put my 
investment on a voluntary basis because the benefit is not going to 
come. This explains why size matters, because in the case of size 
it is easier to say: My contribution to the good will not be 
decisive in making it either happen or not happen. My failure to 
contribut~ towards liberation is not going to be the crucial issue 
that results in the success or failure of the struggle. If enough 
people participate, then there is no need for me to do likewise. 
If too few contribute or participate, then I also do better not to 
join. Therefore, whatever they do, it is better that I do not 
participate. This is the puzzle. Public goods involve benefits 
and services regarding which people find themselves in the 
prisoner's dilemma situation. Private firms have incentives to 
produce private goods, but have none whatsoever to produce fully 
public goods (Braybrooke: 1987: 182) • Therefore, leaving public 
goods to be provided by private charities raising funds from 
voluntary contributions simply gives carte blanche to free riders. 
If the provision of public goods is a function of 
organisations (usually a state), then such groupings cannot simply 
rely on voluntary contributions from their members. This is the 
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function of taxation. Similarly, 'neither can other large 
organisations support themselves without providing some sanction, 
or some attraction distinct from the public good itself, which will 
lead indi viduals to help bear the burdens of maintaining the 
organisation' (Olson:1971:15-16). 
These features have important implications for the theory of 
obligation. In the first place, unlike private goods, public goods 
cannot be rejected at will, in the sense of refusing to consume 
them, without possible dire consequences for the rest of society. 
They are simply available. They can only be received. Even when 
an individual claims to reject them, he can continue to enjoy them 
whenever he feels like it. As a result it makes no sense to appeal 
to consent. How can people be said to have consented to pure air, 
or to the absence of fatal epidemic? If there is any obligation 
here, it cannot be explained in terms of consent. Consequently, 
either there is no obligation at all for the production of public 
goods or, if there is, it can be explained only in terms of the 
benefits themselves. 
The Prisoner's Dilemma 
This is the scenario: Imagine two prisoners in detention over 
a serious murder charge. The police lack irrefutable evidence to 
press cha~ges, but suspect strongly that the two have committed the 
alleged acts. On the other hand, they have conclusive evidence 
against both to convict them on a less serious charge of motor 
vehicle theft. If found guilty of murder, the prisoners face 30 
years' imprisonment. For the motor car theft they will serve only 
a 5 year jail sentence. They are kept in separate cells to prevent 
them from communicating with one another. The interrogator makes 
them an offer. If one becomes a state witness and gives evidence 
against the other in the murder charge, then the charge on which 
police have conclusive evidence will be dropped. The witness will 
then go free, while his fellow inmate gets the mandatory thirty 
years. If both refuse to confess, then the state will press ahead 
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with theft charges and convict them for 5 years. If the two 
confess, then both must go to jail for 10 years each, "instead. 
This situation is portrayed in figure 4.1. below. 
p - Two 
Non Confession Confession 
- 5 0 
Non Confession 
- 5 - 30 
P - One - 30 - 10 
Confession 
0 - 10 
4.1 
The dilemma raises two immediate questions. What are the 
prisoners likely to do? What is the best possible outcome in their 
circumstances? The first question cannot be answered without a 
major assumption that each prisoner deliberates solely in terms of 
self-interest in protecting his interests. In that case, naturally 
the temptation for both is to confess. This option offers the 
safest or" least disastrous outcome, regardless of what the other 
prisoner does. This is what is meant by 'dominant' choice. When 
both prisoners choose the dominant action, then you have a state of 
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'equilibrium'. It means the state of affairs is stable (Ullman-
Margalit:1977:18-20). The situation can only deteriorate for both 
if either deviates from this equilibrium unilaterally. Why is 
confession attractive? The worst outcome for either prisoner is 
thirty years' imprisonment (-30). This fate awaits the one who 
refuses to confess while the other does. Ten years (-10) 
imprisonment is the result of dual confession. However, confession 
also carries the possible prospect of freedom (0), should the other 
prisoner refuse to confess. In other words, the worst that can 
happen with a confession is -10, whereas -30 is a possible, if not 
probable aftermath of non-confession. Given that the prisoners are 
motivated solely by rational self-interest, it makes sense to 
confess, regardless of what the other person does. Non-confession 
requires absolute certainty that the other party will not confess. 
Where doubt reigns, it would be unwise not to confess. In short, 
confession offers the best or least disastrous consequence for each 
prisoner, regardless of what the other does. 
However, the likely o~tcome does not correspond to the optimal 
outcome in the circumstances. Clearly, it makes sense to opt for 
five years (-5) rather than ten years of imprisonment. However, 
this requires mutual non-confession, an option already found to be 
elusive and irrational without firm guarantees. The whole 
presentation so far takes place against the background of non-
communication. What would happen were this barrier to be lifted 
and the prisoners allowed to communicate? Suppose the prisoners, 
as rational agents, concluded that non-confession is the only fair 
and rational choice. will the dilemma begin to unravel? In fact 
it will not because the incentive to default will still persist. 
Firstly, one might distrust the other afterwards, and fear possible 
thirty ye~rs' incarceration. Secondly, he might trust the other, 
and harbour no fears of possible betrayal. However, precisely this 
trust tempts him to choose confession in order to be released at 
the expense of the other. It must be noted that similar thoughts 
go on in the other prisoner. Confession again emerges as a 
dominant choice. It would appear then that the prisoners require 
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something that holds the agreement in place, and that cannot simply 
be promise or trust. Their dilemma simply amounts to the 
challenge: How to protect a jointly beneficial, yet unstable state 
of affairs from deteriorating (Ullman-Margalit:1977:28). 
The most common solution would appear to be agreement 
enforceable by coercion. This is based on the Hobbesian (1968) 
well known dictum, 'covenants, without the sword, are but words; 
and of no strength to secure a man at all'. Coercion is a method, 
one form of exercising power. By power is meant the ability of a 
person, A, to get another person or persons B to perform action C 
if B would normally not do it. In a coercive situation, -A alters 
the incentives facing B. He attaches something B desires to an 
action B would normally not do. For example, if B wishes to stay 
alive and keep his job, A urges him to boycott his work, or join a 
march towards machine-gun happy police. The goal is to change the 
pay-offs so that non-confession becomes a dominant choice. Like 
previous attempts, coercion is intended to alter attitudes and 
preferences in such a manner as to make a mutually desired goal 
attainable. In addition though, it also ensures that any agreement 
reached is guaranteed to be observed. 
might resolve their problem. They 
This is how the prisoners 
realise that their most 
desirable outcome is freedom from incarceration (0). However, this 
outcome is simply unattainable unless one offers not to sacrifice 
while the other does. This blind altruism has been ruled out by 
the original assumption that the prisoners pursue only their 
individual self-interest. As long as each insists upon the best 
possible outcome for himself, he will at best receive the third 
best option. 
Rational persons will soon remember that while mutual non-
confession does not offer maximum utility, at least it prevents 
maximum disaster. It ensures that each gets only five, rather than 
ten years' imprisonment. How do they ensure that the instability 
of solidarity and friendship are avoided? To achieve an 
enforceable agreement they might, for example, enlist the services 
of a notorious underground hitman. For a fee he could be 
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authorised to track and eliminate either of them in the event of 
default (confession). Alternatively, something even more brutal 
might be contemplated. They might agree that whoever confesses 
will have his house petrol bombed, possibly with his entire family 
inside. If both confess, the hitman is authorised to reveal to the 
police conclusive evidence of another heinous crime in which they 
were both involved. So far, this other crime is altogether unknown 
to the police. If convicted on this, as they are definitely going 
to be, the sentence involved is 25 years. It is interesting here 
that coercion is enlisted, not to dominate one another, but to 
pursue an elusive and unstable but mutually desirable ·state of 
affairs. It is a route to, and a guarantee of utility. Secondly, 
the more brutal the penalty for desertion, the stronger the appeal 
of the agreement because the threat it stabilises is a mutually 
desired position. The introduction of enforceable agreement alters 
the payoffs, as figure 4.2 below illustrates. 
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P Two 
Non Confession Confession 
- 5 -20 
Non Confession 
- 5 - 35 
POne - 35 - 25 
Confession 
- 35 - 25 
4.2 
The introduction of the coercive measures changes the pay-off 
matrix drastically (4.2). Confession no ' longer represents a 
dominant choice. It involves death or a long jail sentence. Non-
confession now becomes the dominant choice for both. It minimises 
the temptation to diverge from the agreement. The dilemma seems to 
be solved now, and both are guaranteed of the optimal outcome in 
the circumstances. There is a variant of the coercion 
namely irrational indignation or the rage of being taken 
of. Suppose A is tempted to confess when B does not. 




'B is in jail and I am out but my God when he comes out 
he is going to even it out with me. It is not clear to 
me that fifteen years contemplating death is the way to 
spend my life. I think that perhaps I better not 
confess. He is going to be pretty enraged, so that even 
if he cannot get somebody to kill me, when he gets out he 
will do it personally'. / 
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The irony here is that it would be irrational and even dangerous 
for B to pursue this vengeful option against A. After all the 
damage has already been done - and B has already completed his 
session in jail. What motive does B have for wishing to have A 
killed? In strict cost-benefit terms there is nothing to be 
gained unless B simply derived sadistic pleasure from seeing A 
suffer and die. Nevertheless, A's knowledge of B' s probable 
irrational response could help the bargain stay. It would appear 
then that such irrational traits may have some social utility by 
helping people to cement social agreements. The paradox , is that, 
strictly speaking, such irrational traits are not worth putting to 
use. Yet it helps if a person is known ahead of time to be capable 
of employing them. The only assurance that people have that an 
agent is likely to employ them is if he is sufficiently irrational 
to employ them. On the other hand, if a person is believed to be 
sensible and considerate then this solution would not work. There 
is an obvious dis-utility in this 'solution'. Irrationality is not 
the type of attitude one would wish to engender on a large scale. 
Irrational people cannot be turned on and off at will and the cost 
of harbouring such people may be higher than the guarantees they 
supply. 
To summarise, the crucial thing is that each prisoner gets the 
third best option because the second best option is always 
unstable. This instability is the result of the availability to 
each of them of what is for each individual, though not for both of 
them, the best option which on the assumption of pure self-interest 
they are bound to strive for. What they both want most is the 
first option. What each of them has to see is that the price of 
one of them getting the best outcome is the other inheriting the 
very worst. The joint value of the second best option is higher 
than the joint value of all the others so that spread between them 
are 10 jail years if they do not confess, as opposed to twenty if 
they do, and 30 if one confesses and the other does not. 
How could they compromise then? The second option is a better 
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compromise than the third alternative. It does not require either 
to sacrifice himself drastically to the other. Both do better in 
(2) than they do in (3). Only if they behave sensibly would each 
of them do better than what they will get if they fail to 
cooperate. The 'paradox lies in the fact that each of the two self-
interested persons ends up worse than he otherwise could have. 
There would be paradox had one of them done better than the other. 
The paradox is precisely that for each one of them it is worse to 
be at (3) than at . (2) and yet they cannot attain that goal. In 
fact, there is no unequivocal best outcome. There is an 
unequivocal better outcome, namely (2) is better than (3), if one 
understands the game to be played in a Pareto universe. According 
to Pareto (Hardin:1982:91) the only situation in which something is 
better than the other is when someone gains while nobody loses. 
(1) is not better than two unequivocally. It is better for one 
prisoner and worse for the other. The same applies to (4). 
The foregoing comments also reveal certain distinctive 
features of the prisoners '. dilemma (Ullman-Margalit: 1977: 23) : 
i. If both prisoners confess, the result is 
detrimental to both of them. 
ii. On the other hand, non-confession heralds 
advantagep for both. 
iii. Individually, the most rewarding option is 
confession. 
iv. The dilemma cannot be solved without cooperation 
between the prisoners. 
v. There is a price to be paid for cooperation. Both 
must abandon their dominant individual choice (0), in 
favour of something less attractive and less disastrous 
(-5). It involves sacrifices at the minimum and risks at 
worst. 
vi. The temptation to confess is overwhelming and 
requires stringent measures to contain it. ' 
vii. If one confesses while the other does not, the 
injury to the confessor is phenomenal. 
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What is the link with society in general, and the liberation 
effort in particular? The dilemma represents in a micro context 
dilemmas and relationships obtaining in the broader society. There 
are activities which promote common interests, but which in turn 
require sacrifices and cooperation. There are numerous examples in 
literature. A strike by workers involves risks of dismissal and 
loss of -earnings. Yet, it also holds a prospect of improved 
benefits. It is tempting for workers secretly to violate the 
strike by turning up for work. Clearly, very few sane people would 
participate in a strike unless a sUbstantial part of other workers 
did likewise. Tax evasion is tempting too. In a democratic 
society taxation enables the government to provide common services. 
Yet it also makes little sense to contribute if no one else, or 
very few people in fact do. Public goods like security in the face 
of external threat, internal law and order, education and 
infrastructure (roads and bridges) are generally provided by the 
state. Even avowed capitalists accept that 'while it is not the 
case that the state ought to interfere where individuals do not, or 
cannot act efficiently, it ought to interfere where individuals 
will not act at all' (Ulmann-Margalit:1977:49-50). 
Prisoners' Dilemma, Public Goods and Liberation 
Certain gains made after a hard political struggle cannot be 
denied those who did not contribute to the effort. When the 
government relented on the 'Afrikaans issue' in 1976 all students 
gained, considering that the imposition of the language would have 
resulted in an intolerable burden on students who were already 
educationally and socially disadvantaged. The teachers benefitted 
too, since a sUbstantial number of them were not qualified to 
handle content subjects in Afrikaans. In short almost everyone 
benefitted, including those who had not supported the protest. 
Similarly; the respite on the 1984 township rent boycott was 
extended to all affected, including those who clandestinely 
continued to pay. When Soweto arrears were eventually written off 
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in 1990, this benefit was extended to all the people, including the 
'free riders'. During bus boycotts against rising fares, some 
people trudged to work. Others managed to sneak into the , buses, 
and saved themselves the inconvenience and pain of walking long 
distances. When the fares were reduced, the beneficiaries included 
everyone, .regardless of their contribution. The extension of this 
argument is that, in the event of national emancipation, even the 
traitors, the selfish and the fearful will reap the benefits. In 
short, the situation of the oppressed maybe explained usefully in 
terms of the prisoner's dilemma and the notion of public goods. 
Also common to the prisoner's dilemma and a liberation 
struggle is the suggestion that egoism, the mindless pursuit of 
narrow self-interest to the exclusion of the interests of others, 
is ultimately irrational. If this happens, everyone loses and no 
one gains. In short both require unity of action and cooperation. 
They do not require ideological uniformity. Cooperation is 
possible between sworn enemies. If no one participates in the 
struggle, oppression can only worsen. There is no point is pushing 
ahead with the struggle if no one, or only a negligible number, is 
willing to support it. That is courting a disaster. Even though 
people desire liberation, they are not always keen to take the heat 
that goes with political resistance. Others m~ght be keen to 
support, but only if the rest make their contribution. The dilemma 
for a bystander is how to reconcile the requirements of liberation 
with the instinct of self-preservation; how to achieve the mutually 
desired, but unstable state of commitment to emancipation. Perhaps 
at this stage it will be useful to juxtapose features of the 
political struggle with those of the prisoner's dilemma. 
Inevitably this involves enormous oversimplification, but this is 
subject to a subsequent review: 
i. Confession corresponds to the reluctance to 
participate in the struggle. If no one takes part in the 
struggle, liberty will never arrive. 
117 
ii. However, participation foreshadows advant~ges for 
everyone. If strikers stand together, they are 11kely to 
get what they want. Labour history abounds with 
examples. The people's resilience during rent boycotts 
had impressive and unexpected results. Consumer boycotts 
have led to the recogni tion, however informally, of 
important community leaders. Universal non-cooperation 
with apartheid by blacks is likely to expedite the demise 
of the system. 
iii. From the point of view of the individual, it pays 
not to participate. Such a person can safeguard her job 
in the event of strikes, her home in case of rent 
boycotts, and the children's education during school 
boycotts. This motive is dominant, regardless of whether 
others observe the boycott or not. 
iv. The dilemma cannot be solved without cooperation 
among the oppressed and those opposed to slavery. 
v. There is a variety of prices to be paid for 
liberation: harassment, loss of jobs, dismissal from 
school, loss of homes, detention, torture, and death. At 
the minimum there are sacrifices and at worst, perils. 
The burdens need not necessarily be uniform or evenly 
distributed. In fact, they never can be. An anti-
smoking law produces different types of pressures on 
smokers, from mild irritation to severe craving. Actual 
burdens are not always the same. 
vi. The temptation not to cooperate with the liberation 
effort is overwhelming. Except for a minority of 
committed martyrs, in general people would rather have 
liberation without the cost it involves. 
vii. If a sUbstantial section of the oppressed is not 
committed to fighting, those who fight incur overwhelming 
hazards. 
The problem can now be stated more specifically. Suppose a 
rational bystander is faced with the decision to support the 
struggle or not. There are four possible scenarios to choose from: 
(a) universal cooperation, where every person contributes; (b) 
widespread cooperation, where a sUbstantial number cooperate; (c) 
widespread free riding, where many people evade contribution and 
finally (d) universal non-cooperation, where no one cooperates. 
What is the rational response to these positions? It seems there 
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are grounds for the bystander not to cooperate. 
Given that the struggle requires widespread, rather than 
universal cooperation, there is no need for him to cooperate on the 
basis of (a) and (b). In both cases, the struggle will continue 
without him. He might argue that too many cooks spoil the broth. 
Widespread non-cooperation (c) makes the production of the public 
good highly unlikely, while universal non-cooperation makes its 
non-production an absolute certainty. It seems too that in cases 
(c) and (d) the rational bystander should not cooperate either. 
These concerns will be addressed fully in conjunction with public 
goods. However, they point to real and potential problems for 
cooperation and participation in the liberation struggle. 
In the light of the above, it becomes evident that a 
stabilising mechanism is required. Such measures should involve an 
enforceable agreement; that is, a deal backed up by coercion. 
coercion is required to ensure that people do their part, and that 
others are not taken for a ride because, ultimately a successful 
struggle requires collective action. The subject of coercion is 
pursued in greater detail in chapter seven. 
Objections To The principle Of Fair Play 
Nozick (1974:93-95) trivialises, derides and ultimately 
rejects the principle of fair play. He argues that it is logically 
incapable of generating obligations: 
•.• even if the principle could be formulated so that it 
was no longer open to objection, it would not serve to 
obviate the need for other persons' consentinq to 
cooperate and limit their activities. 
Nozick, it will be argued, misses the point altogether. This will 
be evident from a careful scrutiny of his examples which are 
reproduced verbatim below. 
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Suppose some of the people in your neighborhood (there 
are 364 other adults) have found a public address system, 
and decide to institute a system of public entertainment. 
They post a list of names, one for each day, yours among 
them. On his assigned day (one can easily switch days) 
a person is to run a public address system, play records 
over it, give news bulletins, tell amusing stories he has 
heard, and so on. After 138 days on which each person 
has done his part, your day arrives. Are you obligated 
to take your turn? 
Nozick concludes that there is no obligation involved. Although 
you have benefitted, you may not consider the benefit worth the 
effort. Secondly, even if the benefit is worth the cost, others 
might derive more from it than you do. On the basis of this, he 
concludes that 'one cannot, whatever one's purposes, just act so as 
to give people benefits and then demand (or seize) payment'. This 
is particularly the case where one also benefits in the process, as 
the following example suggests: 
••. suppose that your best way of getting exercise is by 
throwing books into people's houses, or that some other 
activity of yours thrusts books into people's houses as 
an unavoidable side effect. . 
The inference that Nozick draws is that, even in this case, 
the beneficiaries are not bound to pay for the books. He is 
presenting three arguments here. First, an obligation does not 
arise except through the deliberate consent of the autonomous 
individual. Second, it is even more inconceivable that an 
obligation without consent arises where the cost of the benefit 
exceeds the value of the benefit itself. Thirdly, it is even worse 
if that benefit were negligible and dispensable. It will be argued 
that only his second and third contentions are sound. The first 
argument has already been addressed. 
A utilItarian might object to the principle of fair play on 
the grounds that it leads to minimisation (or dis-utility) rather 
than maximisation of utility. In an efficient system what is 
required for the production of public goods is not universal 
cooperation, but only participation by a sufficiently large portion 
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of the group. Consequently, there is no need to prevent all free 
riding. 
A third objection is that the principle of fair play may 
easily lead to paternalism. It gives to a handful of people the 
right to decide on the political goals and means, and to impose 
them on the rest of society. In the case of a liberation struggle, 
it' forces people to be free'. What happens if the oppressed 
prefer to live under apartheid, rather than under an alternative 
system? People have a right to remain even in the Hobbesian state 
of nature, if they so desire. This is addressed in chapter nine. 
Dworkin (1986:193-195) discusses the principle of fair play in 
the context of political obligation. He rejects the principle on 
the following grounds. Firstly, a fair play argument assumes that 
people can incur obligations simply by receiving what they do not 
seek, and would reject if they had the chance. For example, a 
philosopher cannot reasonably demand payment for his broadcast 'of 
a stunning and valuable lecture from a sound track'. Secondly, 
there is an ambiguity regarding the very basis of this principle, 
namely, 'benefiting from a situation'. A person is said to have 
benefitted if her 'overall situation is superior under the 
organisation to what it would otherwise have been'. The problem, 
according to Dworkin, is the ' bench -mark' to be used, or the 
meaning of 'otherwise'. - The result is that the principle becomes 
too strong or too weak. 
The principle is too strong if it justifies nothing, for 
example, if it requires showing that every citizen is better off 
under the existing resistance organisation than he would be under 
any other system that the principle is meant to embrace. It is too 
weak if it is too easy to satisfy, for example, all that is 
required is proof that the person is better off under this system 
than in no system at all (such as the Hobbesian state of nature). 
It might also be obj ecte? that coercion is not the only 
solution to the prisoner's dilemma. There are moral and other 
incentives that may be equally effective. The last objection is 
addressed first. 
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Morality and Non-Coercive Solutions to the Dilemma 
Non-coercive strategies for coping with the dilemma involve 
cUltivation of certain attitudes and moral principles which offset 
the costs of cooperation, for example trust, friendship, 
conviviality, solidarity, in-process incentives, and inculcation of 
certain moral values. These measures are thought to be capable of 
bringing about restraints on choices and altering the preference 
orders of the prisoners. Trust, in-process benefits and general 
morali ty will be dealt wi th consecutively. Trust occupies a 
special place in society and the persistence of a worthwhile 
society depends on the amount and level of trust between its 
members. It is perhaps ' :the most important ingredient in the 
social glue' (Buchanan:1979:71). It is interesting that in the 
black townships ' stokvels ' ,6 an old system of joint capi tal 
accumulation, survives largely on trust. People collect money and 
provide loans to one another without any security at all. Some 
minimum trust is essential if such organisations are to work. 
However, on their own, moral measures cannot be effective 
stabilising devices. Like friendship, trust is likely to be 
tenuous arid even more elusive in a large and somewhat divided group 
than in a small circle. Promises, trust and solidarity are not 
generally effective if they involve people who have hardly 
encountered one another personally. They might work within the 
cadres and other officials of liberation movements but, even here, 
continuous vigilance is called for. The community of the oppressed 
is large and indeterminate. South African resistance organisations 
operate on the assumption that there is at least one police spy in 
every group. This is not idle speculation, but is borne out by 
painful experience. Some of the spies turn out to have been the 
most trusted members, or even top officials of organisations. 
Moreover, trust does not offer the type of absolute certainty 
required in the prisoner's dilemma. Friends can and do betray one 
another, not necessarily out of malice but from pressure. Some 
people simply crack during torture and release crucial information 
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unintentionally during interrogation. Solidarity might at best be 
an indication of how people feel about one another or how they plan 
to support each other, but not a guarantee of how, in fact, they 
will behave under trying conditions. The same may be said of 
trust. There are trustworthy people, but even they might succumb 
to temptation to betray the trust. For less innocent reasons trust 
might be the precise motive for betrayal. A shrewd and 
unscrupulous prisoner might in fact confess precisely because he 
trusts that the other will not. On the basis of the prisoner's 
dilemma, such a schemer will be released from jail at the expense 
of a trusted fellow in-mate. While intense solidarity exists 
within the oppressed class, there is anot~er reality: That of 
competitive egoism and individualism. There is competition for 
jobs and houses. This explains why there were some politically 
naive people who bought the homes belonging to those evicted as a 
result of the township rent boycotts. 
In-process benefits are 'certain goods intrinsic to the 
process of [revolution] such that the individual will gain [them] 
from the process of participation itself regardless of the outcome 
of the process' (Buchanan: 1979: 69) • Olson refers to them as 
'selective incentives'. For example, a labour 
negotiate certain special deals for its members. 
union might 
They might be 
entitled to certain discounts at stores, receive bursaries for 
their chiidren, be offered training abroad, and receive sickness 
and death benefits. Although non-members may benefit from some of 
the union's activities, such as increased remuneration, they also 
lose out on certain attractive in-process benefits 'which, by 
definition, are confined to active members. Once sufficiently 
strong, a union might also establish a 'closed shop', that is, get 
firms not to employ non-union members (Barry: 1978: 26). Essentially 
such benefits result in cooperation for its own sake, that is, for 
the sake of realising the values inherent in the cooperation 
itself, regardless of whether the effort will realise the public 
good. The process itself is a rewarding experience which offsets 
the cost of production. In view of this a deep atmosph~re of trust 
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and solidarity can be engendered among the oppressed and the 
process of, or participation in the struggle itself could-become a 
fulfilling end-in-itself. This is how Nolan (1988:160) portrays 
the South African situation: 
People are so angry with a system that is merciless and 
unreasonable that they become highly motivated to do 
something about it. But it is the struggle that helps 
them overcome their natural fears. The experience of 
solidarity and support together with the example of 
others gradually enables a person to overcome fear and to 
act with confidence and courage. 
In-process benefits play an important role and their 
importance cannot be overemphasised. However, there are limits to 
their effectiveness. What kind of in-process benefit must there be 
so that it could offset the costs of participation, of detention, 
torture and possible liquidation? The unions could include special 
discount rates for their members, or preferred membership to 
certain beneficial institutions. One could argue that even if 
their members paid membership dues, what they get out of the union 
outstrips their financial contribution and is therefore worth it. 
Yet, what can joining the ANC or PAC offer which could offset the 
dangers that come with membership? certain members of the 
liberation movements might receive preferential treatment in 
overseas scholarships. In fact there are bursaries reserved only 
for refugees. However, a moment's reflection illustrates that this 
is not sufficient to attract bystanders. There are many other such 
- -
opportunities for non-activists in South Africa. In fact such non-
activists do even better, because their academic performance is 
likely to be better than that of activists.? So this fact alone 
cannot be a sufficient motivation for joining the struggle. It 
might explain, though, why there is pressure that social and 
poli tical commitment should become a paramount consideration in the 
allocation of bursaries. If solidarity, community and fraternity 
is all that can be offered, surely these can be obtained elsewhere 
and inexpensively for that matter. One could join some welfare and 
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philanthropic organisation or, even less worrying, Jimmy swaggart' s 
ministries. 
There are other possible in-process benefits but one needs to 
be a cynic in order to harbour them with any degree of earnestness. 
The struggle could provide some spiritual and emotional home for 
'the unemployed, unloved, unnoticed, marginalised and all social 
casualties' (Becker: 1982: 145) • Similarly, one could join the 
struggle in a quest to assure himself a heroic funeral and a place 
in the annals of South African history. That there are such people 
around cannot be doubted, but it would be unreasonable to judge 
political commitment on the basis of such eccentric people. Given 
the costs of the struggle, in-process benefits would involve 
precisely such eccentrics. People with such motives would be 
]ol.nl.ng the struggle for the wrong reasons altogether. In 
particular, they are likely to harm and be harmed by the cause. 
The temptation to become unnecessarily reckless is particularly 
strong within this group. No one would seriously suggest this as 
a noble or even rational ~eason for supporting the cause. 
Furthermore, in-process benefits make sense only insofar as they 
are not the primary goal. One joins a union not primarily to get 
additional in-process benefits. The primary aim is to be protected 
as a worker. A union that offers members free soup but fails to 
protect them from unfair dismissal is hardly worth the name. In 
other words, there should be an independent goal which is cherished 
by all. In-process benefits make sense only in the light of that 
goal. Similarly anyone who joins the struggle solely in search of 
self-realisation is treading on dangerous ground. The struggle may 
have its light and humorous moments. However for the better part 
it is full of frustrations and humiliation, and might shatter the 
hopes of those who joined for wrong reasons. In addition, in-
process benefits are not always forthcoming. A strong sense of 
solidarity can easily be replaced by disillusionment, especially 
when trust is betrayed. There are cases where spies were some of 
the most trusted memoers of an organisation. If resistance 
organisations provide solidarity, that is not the end of the story. 
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They also are forums for spying and selling out. Traitors and 
informers have been discovered within groups believed to be held 
together by a strong sense of solidarity. 
The moral solution involves the cUltivation of some 
generalised principles imposing duties. These duties may include 
cooperation, trust, keeping promises, building just and humane 
societies and promoting free social and political orders. 
According to Barry (1978:32) 'an alternative moral position which 
might lead to participation in collective action would be a simple 
utilitarianism'. On this basis it might occur to someone that the 
increment of benefits (or incremental probability benefit) " produced 
by his contribution would be greater than the cost incurred by 
himself, so there would be a net benefit (not to himself, of 
course, but to the human race as a whole) if he contributes. 
Ultimately it does not matter how strong arguments in favour 
of non-coercive measures are; they will always be subject to one 
limitation. They cannot prove, conceptually and empirically, that 
coercion will always be dispensable altogether. 
even if it were proved that all people here 
In other words, 
and now were 
trustworthy, it does not follow that they will always remain so. 
A case for coercion does not rest on the belief and hope that 
people have to be actually coerced. The fundamental issue is that 
they have to be coerced if neeessary. In other words, the secret 
lies in the threat rather than the actual employment of coercive 
measures. Coercion is a safeguard of community values, rather than 
a motive for those values. Consequently, to argue that people 
require no coercion is not to make a significant case against the 
role of coercion in the prisoner I s dilemma. Supporters of coercive 
measures need not believe that there will always be untrustworthy 
people. They need only point out that there could be some - now or 
in the future. 
One could argue further that in order to be effective, 
coercion itself presupposes precisely those shared normative values 
like trust and solidarity. Education and moral consciousness are 
necessary but not sufficient conditions for political action. 
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coercive measures may supplement and cement them. On its own, 
coercion cannot easily be a primary motive for action. The South 
African situation is a case in point. Massive state reprisals, 
detention, torture and assassinations have not abated the uprisings 
but have instead precipitated resentment, anger, resolution and 
intensified resistance because such coercion is not designed to 
protect people's shared concerns and values. In contrast, when the 
united states treasury tracks down tax defaulters, then the 
community throws· its back behind the government. In this 
situation, few serious Americans would complain of coercion and 
suppression of individual liberty. 
situations coercive and non-coercive 
All in all, in· certain 
measures should not be 
construed as antitheses. They are often complementary. Morality 
without coercion may be unstable, and coercion without morality is 
terror. 
The moral solution would ultimately be the most effective. 
Morality, especially in the Kantian sense of the categorical 
imperative, demands that certain people perform acts contrary to 
their inunediateself-interest as a means towards greater mutual 
advantage (Ullman-Margalit:1977:43). A moral person acts out of 
conviction, regardless of what others in her situation choose. She 
would not betray the cause, even if she could do that with 
impunity. According to Hardin (cited in sartorius: 1982: 212) , 
people who respond to the demands of 'conscience' would voluntarily 
contribute towards the production of public goods. However, he 
recognises clear limitations on the role of morality in the 
solution of the prisoner's dilemma. 
reasons (Sartorius:1982:212): 
This is largely fpr two 
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i .... the long range consequences of such a policy wo~ld 
be self-defeating, because those who would be respons1ve 
to such appeals would be eventually outbred by those who 
are not - the wicked would inherit the earth, and in 
excessively large numbers to boot. 
11. . •. calling on people voluntarily to [cooperate in 
the production of public goods] would place them in an 
undesirable psychological 'double-mind'. They would 
either fail to cooperate and feel guilty for doing so, or 
cooperate and feel that they were being played for 
suckers by those who did not. 
The first point is odd, to put it mildly. It sugg~sts that 
altruism (morally) is genetically determined. If this is so, and 
if 'ought implies can', those who are not altruistic cannot help 
themsel ves. They are genetically biased towards self ishness in the 
way that individuals are biased towards alcoholism. Here we are 
back to the Wolffian problems: 'I am accountable only if I could 
have chosen to act differently' . Genetics apart, some 
disenfranchised people acknowledge that freedom from apartheid is 
a public good but argue that, in their situation, there are more 
immediate goods to strive for - like educating their children. In 
fact both points provide weak considerations. Is the first claim 
empirically or conceptually correct? Surely it cannot be a 
necessary truth because one can deny its claim wi thout 
contradiction. As an empirical statement, it is unsupported. 
There is simply no empirical evidence to support the contention 
that there will be more evil than good people on the earth. The 
effect of the second contention is that people should not be 
expected to behave morally where sacrifices are involved. If the 
role of morality is to be rejected, some stronger argument is 
required. Olson bypasses these problems by again appealing to 
group size, especially with regard to the impact of individual 
contributions in a large group. He argues that even an altruistic 
and benevolent person would have no reason to contribute towards 
the public good, because 'his own contribution would not b~ 
perceptible' (1971:64). 
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To conclude, morality does not eliminate the need for 
coercion. If all people are moral then obviously there is no need 
to employ it. If they subsequently degenerate then coercion is 
handy. Further, even if all people were moral, this fact in itself 
is worthless unless it became general knowledge. Coercion is a 
safety mechanism which need not be enforced, but which could if it 
needs to be. 
Fair Play and Consent - Equivalents or Substitutes? 
A reply to Nozick 
In the light of the foregoing, it is possible to respond to 
the Nozickian attacks on the principle of fair play. It will be 
argued that the overwhelming importance of a public good and the 
fair procedures of its production appear to be legitimate 
substitutes for consent. It is worth recalling that for Nozick the 
principle of fair play is [logically] incapable of generating any 
obligations, regardless of how it is formulated. His position is 
simply that consent, and nothing else, is the basis of political 
obligation. Whether this is correct or not, it certainly does not 
follow from any of the arguments he advances. Nozick's style is 
particularly crucial here. He attacks this theory simply by 
providing . some intuitively emotive examples. In fact if his 
examples were modified they would result in different intuitions. 
In the first place, is a person obligated to contribute 
towards the public address entertainment described above? Nozick 
maintains that this is not the case. The reasons are obvious. The 
person was not consulted beforehand. His name was merely posted. 
Although he enjoyed the entertainment, this is certainly a luxury 
he could do without, if he knew beforehand that he had to pay. 
This is an open benefit, which he can avoid at some considerable 
cost - for example, by moving out of the neighbourhood until the 
entertainment is over. While this is true, it proves very little. 
It demonstrates merely that you cannot impose entertainment 
gratuitously on people and later demand payment for it. Nozick 
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seems to derive from this the claim that you cannot impose any 
benefit and later demand payment for it. Suppose this 
neighbourhood was located in an earthquake-prone area and that the 
\ 
public address system was used not only for entertainment, but also 
for emergency announcements. Is it obvious that people are not 
obliged to support it? 
Essentially the same applies to the 'books' example. Books 
are private goods which can be rejected or accepted. If a person 
is offered an unsolicited gift, it follows that he cannot be later 
expected to pay for it. Nozick' s objections make sense always when 
they apply to private goods and (sometimes) to open benefits. Open 
goods cannot be denied to others in the neighbourhood, and yet are 
also not essential. They are the type which reasonable people may 
be willing to forego. If the principle of fair play imposes 
obligations on people for merely receiving or enjoying private and 
open benefits, then it is prone to generate extreme and obnoxious 
types of paternalism. In this respect Nozick's criticism is solid. 
Is this, however, th~ only possible version of the principle 
of fair play? It seems not, and for this reason it is useful to 
return to Hart and Rawls. Rawls specifically contends that only a 
person who has voluntarily accepted the benefits is obligated. 
Nowhere does he specify what he means by accepted. However, 
'voluntarily' suggests that the benefits were not merely passively 
received, but actively pursued (Bell:1978:67-71). Hart's position 
is not straightforward. While he refers only to benefits having 
been received (as opposed to accepted?) he also maintains that 
people conduct a 'joint enterprise according to rules'. This seems 
to imply a degree of accepting the rules, as opposed to having 
benefits simply imposed. still it seems those who have accepted 
the rules may demand payment from those who simply benefit, 
regardless of whether they accepted the rules or not. 
What then does acceptance of goods mean? Simmons (1979:129) 
attaches enormous significance to the distinction between receiving 
and accepting (the a-r distinction), and defines acceptance in 
terms of two essential features: 
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i. either a person must have tried to get (and 
succeeded in getting) the benefit; 
11. or he must have taken the benefit willinqly and 
knowinqly.8 
clearly, there is no way that enjoyment of Nozick' s books and 
public entertainment would constitute 'acceptance' of benefits. 
These are straightforward cases where a benefit is simply imposed. 
So, Nozick's criti~ism should not hold against Rawls who explicitly 
stipulates that the goods must be accepted if an obligation is to 
be incurred. 9 
The a-r distinction proves too much, especially where benefits 
must be accepted 'willingly and knowingly'. What is it, for 
example, that the beneficiary must know in order to incur 
obligations? According to Simmons (1979:132) this involves 'an 
understanding of the status of those benefits relative to the party 
providing them'. The status may plainly vary, from an unsolicited 
gift, a priced item of merchandise or a conditional gift. People 
sometimes issue 'gifts' only as a form of bribery. Suppose that 
with all the background information, one goes ahead and takes the 
benefit. If this constitutes acceptance, then such a person is 
obligated. 
The a-r distinction is clearly a convenient device for 
ensuring that obligations are not simply incurred at any turn, but 
only where private goods have been accepted. However, it is 
precisely this feature that makes the distinction counter-
productive. To accept something in Simmons' sense is to aqree to 
the conditions of its issue. Consequently, the obligation arising 
from this transaction is not based on the enjoyment of benefits as 
such, but fundamentally on agreement to accept them under specific 
conditions such as shouldering the costs. If this is correct, then 
consent r~ther than fair play accounts for the obligation. In this 
way, the principle of fair play collapses into consent, and is 
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consequently superfluous. This is a major flaw in simmons and 
Rawls' approach, although Simmons (1979:128) seems oblivious to it: 
•.. the principle of fair play does not collapse into a 
principle of consent. While many participants in 
cooperative schemes will be bound to do their parts 
because they have consented to do so, many others will be 
bound because they have accepted benefits from the 
scheme. The obligations of the latter will fall under 
the principle of fair play. 
Ironically, the distinction seems to provide an adequate response 
to Nozick's criticism. In fact, it does so only by unwittingly 
abandoning the principle of fair play. Nozick's position seems 
unassailable. It . is solid against Rawls and Simmons who re-
introduced voluntariness. Now it looks even stronger against Hart 
for whom mere enjoyment of benefits can be a sufficient reason for 
incurring obligations. There is a twist of irony here, because it 
is precisely Hart's account, with some modification, which provides 
some hope out of this impasse. 
There is a common flaw running through Nozick, Rawls and 
Simmons which Hart may have avoided. All three focus on the 
beneficiary's state of mind, whether he has voluntarily accepted 
the benefits or not. This has been shown to be generally helpful 
in accounting for obligations although it does so at the expense of 
the principle of fair playas such. The beneficiary's choice, 
intention and desires are indicative only of his consent or 
agreement. The principle of fair play should be a sUbstitute for, 
and not a variant of consent theory. Consequently, in order to 
apply the principle, it is futile to enquire into the consent or 
lack of it on the part of the beneficiary. The only feasible reply 
to the Nozickian attacks is by focusing on the nature or type of 
benefits, regardless of how the beneficiary feels about them. One 
could then plausibly argue that if certain types of benefits are 
merely received then the obligation arises. Certain goods, as 
Miller and Sartorius (1979:130) point out, cannot be accepted in 
the Rawlsian sense: 
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the principle [of fair play] may be invoked against 
any indi vidual only when it may be claimed that his 
acceptance of the benefits in question has been 
intentional and fully voluntary, a claim which is quite 
dubious when what is at issue are public goods which are 
available to all within a large community, including 
those who have little option with regard to the question 
of continued membership.10 
In the light of this, Arneson (1982:620-621) concludes that: 
where pure public goods are supplied, voluntary 
acceptance of benefits is impossible and so, unnecessary 
to generate obligations according to the principl~ of 
fair play. Mere receipt may suffice to obligate. 
This suggests that Hart's initial intuition may have been correct. 
The principle of fair play need be based only on the mere enjoyment 
of benefits. However, Hart did not spell out the details of the 
nature of benefits. ll 
account for political 
However, since he uses this principle to 
obligation, it is likely that he had 
collective and public goods in mind. After all, government 
officials do not move about throwing books into people's yards. 
The provision of public goods is generally the domain of the public 
sector. 
In the light of the foregoing discussion, it is concluded that 
the principle of fair play is a genuine source of obligations. It 
is not contended that enjoyment of any public good generates 
obligations. For this reason liability is restricted to pure 
public goods. Mere enjoyment of pure public goods is sufficient 
for incurring obligations. Pure public goods cannot be accepted or 
rejected. They are merely enjoyed. However, there are four other 
important condi tions to be -met before obligation is incurred 
(Maphai:1987:78): 
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i. The goods must be sufficiently important for, if not 
essential to, everyone's welfare. Consequently, everyone 
has a vested interest in their being adequately financed 
and produced. It should not be simply a beneficial, .but 
dispensable luxury. It is possible for a b~nefit to be 
non-excludable while remaining non-essential. However, 
a pure public benefit should be both non-excludable and 
essential. 
This is crucial. If people are going to incur enforceable 
obligations non-voluntarily, then what is at stake must be of vital 
welfare to the community. It has been conceded that overriding 
individual consent is a serious moral challenge which can be 
justified only by another value, of an equal or more fundamental 
order. Nozick is correct to insist that imposing classical music 
on people, beneficial as it might be, is not a genuine ground for 
demanding payment in return. However, the demise of oppression and 
the establishment of a democratic, non-discriminatory political 
system would seem to meet some of the requirements of pure public 
goods. The distinction between public goods and pure public goods 
is crucial for the rest of the argument and can therefore not be 
overemphasised. People have a moral obligation to maintain public 
·goods. In addition to a moral obligation, they have a social and 
political obligation to maintain pure public goods. The principle 
of fair play is restricted here to pure public goods and not to all 
public goods. 
The quest for liberty has become an overriding concern for the 
oppressed. Should the good be of benefit to each and everyone? 
In practice, the provision of an essential benefit may naturally 
entail disadvantages for others. For example, comprehensive and 
successful inoculation can incur some financial losses for doctors. 
A decrease in crime similarly augurs badly for lawyers. However, 
no one should dispute that a healthy and crime-free environment is, 
overall, a benefit in which society in general has a vested 
interest. In fact, lawyers may have to be taxed in order to 
support a crime prevention project, just as doctors could also be 
required to contribute towards primary health care and education. 
On the other hand, an unhealthy and crime-infested environment is 
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a danger to the doctors and lawyers as well. Is there a doctor who 
has no vested interest in the elimination of Aids? If there are 
disadvantages occasioned by the provision of public goods, they are 
likely to be of a minor nature. At best they are a nuisance, but 
neither harmful" nor injurious. 
ii. The benefit should be worth the costs. 
No person, however oppressed, is obliged to confront a 
repressive and ruthless government if the cost of doing so is 
likely to be out of proportion to the anticipated resultant 
benefits. It is true that political rhetoric exhorts people to 
give up everything, including their lives. Giving up lives may be 
worthwhile if there is light at the end of the tunnel. 
iii. The benefit should be fairly distributed. 
This is the most diff"icult of the conditions. What precisely 
is it that needs to be fairly distributed and what counts as fair? 
It raises general questions about distributive justice and an 
answer to such a broad range of issues is hardly worth an attempt 
here. Suffice it to emphasise that in this context a demand of 
fair distribution of benefits makes no ideological assumptions 
regarding the future economic system and the country's notion of 
justice. There have to be certain minimal requirements, such as 
political rights, optimal liberty and equality before the law. 
Fair distribution of benefits raises problems when juxtaposed with 
fair distribution of burdens. Should people contribute equally to 
the struggle, or only according to their ability and means? 
Similarly, does fair distribution of benefits imply that, to those 
who contributed more, more of the cake will be given and vice 
versa? It would clearly be dangerous to argue that those who get 
more from the system have an obligation to support that system even 
more vigorously than those who are getting less. 
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iv. The prov1s1on of such benefits must be essentially 
the function of groups rather than individuals. 
Lighthouses and decoded television services are open goods 
that the private sector can provide. Liberation cannot be provided 
by the private sector or individuals. Even if a private mercenary 
group were hired, it would still have to be paid by contributions 
from the community. This is . not a conceptual requirement. 
However, only a b.izarre neighbour would · undertake to clean the 
streets free of charge for other neighbours. Similarly, it would 
require an exceptional messiah to wage a lone liberation .. struggle 
on behalf of the ·community. Further, the quest for liberty 
involves human and material costs. It seems only fair that the 
beneficiaries the entire society should shoulder the 
responsibility of creating 
Consequently, where the stakes 
available" obligations may still 
about such a claim. In fact 
a free, non-racial society. 
are high, and consent is not 
arise. There is nothing radical 
it confirms some common moral 
intuitions. The overriding importance of human life, for example, 
is sufficient for imposing obligations to respect it, regardless of 
the desire of some to lead a more piratical life. 
To conclude, non-consensual obligations are possible, as the 
principle of fair play demonstrates. In some respects at least, 
the struggle for liberation may be expressed in terms of public 
goods. However, it remains to be seen how such an imprecise 
concept as the 'struggle' can be explained by means of fairly 
precise terms like 'public goods'. This conclusion raises other 
intricate questions: Who, for example, defines liberty as a public 
good? Who decides on the allocation of the costs? Can there be an 
equal allocation of costs in the political struggle? There will 
always be some conflict between meeting needs and respecting 
liberty . . Rich people sometimes get taxed heavily for collective 
goods that they do not require, or use less than others. These 
questions are raised already at this stage, although they are 
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addressed in the coming chapters. For now, it should be 
acknowledged that they raise genuine problems for this argument. 
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1. Emphasis added. 
2. Emphases added. 
3. The principles are: (A) Each person is to have an equal right 
to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties 
compatible with a similar system of liberty for all; (B) Social 
and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both 
(i) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent 
with the just savings principle , and (ii) attached to offices and 
positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of 
opportunity. 
4. For problems raised by Rawls' justice condition see 
Simmons:1979:109-114. 
5. Emphasis in the original. 
6~ Also variously known as 'syndicates' or 'societies'. 
7. · This is an untested assumption. There seem to be activists who 
do much better than those who confine their visits to academic 
libraries. Whether they are exceptions to the rule or not cannot 
be established here. 
8. Emphasis added 
9. It should be mentioned briefly that the distinction between 
receiving ' and accepting is not as neat as Simmons suggests, but 
this is not something that should divert attention at this stage. 
For an elaborate study see Maphai:1987:75. still, there is some 
analytic merit to this distinction. 
10. Emphasis added. 
11. In fairness to Hart, it must be pointed out that the principle 
of fair play was not his major focus. He mentions it briefly in 
the context of natural rights. 
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utilitarianism and Fair Play 
The principle of fair play may be based on two possible 
ethical bases, namely, deontology and consequentialism. A 
deontological perspective condemns free riding as intrinsically 
unfair whereas a consequentialist objects to free riding only if it 
is socially harmful. This chapter deals with the debate between 
utilitarianism and fair play. The problem is that free riding may 
be simultaneously required by, or condemned on utilitarian. grounds. 
The central dogma of utilitarianism is maximisation of total or 
average utility. On the other hand, the principle of fair play 
insists that all who benefit should cooperate in the production of 
the benefit, that is, the class of beneficiaries should be 
identical .to that of cooperators. The principle of fair play is 
based upon just distribution of benefits and burdens, while 
utilitarianism is concerned with optimal utility. The result is 
that whereas the principle of fair play prescribes universal 
participation, utilitarianism might require only widespread 
selective cooperation. It will be contended here that there is no 
inherent and irreconcilable conflict between fair play and 
utilitarianism. They are contradictory only if one examines free 
riding from a deontological position. The relative claims of both 
the deontological and consequentialist approaches towards free 
riding will be examined. In the end, it will be demonstrated that, 
even if from the deontological approach free riding were 
intrinsically evil, this itself would not justify coercive 
enforcement of cooperation (that is, the prevention of free 
riding) . One would still have to fall back on utilitarian 
considerations by demonstrating that such intrinsic wrongne~s was 
also socially harmful. 
To recapitulate, free riding could be condemned for two 
reasons, namely, that it is potentially harmful (utilitarian), and 
it is flagrantly unfair (deontological). However, what justifies 
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coercive measures against free riding would not be its intrinsic 
immorality, but rather its potential for public harm. society has 
a right to protect itself from harm, but it is not its prerogative 
to force people to behave morally. In other words, legal moralism 
is not an acceptable liberty-limiting principle, except where there 
is a link between the (im)morality and public harm. 
Problems with utilitarianism 
Three criticisms are levelled against the utilitarian basis of 
the principle of fair play. First, and this is - ironic, 
utilitarianism can in fact undermine the principle of fair play. 
If everyone had to deliberate and act like an act-utilitarian, then 
this would result in massive disaffiliation from say, a liberation 
movement. The threat of such a failure is constant. Second, from 
a deontological perspective, utilitarianism is blatantly unfair. 
It is indifferent to the demands of fair shares of burdens and 
benefits. The benefit might eventuate with optimal but extremely 
unfair methods. ThirQ, utilitarianism may not be as efficient and 
cost-effective as it claims to be. On the contrary it could be 
impractical. To summarise, both fair play and utilitarianism 
pursue and protect certain fundamental values. utilitarianism aims 
at efficient and rational cost effectiveness. Fair play focuses 
upon a fair distribution of a public good and a fair allocation of 
costs. 
Briefly, utilitarians argue that universal cooperation leads 
to non-optimal consequences; that it is not necessary for each and 
every person to be involved in the liberation effort, nor is it 
necessary that all those who have benefitted from a scheme 
contribute towards its maintenance. What is required is only that 
some, probably the majority should cooperate. The crux of 
utilitarian complaints is that it is foolish to have a benefit at 
a higher price than one needs to pay because the optimal outcome is 
to get it 'at the lowest cost possible. If more people contribute 
than is necessary more is being paid for it than is necessary. As 
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a result there is a smaller utilitarian surplus than there would be 
if fewer people contributed. The best utilitarian outcome is if 
the minimum number of people sufficient to produce a surplus 
contribute. consequently, free riding is not necessarily wrong, 
especially where no harm results. On the contrary free riding may 
be prescribed or even demanded by u~ilitari~nism. 
Why is there a problem in the first place? Why should cost-
effectiveness and fair play be mutually exclusive? It is 
necessary to recall some relevant features of free riding and 
public goods. There are essentially two different types of free 
riding (Griffin:1985:120). One adds a real, though often minor, 
extra burden on members of a scheme, whereas the other involves no 
extra load whatsoever. It is the latter that raises problems for 
utilitarians. Public goods were seen to be those in respect of 
which people find themselves in a prisoner's dilemma situation. 
Consumption of such goods cannot be restricted to those who have 
paid for them. Because the condition of individual insignificance 
is satisfied in the case of public goods, it is tempting to become 
a free rider. This is the dilemma from an individual's viewpoint: 
'If others produce the public good, I shall get it. If on the 
other hand they deliberate like me and fail to contribute, I will 
be irrational to put my investment on a lost cause. Consequently, 
whatever everybody else does, it is better that I do not 
contribute'. This is the paradox that both utilitarianism and fair 
play must address. How do they respond? 
utilitarians opt for the optimal outcome, that is the minimum 
price because this maximises the surplus. What is their attitude 
towards universal cooperation? There are two possible answers. 
Either (a) they dismiss fair playas irrelevant or (b) they take it 
into consideration as a separate issue altogether. The alleged 
irrelevance of fair play is evident in the following argument 
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(Sumner:1971:116): 
But this [the principle of fair play] is an unfortunate 
principle in the sense that universal conformity to it 
necessarily produces a non-optimal outcome, thus 
requiring unnecessary sacrifice on the part of some 
members of the community. Those who make ita point 
always to follow such a principle and seek no method for 
bringing about an optimal outcome are to that extent 
wrong-headed. If Dogood waters when all others are 
refraining as a consequence of their adherence to such a 
principle then he is in a perfectly good sense taking 
advantage of them ••. and if they are, as we are assuming, 
conscientious then he is taking advantage of their 
conscientiousness. Howeyer steadfastly they hew to their 
principle, the point is that a better outcome may be 
possible if they abandon it; this is a measure of their 
foolishness in being thus steadfast. When others are 
being foolish and wrong-headed is one required to be 
foolish and wrong-headed as well? 
How does a utilitarian take fair play into account? Such fair ' 
play would be based on the theory that if there are not any 
procedures for fair distribution of the surplus then there are 
well-known human characteristics that result, like bitterness, 
resentment and the desire not to be taken for a ride. Therefore, 
it is possible to prescribe on utilitarian grounds that there 
should be some fair share procedure. still, where conflict occurs 
between utilitarianism and fair play, then utilitarianism would 
take prec~dence. utilitarians argue that to prevent everyone from 
certain potentially harmful activities, when there are feasible 
ways of permitting others to perform those activities without harm, 
is senselessly severe. Broad (cited in Lyons:1965:168) is explicit 
about this: 
There may come a point where it is better that some 
people should refuse to co-operate although this involves 
an imperfect distribution, than that they should by co-
operating produce a much smaller net-balance of goods 
though perfectly distributed. 
The rest of the chapter proceeds on the assumption that fair play 
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is taken into consideration by utilitarianism, but only as a 
separate issue altogether. It can no longer be assumed that the 
latter is indifferent to the requirements of fair play. In that 
case what would separate fair play from utilitarianism? The 
following illustration provides a clue to a possible answer. 
Suppose that a group of persons hired a jumbo jet which holds 
400 passengers, at a total cost of R80 000 payable six months in 
advance. Assume further that the flight is of prime or overriding 
importance, such · that they cannot afford to cancel but for 
exceptional reasons. They elect a committee to plan and arrange 
the flight. The conditions are as follows: Once an individual has 
paid, the journey is guaranteed for that person. If he withdraws 
subsequently from the deal, the initial payment is non-refundable. 
If the full price is not covered from individual contributions, 
committee members have to make up the shortfall from their personal 
resources. If more has been collected than was necessary, then the 
surplus is shared by the committee members. This agreement creates 
legal rights and obligations between the committee and the members. 
Assuming that the committee consisted, not of rugged capitalists 
but rather of utilitarians, how should they calculate a fare per 
passenger? Two options come to mind: 
i. One approach (utilitarian) results in the price of 
R200 per person (R80 000 divided by 400). This is 
optimal and fair. No waste is involved. 
ii. The other alternative (fair play) might require R250 
per person. This is also fair, in the sense that this is 
what everyone pays. However, it is non-optimal, i . e 
travellers pay more than they need to. 
Which then is the c·orrect price? The answer depends on a host of 
\ 
factors. Suppose that all the passengers paid and turned up on the 
departure day (this fact could not have been known in advance). 
The utilitarian price would definitely be the best under these 
circumstances. However, it depends on other preconditions. 
Firstly, there has to be sufficient passengers to occupy each and 
143 
every seat. If not, the organising committee runs the risk of 
carrying additional costs. Had the committee not been obliged to 
take responsibility for possible extra costs, the situation would 
have been worse. It may have become necessary to cancel the 
journey or to ground the jet until every available seat had been 
taken. At this point the patrons might consider other modes of 
travel. In other words, while the utilitarian solution is 
financially optimal, it is nevertheless extremely unstable. 
utilitarians ' also face what looks like an imponderable 
information problem. However, in soine cases, given certain 
relevant information about the cost of a public good, it should be 
possible to calculate fairly the cost to each one. The example 
above clearly demonstrates that this is possible. In short, what 
utilitarians need to do is simply to calculate the minimum cost 
required. This strategy results in salience. It ensures that 
every action has implications for the scheme, and that each knows 
that unless he participates, then it will result in a disaster. 
There is no condition of individual insignificance (Tuck: 1979: 150) . 
What becomes an issue then is the fair play or otherwise of the 
procedures by means of which free riders are chosen. Such free 
riders might be decided by lot, or by a system of rotation. The 
above dilemma is similar to the one which Tuck (1979:151) provides 
about the number of people who may cross the lawn without causing 
damage to it: 
Assuming that each member of the community is a 
utilitarian and knows that his fellows are the same, and 
that each person can work out independently what the 
utilitarian optimal1 allocation is, then it should be 
possible for them so to co-ordinate their acti vi ties that 
the allocation is achieved. Suppose they calculate that 
the optimum number to walk on the grass is 10 .• , and 
there is a population of 100, then each member of the 
population can independently give himself a probability 
of walking on the grass such that if they all gi ve 
themselves the same probability, the number walking on it 
will ordinarily be 10. 
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Part of the problem with utilitarians stems from the type of 
examples with which they work. They involve people agonizing over 
whether to cross a lawn or not, to litter or not, to water a garden 
, or not, to pick up flowers or not, to raise a room temperature from 
50 to 60 degrees or not. with such items and objects it is 
relatively easy to calculate costs and distribute them optimally 
and fairly. Yet there are problems even in these cases. For 
example, where calculation of costs is possible, as was evident 
from the jumbo jet" example, utilitarians cut their scheme too thin 
by making it too unstable and too susceptible to minor deviation. 
In the long run this might prove costly and inefficient. Besides, 
the establishment and monitoring of such procedures might prove too 
unwieldy. 
However, to make the kind of calculation they need in respect 
to public goods, they require a degree of· knowledge that is not 
readily available or even conceptually possible. For example, how 
could anyone possibly compute the costs of a liberation struggle? 
Does it make sense to compile a definitive final shopping list: 
200 tanks, 6000 hand grenades, 4 weeks for a national strike, 20 
national demonstrations, 18 calls for sanctions, 20 000 casualties, 
50 school boycotts, and 30 consumer boycotts? On the utilitarian 
optimal principle, accurate calculation is necessary so that no 
disutility follows. Moreover, as Tuck (1979:152) points out, 
ultimately the difficulty involves far more than data. It is a 
'slippery slope' problem: 
At what point do you recognize the threshold, or when 
does a heap become one? There is not such a clear cut 
criterion. In fact, the free rider problem arises 
precisely because public goods are characteristically not 
like that - the amount that they can be bought for is 
indefinite, because what is being bought is essentially 
indefinite. 
Similarly~ how does any government define the borders of a good 
health service? This is 
utilitarians seem to think. 
not merely an information problem as 
What is at issue is a logical riddle. 
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Until this riddle is resolved (by logicians) no utilitarian shall 
ever be in a position to provide a satisfactory cut-off point. 
There is some truth, then, in sartorius' (1982:214) contention 
that cooperation under the act-utilitarian banner would be limited 
to the following conditions: (a) no significant threshold effects 
are involved2 ; and (b) the individual is in a position to act in 
a manner that will have a perceptible effect on the welfare of 
others. This formulation confirms the contention that the bigger 
the contributing group the less difference non-cooperation makes. 
There is a further possible anti-utilitarian considerati9n, namely, 
that the utilitarian position is internally inconsistentr that it 
is impossible to sustain it even in a community consisting entirely 
of utilitarians. Such a community would be incapable of 
cooperation since it sanctions free riders. To appreciate this 
concern, it should be recalled that fair play does not necessarily 
insist on each and every single person contributing regardl~ss of 
personal circumstances. There are possible exceptions. However, 
the onus rests on such exceptions to demonstrate how relevantly 
different they are from other contributors to deserve special 
exemption from communal obligations. For this reason, the poor and 
incapacit~ted may be exempted from payment. There is a morally 
relevant difference between them and other members of the 
community. 
The utilitarian position is much more radical than this. It 
wants to exclude all who feel that a contribution is unnecessary, 
even though they can afford it. In other words, whereas fair play 
permits 'free riding' as a counsel of prudence, utilitarianism 
prescribes it as a moral imperative. For utilitarians, the 
problem becomes the mechanism of deciding who should contribute, 
and who may be left t off the hook'. This problem should be 
explored against an earlier assumption - the assumption that fair 
play has been added to utilitarianism. Suppose this dilemma occurs 
in the society inhabited only by utilitarians: Who should free 
ride and how is that decided? What utilitarians recommend here is 
an equitable chance to everyone for exemption. 
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However, the method of calculating costs of public goods is 
likely to be suspect. The criterion for such assessment could be 
nothing more than personal discomfort. A utilitarian 'wimp' could 
be tempted to exaggerate the cost of liberation so that his non-
cooperation might seem morally respectable. This could be a purely 
subconscious process and there is no need to assume malicious 
motives on the part of utilitarians. Besides, for three-quarters 
of the world's population, the types of benefits cited (well-
trimmed lawns, rising temperatures and beautiful flowers) are 
dispensable at best, and unattainable luxuries at worst. This may 
be asked: Is it judicious to subject fundamental public goods like 
liberty to utilitarian whims? Further, the type of 'occasion-by-
occasion' calculation required by act-utilitarianism presupposes 
the availability of leisure to which many oppressed people have 
still to gain access. 
Lastly, as it was suggested earlier, much of this calculation 
takes place against the background of either total ignorance or 
insufficient information., In a large community it is often 
difficult to predict what the ,others will do. Utilitarians do not 
provide an unconditional and unqualified support for a public good. 
Their decision to cooperate or not depends largely on what others 
are doing. In that case, they 'should then try to form an 
estimate about the probable number of cooperators and choose to 
cooperate , if that number is on an increasing part of the average 
utility curve' (Elster:1985:150). For them to be able to do this, 
the principle of fair play should assume a more central position. 
They require a guarantee that there would at least be others who 
will always cooperate, regardless of the circumstances, that is, 
those who regard the duty to cooperate as something close to a 
categorical imperative. without this basic presumption, the 
utilitarian probability approximation would rest on a precarious 
foundation. Consequently, a rational utilitarian seems to be 
parasitic on the presence of non-utilitarian, deontological 
moralists. Of course, this is not a problem. A utilitarian is 
someone who, amongst other things, knows or tries to determine how 
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many deontological moralists are around. 
To recapitulate, what justifies coercive measures against free 
riding is not its 'intrinsic immorality', but rather its potential 
for public harm. Society has a right to protect itself from harm, 
but it is not its prerogative to force people to behave morally. 
The issue at this point becomes: What constitutes harm? This is 
the subject of the next chapter. 
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1. Optimal utility is that in which only the required minimum 
take part. There is no unwarranted and unnecessary addition of 
burdens (Sumner:1971:109). This note is not found in the original 
quote. 
2. Threshold effects are those consequences of individual action 
that result or fail to result depending on whether or not a 
sufficient number of others are acting in the appropriate way. 
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CDPfBR SIX 
An analysis of the concept of Harm 
In this chapter, it is demonstrated that free riding is 
potentially a socially harmful activity and that, consequently, it 
calls for some form of social intervention. That harm is a genuine 
liberty-limiting principle is assumed without argument. However, 
harm is not a tidy and problem-free concept as the following 
illustrate: 
i. To harm someone is to damage (thwart, set back or 
defeat) their interests. To have an interest in 
something is to have a stake in its being well 
maintained. A person stands to gain or lose in respect 
to the interest because of some investment of energy or 
goods (Feinberg:1973:53)1. Tbis is essentially Hare's 
position as well (1972:25). 
ii. To harm is to do what most people do not want, and 
we think they are right in not wanting it 
(Lucas:1966:172). 
111. Harm is a severe loss of a valued thing, and the 
violation of rights (Goodrum:1976:329). 
iv. Harm is a violation of a legally protected right 
(Kleinig:1978:27). 
v. In a moral sense to harm a person is to wrong him, or 
treat him unjustly (Feinberg:1984:34). 
These definitions call for some preliminary comments. All 
are incomplete or vague as they stand. However, they all include 
some important concepts linked with harm. The first (i) raises the 
question of interests which is central to the notion of harm. 
Similarly wants or desires playa prominent role in (ii). Also 
suggested is that only violation of legitimate wants constitutes 
harm. There is a moral sense to the concept. Harm presupposes 
wrongful conduct~ Rights and justice are also suggested by (iii) 
and (v). The notion of harm presupposes some theory of rights. 
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Goodrum's account is broader on the question of rights than 
Kleinig's 'and covers a wider area than legal rights, by including 
both moral and natural rights. This should be distinguished from 
the view that only violation of legal rights constitutes harm as 
asserted by (iv). Such a theory is too narrow because it excludes 
slaves and others without political and legal rights from the class 
of possible victims of harm. Worse still, it would legitimise 
questionable but legally protected rights in a repressive and 
discriminatory system. Clearly some laws are deleterious and 
confer rights which morally ought not to be respected. Existing 
rules in an unjust and discriminatory society can cause harm, and 
the South African society is a paradigm case. 
Now for some examples of harmful behaviour. Generally, the 
concept covers a wide variety of individual and collective actions. 
Common examples are wilful homicide, assault and battery, robbery 
(Feinberg:1973:25); bodily injury, fraud, theft, destruction of 
property (Goodrum:1976:329 and Taylor:1973:56)i mental anguish or 
pain, physical pain, hurt and suffering, grief, sorrow and the loss 
which had occasioned it, and malicious and untruthful gossip 
(Kleinig:1978:27); imprisonment, exposure to infectious diseases, 
a tarnished reputation, loss of jobs, being kept in ignorance, and 
being corrupted (Lucas:1966:172); malnutrition, starvation, 
emotional disturbances, illness and disease, vulnerability to 
attack and homelessness (Lyons:1979:7); loss of something desirable 
(Goodrum: 1976: 240); a deprivation of more valuable aspects of 
living (Thomson:1987:37). 
It should be evident that the list constitutes an untidy maze. 
It gets even more indeterminate than this when collective harms or 
harms to public interest are added. Private harm is generally 
directed at individual interests. In contrast, public harm entails 
damage to institutions and systems considered to be in the public 
interest. ' It is not essential to the notion of public harm that 
specific people should incur visible and concrete injuries or harm. 
What is required is that institutions in which the community has a 
stake should be undermined or threatened (Feinberg:1973:25). It is 
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also possible to base a conception of harm on the need for common 
values. In this case, harm simply means the violation of common 
values of the community and its ideal life patterns 
(Lucas:1966:173): 'Unless there were some things generally 
regarded as harm, there would be ••. no basis for any community at 
all' • 
Hart (1961: 189-195) conceives of public harm against the 
background of 'certain rules which any social organisation must 
contain if it is · to be viable'. The need for these rules is 
explained largely in terms of three features of human nature: 
i. Firstly, because of natural equality and limited 
altruism, humans are vulnerable to bodily attacks and 
killings from fellow humans. This was also one of the 
fundamental assumptions of the contract theorists 
regarding people in the state of nature. 
1.1.. Secondly, unlimited wants for limited resources like 
food result in the need to control property. 
iii. Finally, commercial deals necessitate rules to make 
promises and contracts binding. 
In the light of these facts of human nature, harmful conduct 
comprises the infringement of those rules, and the impairment of 
those institutions, necessary to the viability of society. This 
account of harm has moved a long way from mere bodily injury to 
societal harm. 
Interest and Desire 
Harm entails the interrelated concepts of wants and interests. 
Interest partly involves the frustration or non-fulfilment of 
desires. For Barry (1965:176) interest means what increases a 
person's opportunity to get what he wants. Interests are potential 
means to ultimate ends. They do not satisfy immediate ends, but 
rather put one in a position to satisfy wants. What is interest 
and how is it related to desire? In this context the notion of 
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interest acquires a specialised meaning, different from the 
psychological phen?menon suggested by the phrase 'X is interested 
in'. Such descriptive connotation usually refers to the 
inclination to pay attention to something, or some person 
(Kleinig: 1878: 27). For example, someone might be interested in the 
results of a tennis tournament. 
The harm-related concept of interest is normative. To start 
with, an intelligible distinction can be made between two concepts 
of interest, both of which are captured by the expression 'X has an 
interest in.' There is a subjective concept, according to which 
interest refers to anything which is the object of human desire. 
Unfortunately, this is too wide a conception to be of use because, 
in principle, people can desire anything and everything. This 
means that the frustration of any desire, however outrageous, 
bizarre, trivial and non-essential would amount to harm. If 
members of the Afrikaner Weerstand Beweqinq or of the Blanke 
Bevrydeqinqs orqanisasie2 desire the extermination of blacks or 
Jews and are prevented from fulfilling their desires, then on this 
account they would be harmed. Consequently: 
••• desires must be subject to some form of assessment or 
criticism before they can be used to define the value of 
prim~ry goods in a theory of well-being and harm 
(Thomson:1987:44). 
In contrast to subjective interests there is an objective concept, 
according to which interest refers to whatever is truly good for a 
person, that is, whatever promotes his welfare, regardless of how 
he feels about it (Feinberg:1984:42). Here interest is construed 
as a generalised means, often indispensable to the advancement of 
ulterior interest (this concept is ex~lained fully below). This 
distinction, useful as it might prove to be, raises an immediate 
question regarding obj ecti ve interests. If they represent 'what is 
truly good for a person regardless of his wants', how are they 
established? 
While interests are not reducible to wants, the two concepts 
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are not unrelated either. Whatever the relationship between the 
two, it is impossible to deal with interests without addressing the 
question of wants (Hare:1972:98): 
It would scarcely be intelligible to claim that a certain 
thing was in a man's interest, although he neither wanted 
it, nor had ever wanted it, nor would ever want it, nor 
anything that it was a necessary or sufficient means to, 
nor might any of these things be the case. 
It is plainly incorrect to reduce all interests to wants. After 
all, it is not logically inconsistent to claim that 'although A 
desires X, X is really not in A's interest'. Not only can· a person 
desire what is not in his interest; conversely, he might also abhor 
what is in his interest. 3 This could be said of a heart patient 
who desires to improve his condition but nevertheless smokes and 
fails to take regular physical exercises. A person might act 
contrary to his interests for a number of reasons such as 
irrationality, immaturity, ignorance and impatience. What then is 
the relationship between interests and wants? 
An instructive distinction can be made between ulterior and 
welfare interests. Ul terior interests are a person's more ultimate 
goals and aspirations such as artistic or scientific achievement, 
high political office, successfully raising a family, and personal 
glory. Typical of ulterior interests is that they function as ends 
in themselves (Feinberg:1984:37). They are intricately linked to 
wants in a manner that welfare interests do not seem to be. 
Welfare interests are instrumental and non-ultimate in the sense of 
being necessary conditions for the 
interests. They may also be basic, 
underdeveloped countries: 
fulfilment of ultimate 
especially in poor and 
•.• even some human beings - at certain times and places, 
most human beings - have as their highest good something 
resembling mere welfare. For these souls, just makinq 
it, surviving from day to day, is triumph enough ... mere 
welfare is the same as well-being. 
In the case of ulterior interest, wants seem to play an 
essential role. In fact ulterior interests seem reducible to wants 
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in the manner other interests are not. For example, how could a 
person have an interest in political life without simultaneously 
wanting such a life? still, wants do not account for all 
interests, as is evident from welfare interests. Welfare interests 
are non-trivial and interference with them usually amounts to more 
than a failure to benefit. In some countries they are protectable 
rights, thus making their enforcement and protection appropriate. 
The following would be examples of welfare interests: bodily and 
mental health, normal intellectual development, adequate material 
security, stable and non-superficial inter-personal relationships, 
and a fair degree of liberty, life, physical health and vigour, 
integrity, emotional stability, freedom from interference and 
coercion, minimal income and financial security, tolerable social 
and physical environment, resources, economic assets, and political 
liberty. They are, according to Kleinig (1978:30) 'privative' that 
is, their opposites are logically primary. A term is privative if 
it is defined as 'the absence of those quali ties which are 
constitutive of its opposite'. For example, 'health' refers more 
accurately to absence of disease, than to abundance of good health. 
Privative notions presuppose 'normalcy'. Good health is the norm: 
it is the disease or ill health that calls for an explanation. 
Welfare, then, consists in the absence of defects and 
irregularities with respect to some conception of its normal 
functioning. Welfare interests are shared by nearly all people. 
They are minimal, but non-ultimate - serving rather as necessary 
means to ultimate ulterior interests (Feinberg:1984:37). 
On the whole, welfare interests are typically instrumental. 
They constitute basic requirements of human beings, but by no means 
all of well-being. They are necessary if people are to have any 
chance in life at all, a chance of achieving other goods. This is 
what makes them more important than ulterior interests in the sense 
that if they are defeated, so are a person's more ultimate goals. 
This fact makes it possible to maintain of any person, that he may 
not necessarily be the best judge of his own welfare. It is true 
that an athlete might be more concerned about his success, but his 
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trainer might be a better judge of what is required for that 
success. · To determine welfare interest~, one needs judgment and 
some expertise. Al though personal feelings are not altogether 
dispensable in the account of interest, still they are not decisive 
either. This is essentially what Barry (1965:177) implies in 
reference to drug addicts, alcoholics and compulsive gamblers: 
And if someone isn't himself able to make the rational 
calculation others can try to think their way into the 
man's value system, or impute what seem reasonable values 
to him (based largely on the value systems of more 
rational people) and prevent him from doing things he 
will regret later or make him do things he will be 
pleased later to have done. 
The harm principle defended here is intended to be both narrow and 
effective. It must be limited to the prevention of harm to others, 
and not include the prohibition of the harmless but undesirable 
actions of others. The harm prevented must always be grave - so 
serious that the cost to the person who is interfered with must be 
negligible compared with the harm his actions would precipitate. 
How is such a concept possible? First a brief look at the 
relationship between benefits and harm. The fundamental thesis 
here is that, in general, people may be coerced in order to prevent 
them from harming one another. They may, however, not be coerced 
into providing benefits. This will require some clarity on the 
differences between non-benefit and harm. 
Harm, Benefit and Non-Benefit 
According to Feinberg (1973:30) harm refers ultimately to 
unmet needs. To harm a person is to deprive that person of needs. 
On .the other hand, 'non-benefit' refers merely to a denial of 
benefits the person does not need. A -public good would be an 
example of a benefit that is not necessarily a need. On the other 
hand, a pure public good is always an essential need. To deny a 
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cerebral palsy patient phenobarb is to harm him, because he is 
unlikely to survive seizures without it. On the other hand, to 
deny the same person an opportunity to study abroad simply amounts 
to failure to provide a benefit. 4 The concept of need can be 
ambiguous~ On the one hand, it refers to a necessary condition for 
other interests. For example, liberty is a need in the sense that 
it is a condition for the exercise of other important human 
faculties. A need may also refer to a fundamental and crucial 
requirement, such that in its absence, survival becomes impossible. 
Food and water are needs in this sense. They are prerequisites for 
a normal biological functioning. Of course, it is possible to draw 
up a list of needs, and then settle the issue of which are more 
fundamental than others. 
The trouble with this 'unmet need' account is its implication 
that, for example, a rich person is not harmed by a minor larceny. 
This would conflict with the definition of harm as a frustration of 
interest. Clearly a millionaire has a stake, and stands to gain or 
lose if her money is tamp~red with. Feinberg resolves this issue 
by concluding that such a minor theft still amounts to harm, though 
not to actual injury.5 The 'unmet need' criterion is a test of 
whether a threshold of 'actual injury' has been met. For Feinberg, 
even where the loss is trivial, it would still be harm. To many 
this might appear too extravagant. 6 However, this need not be an 
issue at all. What Feinberg needs to maintain is simply that a 
trivial loss is still harmful, but not so seriously injurious as to 
warrant interference. 
intervention. 
In other words, not all harms require 
It should be evident now why the area of welfare interests is 
so crucial here. This is an area of possible harm. It covers 
fundamental (friendships and love) and survival (food, water and 
air) needs. Survival needs are fundamental needs, but fundamental 
needs also includes areas of personal freedom and security. 
Further, the concepts of harm and of interest presuppose morally 
acceptable action. Even in a political context, the notion of harm 
is not ethically neutral. It does not serve a descriptive function 
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only. Of course there are certain purely descriptive features, 
common to the various accounts of harm. For example, there must be 
desires and interests, and these must be frustrated or violated. 
However, these are only formal requirements. The content of 
desires and interests is crucial in the ascription of harm. 
'Harm', like 'murder', is ethically and normatively loaded. Both 
assume culpability. strictly speaking, only the innocent and the 
righteous can be harmed. Social harm is no exception. It 
presupposes some notion of what an ideal society or person should 
look like. In this sense, harm becomes a violation of 'ideal-
regarding' interests (Feinberg:1977:287). Such ideals are 
analyzable in terms of what would be ideal, or best for people, 
their wants notwithstanding. When apartheid is condemned as 
morally reprehensible, this is done from a moral perspective of 
what a good society should look like. Once again the notion of 
rights becomes helpful. People are harmed if they suffer a 
gratuitous diminution in their set of entitlements. 
Free Riders and Barm to the oppressed? 
It was pointed out that harm presupposes a moral context. The 
moral context in the case of the oppressed was the presumptive case 
for liberty. This is the assumption underlying this work. The 
assumption simply amounts to a claim that autonomous adults may not 
be coerced, unless there are serious moral considerations 
prescribing such constraints or limits to their freedom. 7 As 
Feinberg puts it, freedom is an intrinsic good. It is not merely 
good because of its consequences. In fact the consequences of 
freedom might be undesirable. Apartheid interferes with people's 
material and moral welfare interests. It undermines their capacity 
as purposive, self-reflective and moral agents. It violates not 
only people's interests in liberti, but in other fundamental and 
basic goods. Worse still, by outlawing open anti-government 
political activity, and harassing its opponents, the government has 
ingeniously devised norms designed to keep the oppressed in a 
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prisoner's dilemma situation. 
Free riders harm the oppressed if their non-cooperation leads 
to an escalating effect of non-cooperation, to the point where the 
liberation effort is stifled. They need not make the situation 
worse, but could contribute to keeping the oppressed in a harmful 
condition. Consequently, Lyons (1979) is correct in the claim that 
'harm might lead to requirements of cooperation'. Normally the 
avoidance of harm to others is not a sufficient justification for 
coercion. The prevention of harm may on balance be deemed an 
inadequate reason for imposing certain constraints. This will 
largely depend on what is at stake. If what is involved are 
essential goods - pure public goods - then coercion might be 
appropriate. In short, free riding could be harmful by obstructing 
a common quest for an essential benefit. 
The Amended principle of Fair Play 
It should be possible now to demonstrate that the basis of 
compulsory contributions under the principle of fair play should be 
something more than mere gratuitous enjoyment of benefits. There 
is something implausible, if not irrational at times, about the 
usual accounts of the principle of fair playas a ground of 
enforceable obligations. The issue is presented as sheer enjoyment 
of benefit - such enjoyment resulting eventually in the incursion 
of obligation. Previously free riding was condemned for two 
reasons; namely because it is (a) potentially harmful I 
(utilitarian), and (b) grossly unfair or intrinsically evil 
(deontological). The first concern (a) will be addressed as a 
basis of coercive measures against free riders. An undiluted 
principle of fair play, based solely on the enjoyment of public 
goods, argues that free riding is intrinsically wrong. Usually, 
the basis of the wrongness is the belief that no one has a right to 
benefit at the expense of others, or through the sacrificial work 
of others. There is certainly nothing intui ti ve about this 
concern. For example, the present generation benefits through the 
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sacrificial work of its fore-parents (scientists, philosophers and 
so on). It hardly makes sense to say that unless one has 
contributed directly (or indirectly) to the scientists' work, then 
one is not entitled to benefits that the works offer in areas like 
travel, health and nutrition. 
However, even if it were possible to portray the intrinsic 
wickedness of free riding, this in itself would not justify any 
intervention, either by the state or the liberation movements. In 
other words, one might still agree that 'what is wrong with free 
riding is not that it is harmful, but that it is unfair' 
(Tuck: 1979: 148) and yet oppose coercive measures against free 
riders. 8 Compulsory contributions based on the belief that free 
riding is intrinsically unfair is a species of legal moralism, and 
is thus not a legitimate basis for community intervention. 
A basic assumption in this argument is that intervention to 
prevent social harm is more easily justified than other liberty-
limiting principles like legal moralism, paternalism and perhaps 
even offence. Needless to say, this is not to suggest that an 
action is wrong only if it is socially harmful. Free riding is a 
specific variety of socially harmfully behaviour. It has an 
escalating effect beyond a certain threshold. If free riders 
persist then there is a real danger that an important benefit to 
society will cease, as other members are tempted to withdraw their 
voluntary support. 'The process [of free riding] will continue 
until either a very expensive equilibrium is reached, or, what is 
more likely, the whole project collapses' (Feinberg:1973:52). 
In delineating the concept of harm one faces immediate 
problems regarding definition and scope. What counts as harm, 
especially social harm? If a proper conceptualisation of harm 
could be established this would go a long way towards justifying 
compulsory cooperation in the event of pure public goods. Harm is 
a generally accepted liberty-limiting principle. Whether it is the 
only one is a matter of constant debate. For the purposes of this 
argument, it is not intended to go beyond the moderate claim that 
it is a justifiable principle (though not necessarily the only one) 
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, 't t' 9 of soc1al 1n erven 10n. This position need not be defended here 
because it is not central to this argument. still, it ' is worth 
devoting a paragraph or two to it, if only for the purpose of 
clarifying why harm, rather than benefit, is the basis of the 
principle of fair play. 
It is common to include a series of other liberty-limiting 
principles such as legal paternalism, legal moralism, welfare and 
offense (Feinberg: 1973). There is a common feature in all of them, 
namely that ultimately they appeal implicitly to social 
consequences for justification. Take paternalism for example - the 
belief that a state could rightly intervene to prevent people from 
self-inflicted harm or to promote their ' own personal welfare. 
Paternalism begins with a moral condemnation of self-regarding 
harms, like addiction to drugs and failure to use car seat belts. 
When critics insist that autonomous adults have a right to control 
their lives, then the harm principle lurks beneath. Supporters of 
the paternalism principle often then appeal to the social costs of 
incarcerating or rehabilitating drug addicts and the misery such 
abusers are likely to inflict upon their families. 
Similarly, those involved in motor accidents without using 
seat belts are said to draw unfairly on limited community medical 
resources. In short, paternalism begins with the acknowledgement 
of self-regarding actions, fails to make its point on the basis of 
these acts, and then eventually rejects the idea that those actions 
were self-regarding anyway. On the contrary, the actions are said 
to carry consequences for the community beyond their perpetrators. 
However, to admit that actions were not self-regarding is to 
abandon paternalism which relies precisely on the differences 
between other-regarding and self-regarding actions. In other 
words, except in a few cases, when paternalism is employed to 
justify state intervention it turns out to be a disguised form of 
the harm principle. This seems perfectly legitimate. Where no 
harm can be proved it is difficult to defend interference with 
individual liberty. Essentially similar parallels can be traced in 
other principles but this will not be demonstrated here. 
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Something along the above lines is proposed for the principle 
of fair play. It should thus be understood as a species of the 
harm principle. Although this interpretation is probably intended 
by many writers, surprisingly few of them explicitly put it in this 
manner. certainly Rawls (1971) and Hart (1967) respectively refer 
only to the acceptance and reception of benefits. This explains 
partly why Nozick (1971) could so easily scoff at their positions. 
Ullman-Margalit (1970 and 1976) comes closer to referring expressly 
to harm as the basis of the principle of fair play. Feinberg 
(1973:53) treats the principle as a 'hard case for the harm 
principle' and 'concludes that it is justifiable where 'there is no 
other ,practical way of supporting [a public service], and [the loss 
of such a service] would be a harm to those who do not want it,.lO 
In other words, interference with people's liberty requires much 
more serious justification than simply the fact that a person has 
enjoyed an important benefit. Such free enjoyment should also 
carry potentially harmful social consequences. 
Indeed, if the enjoyment of benefits were the sole basis of 
obligation, then potential free riders might have good reasons for 
not participating in the struggle. For one thing, no one has yet 
enjoyed a benefit. Such a benefit remains to be seen - and even 
this is a matter of fai th rather than certainty. By solely 
engaging in a cost-benefit analysis they might consider that, in 
the short (and even long) term, the benefits of the struggle are 
outweighed by its costs. The struggle might leave many people 
dead, maimed, or socially dislodged. Liberation might not even 
materialise during their lifetime. Even if it did, the newly 
liberated people might still be caught up in the process of 
reconstructing society, after scars caused by sanctions and wars of 
liberation. The physical, economic and political infrastructure 
might 'be in ruins. In other words, engaging in the struggle 
entails benefits only for future generations and dangers for those 
currently taking risks ('death now - liberation later'). Victory 
is remote and when it finally arrives, it might only usher in 
another undesirable system. 
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In short, those who do not or will not benefit need not 
contribute. consider the case of successful, powerful and wealthy 
middle class blacks in their fifties. Why should they give up what 
they already have for an uncertain future? These are the obvious 
consequences of focusing on the enjoyment of benefits by those who 
incur obligations. Unless the principle is modified it must 
necessarily carry some undesirable, though unintended consequences. 
It reinforces the reasons for free riding rather than 
participation. A possible way out of this impasse is to focus less 
on the benefit than on the harm occasioned by free riding. A free 
enjoyment of a benefit does not always result in an obligation. At 
the same time people may be obligated even though they have not 
enjoyed, or are not even going to enjoy any benefit. This can 
hardly be captured by the principle of fair playas it is 
traditionally stated. 
A version of the principle which remains faithful to its 
classical formulation but escapes the consequences of such a 
presentation is required. Such an amended principle of fair play 
(APF) should run along the following lines. In a community, people 
may have an obligation to support a jointly beneficial and mutually 
desired initiative. The obligation is strong particularly where 
the following other minimal conditions obtain: 11 
i. the initiative is already established, morally non-
objectionable, fair, effective and promising; 
ii. the benefit at issue is a pure public good (not 
simply a public good); 
iii. follows directly from (ii), namely, that the 
absence or removal of such a benefit constitutes a 
serious harm to society. 
It should be clear now why it was insisted earlier that the type of 
benefit at issue is crucial in the role of the principle of fair 
play. Only pure public goods (the absence of which, ex hypothesis, 
constitutes a serious social harm) are relevant to the principle. 
In fact they define the scope of its applicability. The 
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significance of the distinction between pure public goods and 
public goods becomes evident once again. While the frustration of 
pure public goods necessarily involves serious social harm, this is 
not the case with ordinary public goods. For example, efficient 
public transport is a public good, though not a pure public good. 
It entails a public benefit but a person is not necessarily harmed 
by carrying on without it. Understood in this sense the amended 
principle of fair play makes no radically new or counter-intuitive 
moral claims. It ·only extends a generally accepted (though by no 
means unproblematic) liberty-limiting principle of harm. This 
extension takes the form of a fourth condition: 
iv. the case for obligation is even stronger where a 
person has also benefitted from, or stands to benefit 
from a cooperative scheme. 
Condition (iv) does not constitute the core of the obligation. 
The basis remains harm to others. In this context, this means that 
everyone has an obligation not to harm the oppressed - positively 
by perpetuating oppression, or negatively, by undermining their 
liberation effort through withdrawal of support. This obligation 
stands regardless of what benef its or inconveniences ensue to 
particular individuals. As a result 'the fallen heroes of the 
liberation struggle' should not complain because they have not 
enjoyed the fruits of their labour. Naturally, common courtesy 
demands that future generations revere their fallen martyrs, but 
certainly not that they should feel chronically indebted to their 
forbears. After all, each generation lives off the efforts of the 
preceding ones (and conversely, sometimes has to carry liability 
for the misdeeds of its forbears). 
This analysis provides a number of obvious advantages. It 
places the obligation towards liberation on everyone's shoulder, 
including the privileged South African and the international 
community. The obligation is not the sole prerogative of the 
oppressed, although the latter are the target group of this study. 
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Further, it is based on a generally accepted liberty-limiting 
principle of harm. While there may be disputes about what 
constitutes harm, there is general agreement that prevention of 
serious harm is a ground for interference with individual liberty. 
The account also avoids Nozickian attacks on the principle of fair 
play. Unless the principle of fair play is restricted to both harm 
and pure public goods, then much of what Nozick (1971) claims 
begins to make sense. 
(1971) and Hart (1967). 
In some sense it may even reconcile Nozick 
According to Nozick (1971) all obligations 
must be created by some sort of positive act of voluntariness, 
except the obligation not to harm others (to violate their rights). 
If Nozick is willing to consider free riding as a form of harm, 
then he could perhaps accept the amended principle of fair play. 
The principle also enables society to act rationally, to know 
when to pursue free riders and when to ignore them. It reduces the 
significance of irrational motivations based upon envy, 
vindictiveness, authoritarianism " and legalism. In a community 
where free riders are ridiculed, dismissed as cowards, thieves and 
weaklings, or derided in cartoons, then surely they do little harm, 
except to themselves and their reputation. Intervention is 
required only where harm - actual or potential - occurs regardless 
of whether the benefit is enjoyed or not. People are restrained 
from assaulting, maiming and robbing others even when no benefits 
accrue to them as a result of the restraining measures. They are 
restrained simply to prevent harm. 
Similarly, it might save somebody sUbstantial overhead costs 
to run a brick factory in his back yard, rather than to rent 
premises elsewhere • Yet health regulations prohibit such a 
practice because of its harmful effects on the neighbourhood. The 
community intervention involves no "benefits for the industrialist 
when he obliges, and yet such a prohibition remains essentially 
fair and warranted. So, ultimately it should be harm to others, 
rather than sheer enjoyment of benefits that accounts for 
obligations. This approach also circumvents the problems 
associated with consent, insisted upon by those who feel that only 
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accepted benefits should be the basis of obligation. Harm remains 
harm, regardless of whether or not it was inflicted intentionally 
or voluntarily. In other words, it is not necessary to determine 
the free rider's state of mind in order to determine harm. 
These examples should suffice to clarify the status of 
condition (iv). It is evidently not essential for the generation 
of obligation. What it does is simply to provide additional, and 
supplementary grounds for cooperation in a mutually beneficial 
scheme. It strengthens the case for obligation. On its own, the 
principle of fair play is incapable of justifying coercive 
intervention. All that the APF establishes is the following: 
Cooperation may be justly demanded of someone to prevent serious 
social harm, even where this involves a loss or no compensation to 
that person (refer to the brick industrialist). Consequently, 
where some benefits accrue to a person as a result of cooperation, 
this independent fact provides additional grounds for cooperation 
(see also Lyons:1979:6). To sum up, the role of benefits is both 
direct and indirect in the scope of the principle of fair play. 
Where society is denied an essential benefit, a pure public good, 
and is therefore harmed through free riding, the principle applies 
directly. Where an individual benefits through enjoyment of a 
public good, this indirectly serves as an independent and 
supplementary source of obligation. The same may be said of other 
harm principles as an extended version of paternalism illustrates. 
What justifies coercive state anti-drug measures is certain 
socially harmful consequences. The fact that in the process the 
victim also harms himself is an independent supplementary 
consideration. On its own, it does not justify state intervention. 
Does this mean that the principle of fair play is therefore 
superfluous, once the harm principle is in operation? 
The answer is both positive and negative. Positive because it 
is only the harm principle which is the basis of obligation. 
However, this obligation is strengthened by the presence of 
additional benefits accruing to the individuals whose activities 
are restricted. On the other hand, harm and non-benefit are not 
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altogether distinct concepts. certain types of non-benefits 
constitute harm. Denying children cheese is a non-benefit, but 
denying them food is a non-benefit which is equivalent to harm. In 
the same manner, free riding is. a specific form of harm different 
from assault and murder. One could therefore argue that it makes 
sense to have supplementary principles for the various types of 
harm. Ultimately, the distinction between harm and fairness is 
methodological rather than substantive.. The harm principle is too 
wide and (some would say) too all-encompassing. There is 
consequently a case to be made for a separate and supplementary 
principle to the harm principle. It should be obvious that the 
harm envisaged in the principle of fair play differs from that 
involved in grievous physical assaults. 
This chapter concludes the discussion on the principle of fair 
play. It makes for clarity to recapitulate the main steps from the 
principle of fair play to the amended principle of fair play: 
i. Either acceptanpe or mere reception of benefits 
generates obligations to contribute. 
ii. Acceptance of both important and trivial benefits is 
the basis of obligation where benefits involved are 
private goods. consent is essential here. However, 
because acceptance involves conscious agreement to the 
conditions of issue, the obligation arising from this 
transaction is based on the principle of consent. 
Acceptance does not generate obligations under the 
principle of fair play. 
iii. If the principle of fair play is to operate 
anywhere, it has to be a SUbstitute for, rather than an 
extension of the consent theory. This means it applies 
where consent does not. Consequently, it is in respect 
to the reception, rather than enjoyment of benefits that 
the principle of fair play applies. . 
iv. Where the good is of overriding importance to 
society, and fair procedures are ·involved in its 
production, then mere enjoyment of that benefit generates 
obligations. Here consent is dispensable. 12 
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v Free riding is wrong both intrinsically and in terms of 
the social harm it breeds. However, social intervention 
to prevent free riding is justified by the social harm it 
causes rather than because of its moral impropriety. 
vi Finally, for the purposes of coercive measures, what is 
wrong with free riding is its potential for social harm 
rather than the brute fact of its being immoral. 
Even if one admi ts the obligation to participate in the 
liberation strugg~e, so far it is not clear what is entailed in 
this obligation. For example, does it require that every person 
joins a specific political organisation, or simply supports some 
liberation movement? As it stands it compares to the duties people 
have to love their neighbours. It is ambiguous, wide and 
imprecise. Acting out of such a duty, people may arrive at 
conflicting conclusions about what ought to be done. Further, what 
happens if a person honestly and seriously indicates that he has no 
objection against apartheid; that he is perfectly happy with the 
status quo, despite its repressive nature? Should this person be 
'forced to be free'? Should he be forced to free others, and risk 
his life and well-being even though he does not care for liberty 
himself? In other words, what right does anyone have to drag 




1. See also Kleinig (1978:28). Generally, harm is interference 
with, or invasion of a person's interest. 
2. These are extreme, exclusively white right-wing organisations. 
Their English names would respectively be: Afrikaner Resistance 
Movement and White Liberation organisation. 
3. This question is discussed extensively below. 
4. Naturally benefits and needs differ from context to context. 
A chance to study abroad might be a need for someone who cannot 
undertake such studies in her home country. 
5. For an opposing view on this issue, see Goodrum (1976:240). He 
does not regard minor inconveniences and thefts as small harms. 
6. Kleinig (1978:30), in contrast to Feinberg, does not believe 
that every interference with interest constitutes harm. 
7. It was already pointed out that the need for maximum social and 
political freedom is assumed, and will not be argued. For a more 
detailed study, see Feinberg (1973: 1-19), Hill (1979) and Hare 
(1989). 
8. In fact the position taken here is in direct contrast to 
Tuck's, as the previous chapter illustrates. 
9. This should not be confused with the claim that society has to 
intervene to prevent each and every harmful act. 
10. Emphasis added. 
11. These are minimal conditions. others are added as the work 
progresses. 
12. This position is closer to what Rawls (1969:334) calls 
'Natural Duty Of Justice' which is divided into two parts. 'First, 
we are to comply with and to do our share in just institutions when 
they exist and apply to us; and second, we are to assist in the 
establishment of just arrangements when they do not exist, at least 
when this can be done with little cost to ourselves'. There are 
slight differences though between Rawls' and my position. First, 
whereas he regards this as a duty, I would consider it an 
obligation. Second, it is not clear what he means by 'little cost 
to ourselves'. If this refers to mere inconvenience, which can be 
a little cost, then my principle is stronger than this. The 
struggle involves far more than little costs. 
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CDP.fBR SBVBII 
coercion and Obligation 
Although coercion is a central theme of this study it has so 
far received cursory treatment. Coercion among the oppressed in 
South Africa evokes images of necklacings, killings and early-hours 
arson on private and public property. This is not what is going to 
be defended. perh~ps such measures are defensible but this is not 
what this essay is about. Al though violence is a form of c::oercion, 
coercion is not reducible to violence. In this chapter, two 
problems will be dealt with: The problem of obligation and the 
problem of coercion, and the relationship between the two. In the 
previous chapters emphasis was laid on the relationship between 
them in respect to the liberation struggle. Much more space has 
been devoted to the problem of obligation than to that of coercion. 
In fact, very little has been said so far about the problem of 
coercion, which is a difficult matter on its own account. How is 
coercion related to the 'rights-obligation' discourse? It will be 
recalled that rights are 'moral claims whose enforcement would be 
appropriate. There is with respect to rights [and therefore, 
obligations] a special congruity in the use of force, or the threat 
of force' (Hart:1967:55). In other words, rights and obligations 
are prima facie grounds for coercion. Consequently, if one could 
demonstrate that resistance organisations have a right to be 
supported, this would justify, in the absence of other overriding 
moral considerations, the employment of coercion by the 
organisations to enforce their rights. 
It is tempting to push the argument even further. One could 
insist that the conditions for coercion and obligation are 
different and that, in some cases, the existence of obligation is 
neither a necessary, nor a sufficient condition for the legitimacy 
of coercion. In fact this point has already been made in chapter 
one. In other words, the existence of rights and obligations does 
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not automatically imply that the employment of coercion would be 
morally acceptable. similarly, even where obligations and rights 
are not at issue, there may still be grounds for legitimate use of 
force. For example, it may be rappropriate to take a neighbour's 
car without permission if this was required in order to rush a 
severely injured person, or a woman in labour to hospital. It may 
even be illegal to do so. It could also be that the two neighbours 
did not particularly get along well with each other. For the time 
being at least, the exigencies of the situation may override 
considerations of property rights and poor neighbourliness. 
Similarly, in an emergency, a person may forcibly be removed from 
a cool and shady spot in a public park, to make room for someone 
who has just fainted. The assumption is that this takes place in 
a public park where people are free normally to lie wherever they 
wish. 
Of course, it is possible to dismiss the preceding arguments 
as purely semantical. It could still be argued that in both cases, 
rights and obligations are at issue. In the first example, it is 
possible that two rights were in conflict: the right to property 
(of the car owner) and the right to life (of the injured person). 
Similarly, conflicting_ rights are at play in the second case, 
between the right to life (of the fainted person), and the right to 
free movement and non-interference (of the person in the shade). 
It could be that in taking the neighbour's car forcibly, one is 
suggesting that such a neighbour has an obligation to save life, 
and that this obligation is morally prior to the owner's right to 
property. In this case, the owner was coerced into saving life. 
While this approach may deal with the problem in part, it 
still fails to dispose of the matter entirely. Obligations arising 
as a result of the principle of fair play do seem to run into 
problems as grounds for coercion in a liberation struggle. In the 
preceding chapter, some conditions which would legitimise 
organisations and give them the right to make certain demands on 
people, were outlined. Even if there were organisations which met 
those requirements, it is not clear that this would establish them 
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with any right to demand support. At best such features provide 
prima facie grounds for cooperation with the organisation, but 
would not as such give them the required right to coerce people 
legitimately into liberation. Moral worthiness as such confers no 
rights. Imagine an eligible bachelor who is also intelligent, 
handsome, loving, faithful, generous, pampering, and diligent. In 
short he meets all the criteria set by prevailing wisdom for an 
ideal husband. Does it follow that this person is entitled to a 
woman of his choice regardless of her concern? Surely not. None 
of these credentials establish possible rights in respect to any 
woman. It may in fact emerge that the best favour any woman could 
do for herself would be to marry this man, but this is beside the 
point. One gains no rights whatsoever simply by being moral. It 
is logically possible for a public good to be delivered comfortably 
and competently by an evil government, just as the apartheid system 
may be overthrown by a movement with no record of democratic 
practice. It is possible for a morally reprehensible movement to 
be the most effective. 
The argument so far is that consent is not a plausible basis 
of political obligation. Similarly, the principle of fair play may 
be a ground of obligation, but it does not spell out in any 
incontrovertible fashion who has the right to enforce the 
obligation. Furthermore, in chapter one it was argued that the 
existence of the obligation as such does not provide conclusive 
reason for action. This means that even if the right and 
obligation (and their holders) were proved beyond doubt, this in 
itself would prove little in terms of what ought to be done. 
Indeed, perfect and complete obligations are rare, especially in 
political life (Walzer:l965:xi). Ultimately, either the obligation 
exists or it does not. If it does, nothing follows about the 
course of action to be adopted. Similarly, if no obligation exists 
to do X, it does not follow that people ought not to do X. 
Therefore, even if people have no obligation to take part in the 
struggle it does not follow that they ought not to participate. So 
far this marks no major theoretical advance. The issue is whether 
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resistance organisations have a right to demand participation and 
clearly they do not. Yet, once more, nothing follows from this 
about what they mayor may not do. For one thing, it is not always 
wrong or immoral to demand things to which one is not entitled. 
similarly, it may not be inappropriate to coerce people into doing 
actions they are obliged to undertake. In such a situation values 
become distorted and in the process moral corners may appear to 
have been cut. 
It is worthwhile returning to the original question, whether 
the oppressed are justified in coercing one another into certain 
types of liberation activities. This was translated into a 
question involving the obligations of the oppressed, and the rights 
of the coercer (often, though not exclusively liberation 
movements) • This approach was based on the understanding that 
rights and obligations are prima facie justification for coercion. 
However, it is evident now that even in the absence of rights and 
obligations, coercion might still be justifiable. In the light of 
this it may be appropriate to reformulate the question. Instead of 
asking whether liberation movements or any other person have a 
right to demand cooperation, it could be asked whether they are 
justified in coercing people into activities which those people are 
not ordinarily obliged to undertake. Just as it may be wrong of 
people to enforce their rights, similarly it may be right for them 
to make demands to which they are not entitled. Perhaps if the 
principle of fair play is prefaced in this manner it could begin to 
be helpful. If coercion towards liberation is wrong, the wrongness 
lies in something more significant than simple interference with 
personal liberty. Similarly, if people are entitled to decide on 
their political rights that entitlement alone does not exclude the 
possibility of their coercion. 
rights and obligations. 
There is more to morality than 
In other words, it may be a proper thing to do, to demand of 
people things to which we are not ordinarily entitled. This is an 
emergency situation which defies analysis solely in terms of 
traditional concepts of liberty and individual rights. The person 
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in the park had the right to remain in the shade and to refuse when 
asked to move. He had the right to use violence to protect his 
right to be where he was regardless of what was going on. His 
rights were clearly violated when he was forcibly removed. 
Similarly, the liberation struggle should be viewed, as was the 
person in a faint, as an emergency situation. 
Reference to an ' emergency situation' should not provoke 
unhealthy parallels with the South African government's state Of 
Emergency. The two previous examples should help explain the 
difference. Firstly, in the case of a neighbour's car the aim was 
morally unquestionable: To save life or lives. The same applies to 
the person in the park. He was asked to move away from the shade 
in order to save another person's life. Secondly, those whose 
rights were violated were not asked to engage in activities 
disproportionately injurious to themselves. It would have been 
unacceptable if the car's owner were asked at gun point, to drive 
a black patient to a hospital largely used by violent anti-black 
right wing elements in the country. In the same way the person at 
the park would have had legitimate reasons to resist moving if the 
only way he could have done so was through jumping into a deep 
river even though he could not swim. In these examples, no 
person's life is being sacrificed solely for the comfort of 
another. The principle applies where a value more fundamental than 
personal liberty is at stake. 
This explains why there should be limits to what people can be 
coerced into doing. Since risk is built into the struggle one can 
hardly demand that people should not be exposed to any risks 
whatsoever. At worst people in our examples suffered 
inconveniences. In the struggle people will incur more than simple 
inconveniences. Yet there are varying degrees of risks. The 
greater hazards should be reserved for the lion-hearted. 
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coercion 
It was concluded in chapter four that in a prisoner's dilemma, 
a stabilising mechanism is required. This should involve an 
enforceable agreement, that is, a deal backed up by coercion. 
coercion was required to ensure that the prisoners did their part, 
and that they did not take each other for a ride. The hope of a 
successful struggle, it was argued, lay largely in collective 
action. Typically, coercion involves four elements: (a) The 
coercing agent, (b) the coerced agent, (c) the goals of action, and 
(d) methods adopted. (A) and (b) have been identified respectively 
as representatives of certain resistance organisations, and a 
bystander. (C) and (d) have still to be addressed. What is 
required now is something more about the concept of coercion 
itself. 
Coercion requires justification for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, it violates personal liberty. To coerce people is to 
exercise power over them in order to get them to do things that 
they would otherwise not have done. Secondly, coercion may be 
harmful. Thirdly, it may be both psychologically and physically 
painful. Fourthly, it is degrading: 'to coerce a man rather than 
persuade him is to treat him as a thing, governed by causes, rather 
than as a person guided by reason' (Wolff:1972:144). In short, 
coercion, and especially violence, always present moral problems as 
Nolan (1988:166) points out: 
.. . violence causes sufferinq. However, we also know that 
in extreme circumstances, in order to prevent far worse 
violence or in order to put an end to an intolerable 
excess of suffering, some people may be called upon to 
resort to measures that cause a certain amount of 
suffering. The best example of this is the surgeon's 
knife. Surgery causes pain and suffering, but we regard 
it as justified when its purpose is to prevent far worse 
suffering and hardship. 
There is another concern about coercion, and such concern is 
particularly pertinent for liberation efforts. Coercion during 
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liberation can easily contribute to a future climate and tradition 
of intolerance. Those who have come to rely on coercion ' over the 
years, increasingly find it difficult to adjust to the new rules of 
the game. Even more worrying is the fact that a liberation 
movement with a long tradition of coercion raises doubts regarding 
democratic prospects when such a movement is in full control of the 
state coercive machinery. In short, coercion is not a matter to be 
taken lightly. 
Chapters four to six were attempts to provide some general 
justification for coercion. Wolff (1972:144-146), however, 
harbours serious misgivings about coercion. He questions the 
belief that coercion is neutral (1972:144-146), insisting that if 
that were the case, then: 
why seek to eliminate, or at least minimize 
coercion, if it is not intrinsically evil? And why view 
the use of coercion as a tactic to which one resorts if 
other tactics have failed? Presumably because coercion 
is not morally neutral (as persuasion perhaps is) . but 
morally evil, and hence requires justification. 
Coercion or Duress? 
It should be noted that throughout this study reference is to 
, coercion', and not simply 'duress'. There is a normative dividing 
line, however thin, between the two notions. One can compare their 
relationship to that between 'killing' and 'murder'. Morally, 
murder and duress are unacceptable. In fact, to refer to something 
as murder is already to impute some moral condemnation, a sense of 
an illegitimate termination of life and use of force. Similarly, 
duress implies gratuitous exercise of pressure upon an autonomous 
moral agent. Against these notions, killing and coercion are 
ethically . 'neutral', in the sense that no value judgement is 
implicit. They require justification and, until then, moral 
judgement about .them is suspended. 
Wolff (1972:144) regards coercion as intrinsically evil, not 
merely because it is painful, but because it is deqradinq; to 
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coerce a person, he argues, is to treat him as a thing governed by 
causes rather than as a person guided by reason. At the same time, 
it is clear that he does not make the moral distinction adopted 
here between coercion and duress. Nevertheless, he does not 
condemn coercion outright. For example, he contends that 'the evil 
of coercing men is frequently outweighed by the good which flows 
from coercion' (1972:145), and also that 'coercion can serve 
positive and creative functions - as a foe of the status quo and 
friend of the excluded and disinherited' (1972:145). 
Ultimately Wolff seems to concede that coercion with the sole 
aim of oppressing people is morally different from coercing with 
the aim of liberation. Similarly, killing with the intention to 
rob is morally distinguishable from killing in self-defence. It 
may be conceded that, from a deontological perspective, coercion 
can be seen as intrinsically evil, provided this does not imply 
that (a) it is so regardless of motive, circumstances and 
consequences or that (b) it is equivalent to the claim that 'it 
ought never to be done' .. If, indeed, all coercion qua coercion 
were an evil, it would then follow that interference with a harmful 
action itself constitutes harm. For example: 
If a group of religious fanatics prevent others from 
practising their different religion, the fanatics harm 
others by interfering with their non-harmful conduct. 
But now, if the state coercively stops the actions of the 
fanatics, this is interference with their harmful conduct 
(Ten:1980:58). 
ordinarily, one would like to maintain that coercion, qua 
coercion, is unjustified where it restricts non-harmful actions. 
otherwise, Wolff is commi tted to defending the existence and 
persistence of harmful behaviour at all costs, and condemning the 
use of coercive measures to prevent harm. This is an unlikely 
position for him to adopt. However, something can be subjectively 
undesirable, unpleasant or painful and still be morally acceptable. 
Apparently this is what Wolff meant. Coercion as such, then is 
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neutral until context, intention and consequences give it some 
moral determinacy. When coercion is described as neutral this is 
to suggest only that it is neither intrinsically good nor bad. 
There is a sense in which it is not neutral. Coercion is 
intrinsically unpleasant and subjectively undesirable. Few, if 
any, autonomous persons genuinely desire to be coerced. 
illuminates a fundamental flaw in Wolff's assumptions. 
This, fact 
He seems to 
presume that only immoral actions require justification: 'coercion 
is not morally neutral ••• and hence requires justification.' This 
contention needs to be supported by argument, because it is far 
from self-evident. Indeed Wolff sUbstantiates (rather poorly) his 
claim that coercion requires justification. However, he fails to 
demonstrate that only immoral actions require justification. 
Surely other amoral actions may require justification, - actions 
that are unusual, embarrassing, unpleasant or undesirable. 
What about the concern that coercion is painful? Once again 
this is not always the case. There are cases when coercion is both 
effective and tacitly welcomed by people who are unable, or 
unwilling to take personal responsibility. Acceptance is also 
possible when a goal intended through the coercive measures is 
clearly defined, and people generally identify with such a goal. 
Coercion is likely to be necessary in the early stages of 
resistance. As Walzer (1970:37) points out, democratic practices 
do not always operate well in the beginning, when people are easily 
gripped by fear and uncertainty. South Africa is replete with 
telling examples, such as Sharpeville Day, June 16th and consumer 
boycotts. On these days and occasions, activists usually demand 
that people stay away from schpol and work, and refrain from buying 
in white business outlets. Invariably there are people who refuse 
for various reasons to participate in the boycotts. 
During political strikes, activists will man the streets and 
force people back home, sometimes violently. Some violators in 
fact died at the hands of the monitoring youths. However, with the 
passage of time, people began to respond voluntarily, and less 
coercion became necessary. Further, originally employers responded 
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wi th heavy handedness to work stayaways, dismissing workers or 
reducing their wages. Since then, many employers have come to 
accept these days as public holidays, and some of them even urge 
the government to do likewise. While scenes of violent 
confrontation between citizens and the police on these days still 
persist, they have on the whole subsided. As time goes on, special 
memorial days are marked by uneasy quiet and subsequently, serene 
silence as people stay home as a matter of course. Little 
enforcement is required. 
The position adopted in this study is that personal liberty is 
a fundamental, but not an inviolable value. Such liberty may be 
overridden with sufficient justification. At times, coercion might 
prove the only viable route towards freedom. In fact this is how 
government coercion is usually justified - to resolve the paradox 
of freedom - the belief that unless freedom is curbed in some 
respects, this might lead to greater threat to freedom itself. 
To complete the assessment of coercion, it is necessary to 
look into both the goals and the methods of the coercer. The goals 
of coercion will be dealt with first, and the best route is through 
the prisoner's dilemma analogy. 
Coercion and Political Goals 
In chapter four it was demonstrated that, individually, the 
oppressed rightly have no incentive to confront the state. On the 
prisoner's dilemma model liberation is a public good, with the 
resultant motivational problems such goods generate. This 
situation necessitates the employment of coercion. 
Coercion may take various forms. It may be employed during 
the struggle against those who refuse to participate. 
Alternatively, it could be used after the revolution as a 
punishment against those who did not participate. For example, 
such free riders may be sent to re-education or labour camps. Yet, 
retributive punishment is unnecessary as far as the principle of 
fair play is concerned. The primary motive behind the principle of 
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fair play is to enlist and ensure support, and not to punish 
retroacti vely. The role of coercion here is to stabilise a 
mutually desired situation - the acquisition of a public good. It 
should reinforce people's desires by assuring them that each one 
will contribute to the establishment of the required good. It 
should not force people towards a pre-selected normative goal. In 
this way, it is hoped that sanctioning coercion does not invite 
unwarranted paternalism. It is crucial to emphasise that coercion 
alone will not suffice. The motivation for the cooperation in the 
struggle cannot, and should not be solely fear of reprisals by the 
resistance movements. Education and political consciousness remain 
important tools towards a revolutionary effort. People should be 
politically literate, in order to identify with the cause. Yet, 
education and political awareness per se are not always sufficient 
to spur people to action. They are necessary, but not sufficient 
conditions for revolutionary motivation. 
To be explicit: Coercion here serves a specific function. It 
reinforces the need for participation. It is designed to guarantee 
members that non-cooperative behaviour will be detected, recognised 
and prevented. It presupposes that there are many others in 
society concerned and serious about liberation. Its function is to 
prevent present harm to the liberation process. It is not designed 
to introduce goals and desires in people, but to protect the goals 
and desires that people have formed independently. It would make 
little sense to coerce people if they massively saw no need for the 
proposed liberation programme. It would also make no sense to 
postpone coercion, and threaten free riders with coercion after 
liberation. This is inappropriate for three reasons. Firstly, it 
is irrationally vengeful. Secondly, it may also be ineffective. 
A person for whom only the present counts is not likely to be 
impressed with threats of future punishment. A student keen on 
obtaining a medical degree and leaving the country will not be 
concerneq. about a possible spell in the 're-education centres'. In 
short, the coercion is not a motivation - it is a supplement to 
motivation. The motivation remains the desire for liberation. 
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Thirdly, .and this is ironical; after the revolution it is 
precisely the free riders who might be in demand. They are likely 
to be more technically qualified. 
expended their energies towards 
towards the liberation struggle. 
After all, they would have 
self-improvement rather than 
~hey are 'safe' bets for any 
government. They have no history of violence or of overthrowing 
governments. Indeed a new post-revolutionary government might be 
less concerned about past free riders than about former 'comrades', 
who may have been .useful in undermining unpopular governments but 
not particularly helpful in building up an economic base required 
for a stable society. Coercion has to provide the assurance that 
those who contribute to the struggle are not investing in a lost 
cause. 
coercive Methods 
This question (d) investigates whether coercive methods are, 
or are not morally justified. Which coercive actions, if any, are 
morally justifiable ways of getting my support? Which kinds of 
non-violent action? Which kinds of psychologically or physically 
violent· actions? These questions arise, not merely because 
individual liberty is at stake, but largely because a person might 
be harmed. The type of coercion to be utilised should be subject 
to certain moral bounds. The important guideline is that coercion 
should act as a deterrent against free riding. People who require 
severe large scale deterrence are probably not particularly 
committed to the struggle. In other words, where a heavy dose of 
coercive measures become a norm, then there is cause for concern, 
and the likelihood is that bystanders see no value in the proposed 
course of action which they are demanded to support. In that case, 
the whole enterprise requires re-evaluation. Similarly, although 
it is acknowledged that it is the function of a legitimate 
government to maintain law and order, there is something suspect if 
the government relies solely on coercion to achieve that goal. In 
fact, it is a sign of the wrongness of the policy of coercion 
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(though not an infallible one) if too much of it is needed in 
support of a cause. 
Coercive measures should not include killings of bystanders, 
especially brutal murders such as 'necklacing' (burning a person 
alive by means 'of a tyre soaked in petrol, and placed around the 
victim's neck). In fact, any method that unduly brutalises, or 
contributes to a tradition of ruthlessness must be avoided~ 
Further, bystanders are perfectly justified in refusing to 
undertake actions that require their participation and where they 
are exposed to disproportionate dangers in respect to their fellow 
oppressed. Their refusal is even more justified when they have 
moral qualms about what they are being asked to do. For example, 
an individual may not be coerced legitimately into placing a bomb 
anywhere, physically attack or wound a policeman or informer, or 
assault other free riders. such activities raise serious tactical 
and moral problems and if they have to be taken, they should only 
be undertaken by those who voluntarily do so. 
Coercion should be a safe-guard against free-riding, rather 
than a daily dose. Its role is to prevent the instability that 
results from fear of being taken advantage of by free riders. 
Threats are best deterrents, especially when they are not carried 
out. The sight of comrades roaming the streets to monitor a 
stayaway is sufficient to keep people indoors. Unfortunately, such 
threats become effective only after an example has previously been 
made. ostracism and ridicule can become painful psychological 
tactics to get people into line. During a boycott, blockading 
streets and making roads impassable are possibilities. In short, 
direct physical harm should be an ultimate resort. To make an 
example by necklacing is, however hard to justify. It raises 
concern even when directed against collaborators and appears worse 
in the case of bystanders, who may loathe the system even more 
intensely than certain activists. Coercion is in general 
legitimate only where it is unnecessary for most people, that is, 
where a widespread inclination to comply shows general support for 
the relevant programmes. 
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coercion and the Prisoner's Dilemma 
There is a problem encountered when the prisoner's dilemma 
model in respect to coercion is extrapolated into the arena of 
resistance politics. In the prisoner's dilemma there is an 
explicit agreement between the prisoners regarding their ideal and 
the means .of achieving and sustaining that mutually desired goal. 
They explicitly agree on the need for coercion upon themselves in 
the event of default. They also appoint a 'hit-man' only after 
mutual consultation and agreement. In other words, obligations 
arising from this deal are based on consent. It is true ' that the 
prisoners are partly acting under duress of their interrogators. 
However, when they were given the opportunity to confer with each 
other they realised that cooperation was essential. Insofar as 
they made commitments to each other, they did so voluntarily and 
intentionally. Both were bargaining from positions of equal 
strength. Their hit-man had a clear mandate and did not exercise 
general authority over them. His mandate was to kill the defector 
in the event of unilateral non-cooperation, or expose the 
prisoners' hitherto unknown crimes in the event of mutual non-
cooperation. 
It will be recalled that in the prisoner's dilemma the hit-man 
is an impartial observer who was appointed and mandated precisely 
on the basis of those credentials. Further the prisoners 
themselves defined and agreed on their goals. They wanted the 
minimal possible imprisonment term. They could withdraw from the 
agreement at any moment in the sense that they voluntarily agreed 
to the terms of the agreement. They could jointly withdraw their 
instructions to the hit-man. In the case of liberation movements 
no appointment of leadership is involved. In fact, such leadership 
may remain unknown for tactical security reasons. Although there 
are some moral restrictions on what demands the leaders may make, 
such limits remain fuzzy. The means of coercion must be arbitrary 
and ad hoc. Resistance organisations have neither jails nor due 
legal process. It is not unli~ely that the disciplinary process of 
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liberation movements could be subject to the whims of some local 
bullies. In reality political coercion employed in the name of the 
struggle is not nearly as neat and managed as this model suggests. 
It is somewhat one-sided and emanates largely from people one 
hardly knows. 
~ 
It was also demonstrated that not all the oppressed in South 
Africa are against the apartheid system. After all there are 
willing collaborators and those who at least find the system 
partially rewarding, however obnoxious in other respects. Unlike 
the prisoners, people do not seem to be agreed on the goals of 
liberation. Unlike the prisoner's dilemma, the struggle for 
liberation may be perceived to involve a degree of paternalism. In 
chapter nine this question is addressed further. For now, it is 
worth mentioning that, even if the paternalism charge were 
demonstrated, this in itself would not be necessarily 
objectionable. still this marks another disanalogy with the 
prisoner's dilemma model. The prisoner's dilemma is based on 
rationality, deliberation, consultation, mandate, debate and choice 
- in short, consent. In contrast, the South African resistance 
situation is based on secrecy, doubt and constant vigilance. 
To conclude, while the prisoner's dilemma model is useful, 
there are some limitations to the extent to which it can explain 
coercion in resistance politics. The main difference is that 
coercive measures adopted in the prisoner's dilemma were not only 
preceded by an intense process of negotiation, they were also self-
imposed. 
Enforcement of the Obligation -
Whose Prerogative is it? 
The argument so far is that the oppressed have an obligation 
not to harm one another. Their dilemma so far is how to enforce 
this obligation and protect its correlative right. Ex hypothesis 
the enforcing agency cannot be a government, since the state's 
legi timacy is precisely what is at issue. The obvious agency would 
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appear to be the resistance organisations. This raises two 
immediate questions: (a) What kind of resistance organisation must 
people support? (b) Where there is more than one organisation, 
which one should enjoy priority over others? 
It is tempting, in response to (a), to outline a number of 
structural virtues which, once possessed by a resistance 
organisation, legitimise such organisation's employment of coercive 
measures. This approach has special appeal. It protects the 
bystander from random and uncontrolled coercion from any source. 
Further, in a situation like South Africa, the existence of the 
multiplicity of organisations, with differing conceptions and 
strategies, may add to the complication of justified coercion. The 
bystander .might end up with an obligation to support each and every 
political organisation. 
still, while this approach has its merits, it should be 
recalled that a basic assumption of this study is that no one is to 
be coerced into joining an organisation, but only into supporting 
certain specific activities. Therefore, what is crucial is the 
qualities of a project rather than those of the coercing agency. 
In fact, the moral worthiness or otherwise of the coercer is 
totally irrelevant to the justification of coercion. It is 
tempting to believe that coercion is justified if it issues from 
those on a higher moral ground. Yet this is an illusion. In fact, 
the most effective movement in overthrowing a government might turn 
out to be the most undemocratic or 'immoral'. Similarly, a morally 
impressive group might turn out to be ineffective. All in all, it 
hardly makes sense to urge a bystander to be dragged into a cul de 
sac by misguided, but morally upright revolutionaries. 
Who then may coerce bystanders? Essentially any person or 
organisation. What matters is not who coerces but what one is 
coerced into doinq. Obligations have nothing to do with the moral 
character of the coercer and the coerced. In terms of the 
principle of fair play, it does not matter whether the bystander is 
a traitor, a sell-out, a priest, a tramp, an angel, a devil qr a 
thief. However, it matters seriously whether the bystander is 
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coerced into murder, arson, or consumer and rent boycott. By the 
same token a neighbour who takes the initiative to organise a rent 
boycott has as much right to coerce as, for example, the ANC does. 
However, a neighbour or organisation which coerces people into 
going to church every morning to pray for liberation is acting 
illegitimately, however important prayer might be perceived by the 
coercer. 
In other words, it does not matter who takes the initiative to 
launch a protest programme. What is essential, though, is that 
bystanders are not coerced into protest measures which are solely 
intended to promote a party or group agenda, or whose effectiveness 
requires boundless faith. This would be tantamount to coercing 
people into supporting a particular organisation. Resistance 
organisations qua organisations have no intrinsic special moral 
claims to coercive · measures. However, empirically and 
contingently, it is often organisations rather than individuals who 
conduct resistance campaigns. This is largely because pure public 
goods are unlikely, in practice, to be provided by individuals. 
However, this is purely an empirical reality rather than a logical 
requirement. In short, if bystanders have any obligations at all, 
it is the obligation to support certain specific campaigns, and not 
the organisations per se. Those campaigns are assessed against the 
principle of harm and the principle of fair play. 
The thrust of this principle, as it was argued is this: Even 
though people cannot choose to accept or reject a liberation 
tradition, and are for the most part born into it, that tradition 
may deserve their support if they are reasonable and sui tably 
respectful of one another's interests. Specifically, this means 
that the liberation tradition must meet the requirements of 
substantive rather than procedural consent. In other words, what 
matters is what is represented (the ideal with which a reasonable 
person identif ies) rather than who is represented (a person or 
organisation with or without a constituency). 
still, the need to subject revolutionary policies to the 
review of public opinion does not end as the struggle reaches its 
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climax. The evidence of mass support for those who are toppling a 
hateful regime is extremely important, and provides some (weak) 
insurance that the successors will not be just as bad. The fact 
that the· Eastern European communist regimes were in effect 
overthrown by mass civil disobedience has given the new governments 
an authority both moral and political which they would not have had 
if it had been done by military force alone. 
The belief that people may be coerced against their will and 
wishes need not prove as alarming as it is sometimes made out to 
be. The idea of sUbstantive consent, it would appear, takes us as 
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close as possible to freedom under involuntary institutions as we 
can get. It applies in those cases in which the amended principle 
of fair play creates obligations. It seems very important in 
solving the problem of coercion. For example, if established 
states have the right to coerce those who do not accept their 
policies or try to circumvent them or break the law, it must be on 
some such grounds as this: Whether they actually agreed to the 
basic rules or not, it WQuld have been unreasonable for them to 
refuse agreement if they had been in a position to do so. A 
parallel criterion needs to be developed fully for nongovernmental 
organisations, particularly in situations of oppression where they 
are candidates for political power. This should extend to the 
conditions of coercion as well. In some parallel form, 
revolutionary organisations have demanded support on the belief 
that bystanders would be unreasonable not to support them. They 
have organised boycotts, and others may have perhaps conscripted 
people into their armies. Those who feel that this goes too far 
need to explain why, particularly if it is acceptable that 
governments adopt these measures. 
To conclude, even if coercion is justified, it remains a 
measure to be approached with a great deal of caution and 
circumspection. This is particularly the case where paternalism is 
possible. The next section looks at the practical application of 
the principles of harm and of fair play in a revolutionary 
situation. 
SBCTIO. TllRBB 
Application and Limitations 
Chapter eight examines specific cases of obligation 
justifiable in terms of the amended principle of fairness . . The 
conclusion is that the principle legitimates some, and not all 
forms and expression of 'the struggle'. In particular, it is 
argued that the 'struggle' is too fuzzy a notion to serve as a 
proper ground for coercion. Essentially, although some coercion 
fails the test of the principle of fair play, it may pass a 
different ·test. The principle provides a conditional acceptance 
and conditional rejection of certaiR modes of resistance. 
The conclusion is based in chapter nine. It is preceded by a 
study of paternalism in respect to the principle of fair play. 
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CDPTBR BIGJI'l 
partIcipation in the struggle 
It might prove worthwhile at this stage to look back at what 
the line of argument has established so far. Firstly, it has been 
argued that the oppressed have a general obligation not to harm one 
another. In particular, chapters four to six examined sources of 
the general obligation to support, and therefore not harm a 
liberation struggle. Secondly, it will be recalled from the 
introduction that the focus of this study is not the South African 
situation per se, but any oppressive situation in which 
organisations have to operate covertly. Nevertheless, South Africa 
provides .an appropriate framework within which to confront 
difficulties raised by the application of certain liberal 
principles in an undemocratic setting. It is possible on a general 
level to maintain that everyone has to support a liberation 
struggle. What that implies in practice depends on the context. 
The same applies to a general obligation to love our neighbours. 
In practice, this might require caring for the sick, helping the 
wounded, or donating to the poor. Similarly, since South Africa is 
the case study, it provides a suitable background against which to 
examine these questions. Thirdly, it has been established that 
consent is not the sole basis of obligation. 
section two of this study (chapters four to seven) examined 
alternative sources of non-consensual obligations. As a result, it 
was concluded that an Amended Principle of Fair Play provided 
grounds for coercive measures under certain circumstances. 
Obligations arising from such a principle are as enforceable as any 
other type. In the course of the discussion, examples of 
liberation measures were mentioned (rent, education and consumer 
boycotts) • 
This chapter attempts to establish whether or not these 
principles apply to the particular examples above. The principles 
are: Non-consensual obligations, principles of fair play and the 
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principle of harm. In particular, it will be argued that although 
bystanders have an obligation to participate in the liberation 
struggle, it does not follow that they have no choice whatsoever in 
which measures to support and which not. The thesis defended is 
briefly as follows: Significant particip~tion in the South African 
liberation struggle should include selective support for or 
participation in some 'protest' action. The term 'protest' is used 
deliberately as opposed to, say, 'political' or 'anti-apartheid'. 
The latter terms a·re too general and vague. The bystander can be 
coerced only into actions whose goals and objectives are explicit. 
In other words, the principle applies only to carefully " targeted 
programmes. In some cases, the bystander could choose which 
programme to support, while in other instances such an option does 
not exist. This chapter attempts to map out those cases. 
The Amended Principle of Fair Play constitutes a criterion 
against which certain means of the struggle can be assessed. It is 
applied to three areas of the struggle: (a) The struggle in 
general; (b) rent and consumer boycotts; and (c) education and 
school boycotts. It should be emphasised at the outset that the 
purpose of this section is not to establish whether or not these 
three examples are grounds for justifiable coercion under any 
circumstances. The intention is simply to examine whether they 
pass or fail the 'legitimacy' test in terms of the principles 
developed in this study. It may be that a different approach, like 
a case study, would unearth other principles in terms of which 
different conclusions are reached. The fact that certain 
programmes may fail the test of the APF does not imply that they 
will not pass any other one. In other words, the APF provides 
grounds for conditional acceptance or rejection of certain 
strategies and programmes. It must be emphasised that the APF is 
preceded by yet another general principle - the principle of 
reasonableness. This is a logical, rather than moral principle. 
According to this principle, the bystander is not obligated to 
fulfil contradictory, mutually exclusive or incompatible 
obligations : For example, the bystander is under no obligation to 
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heed, simultaneously, a school boycott call from the united 
Democratic Front and a 'back to school' call from the ·Inkatha. 
Further, the bystander is under no obligation to participate in 
activities with fuzzy objectives. In the light of this, it is 
necessary .to focus on the general obligation to take part in the 
struggle. 
In short, for the principle of fair play to apply certain 
general conditions are essential: 
i. The issues should be as clear as possible. People 
could hardly be expected to risk their lives for f~zzy 
goals. 
ii. The issues should represent the will, the 
aspirations and the hopes of society. In other words the 
coercers should have a 'legitimate expectation that [the 
goal] is widely shared' (Walzer:1970:37). Such 
aspirations should transcend the ideological barriers. 
iii. It is useful, though not essential, that the 
coercer has a track record of effectiveness. The 
material and human cost of liberation is heavy, and for 
this reason it should be worth the price. 
iv. Specific programmes which people are demanded to 
support must be politically possible. 
The general call to liberation: 
with Us or against Us? 
To recapi tulate, 
coercion justified? 
different levels and 
in which specific or particular acts is 
This problem has been seen to ar ise on 
formulations: (a) What constitutes 
liberation? (b) Are bystanders who accept the obligation to 
liberation free to choose in what way they will get invol ved 
politically? (c) Does this obligation require people to be 
political activists? (d) Do individuals retain the right to make 
autonomous decisions both at the level of which movement they 
support and at the level of which strategies are to be pursued? Or 
does the obligation give any and every liberation movement a right 
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to everyone's support? context impacts on the preceding arguments 
('the arguments') in the following manner (i - iv): 
i. Do the arguments so far justify, for example, the ANC 
or the PAC· to coerce the same bystander? 
ii. If different movements, or elements in the same 
movement, are running contradictory strategies 
( 'education for liberation' versus 'liberation before 
educat~on'), who in terms of the amended principle of 
fair play is ~ free rider? And which party may appeal to 
the principle of harm? 
1.1.1.. Given that (a) there is more than one movement .. and 
(b) that there are contradictory strategies, how do the 
arguments deal with the bystander who appeals to her 
obligation to be rational and therefore to make her own 
choice? 
iv. Given the principle of harm, who harms society: The 
person who adopts the principle 'education for 
liberation', or the one who acts on 'liberation before 
education'? 
This section addresses the first set of questions (a) - (d) raised 
above. As far as questions (a) - (c) are concerned, some general 
comments will suffice, while (d) requires extensive examination. 
As far as (a) is concerned, it is evident that there is a 
difference between supporting 'the liberation struggle' and 
'supporting particular liberation movements (ANC, PAC, UDF, Azapo, 
NUM) '. The struggle is more than the sum total of these 
organisations' activities. A person might concede to a general 
obligation to support the struggle without committing himself to a 
specific organisation, in the same way that a person may have an 
obligation to drive safely. In the latter case, where consumption 
of alcohol is concerned, he may fulfil his obligation in various 
ways: 
(1) He may refrain from drinking while driving. 
(2) He may drink and request a friend to drive him. 
(3) He may employ a chauffeur. 
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Similarly, concerning (b), there should be ways to support the 
struggle as such without being a party member. This is largely 
because political involvement in South Africa involves two related 
but distinct goals, justice and power. The two objectives are 
related because, in order to introduce justice into the South 
African political order, it is necessary to acquire political 
power. Power is a necessary, though not sufficient condition for 
justice. 
Religious institutions like the Southern African Catholic 
Bishops' Conference (SACBC) and the South African Council of 
Churches . (SACC) are concerned primarily with justice and 
secondarily with power, and even then, only insofar as power is 
necessary for the establishment of a just political order. 
Typically these organisations are not party-political. The same 
applies to certain individuals who may generally be non-political. 
such people may also be 'non-sectarian', that is, politically 
committed to the cause of liberation though not necessarily to 
particular organisations. They might choose to exercise political 
options through other institutions religious or economic. 
Alternatively, they might reserve for themselves the right to 
decide which activities to support in the various political 
organisations, without committing themselves to an organisation as 
such. They might feel that choosing organisations is something for 
the next phase of the liberation effort; that organisations are in 
fact divisive. 
On the other hand the ANC, PAC, UDF and Azapo are political 
organisation and, as such, are concerned with both justice and 
power. Whereas religious institutions regard power as a means to 
justice, for political parties power is also a goal. The task of 
a political party is to gain political power and to retain it for 
as long as it can do so. This is what underlies the differences 
between political organisations and other anti-apartheid 
organisations. Formal party members are necessarily conscious 
political animals. When apartheid is overthrown their political 
struggle continues. The quest for justice may cease when justice 
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is achieved but political struggles continue even then. Suppose 
that South Africans were so morally perfectible that the demise of 
apartheid at once heralded a society of flawless social and 
political justice. In that case, it would make sense to 
religious leaaers like Bishop Tutu to keep out of politics. 




South Africa is an intrinsically unjust society, and concern for 
justice is not the sole prerogative of politicians. It is of 
primary concern · and interest to all layers of society. 
Consequently, although everyone has an obligation to bring about a 
just society, no one is in fact obliged to be a member or an 
unqualif ied supporter of a particular political organisation. This 
is not to suggest that they ought not to do so. A person may find 
that an organisation about which he is not particularly keen is 
nevertheless the most effective. The same applies to religious 
organisations. While retaining their independence they may also 
find it possible to cooperate with liberation movements in areas 
which pose no moral dilemmas for their members. 
A more difficult question than the foregoing is whether an 
obligation to support the struggle necessarily involves being 
politically active. In the previous cases the issue was simply 
whether a particular political organisation has any legitimate 
claims upon the individual. Here the question is whether a non-
activist is necessarily non-supportive of the struggle. There are 
two extreme perceptions of what involvement and support entail. 
The first requires scars of liberation such as detention, death, 
police brutality and some form of media-catching heroic acts. 
According to this view, people are politically irrelevant unless 
they can 'produce such political bruises. An al ternati ve view 
reduces the struggle to a series of welfare and benevolent acts, 
such as feeding the hungry, educating the poor and being kind to 
the underprivileged. In the middle, one finds some 'moderate' 
position. l For example, one may argue that liberation is 
expedited if the oppressed gain a foothold in the economic and 
educational spheres, through education and leadership training. No 
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one should belittle any of these approaches because they have a 
role to play. Dramatic political symbols are required to keep 
faith in the struggle alive. Similarly, ameliorative gestures 
underline the essential good in human nature, and provide the much-
needed short- and medium-term contributions to the struggle. Yet 
it would be wrong to reduce the political struggle to these short-
term measures. There is something suspect, as it was argued 
earlier, about struggle that requires everyone to be injured. 
Similarly, there is something dubious about someone who supports 
the struggle solely by promoting an anti-smoking campaign designed 
to save more black lives! 
It seems reasonable to conclude that participating in the 
struggle does not require one to be an activist as such. This is 
particularly the case if one considers that the str,uggle is not a 
momentary event, but a process. The struggle requires not only the 
overthrow of apartheid, but also the building and strengthening of 
a free and non-racial society. The latter require leadership and 
education, and above all, a strong economic base. Non-activists 
typically contribute towards the second, long term phase of the 
struggle. However, the second phase cannot be attained unless 
apartheid has been overthrown. In other words, supporting the 
liberation struggle is not simply reducible to doing good for 
blacks - whether it is praying for them, feeding them, building 
sports facili ties and so on. Nor is it simply identical to 
languishing in jail. While these are not meaningless gestures, 
they are also not individually the tested means of overthrowing 
evil governments. The immediate struggle is about overthrowing 
apartheid in South Africa. This is a collective action which might 
involve national coordination at one point. Naturally, collective 
action is not equivalent to universal action or even majoritarian 
action. Nevertheless, where collective action is concerned, total 
commitment rather than momentary consent would be required. 
Therefore, one cannot simply withdraw and lend support whimsically. 
Naturally, as it is argued later, there may be overriding moral 
reasons why a person needs to withdraw. To conclude , non-activists 
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do contribute to aspects of the struggle, though it may be 
necessary for them to ' be activists at one or another point. 
Finally, (d) raises the question: Do individuals reserve the 
right to make autonomous decisions both at the level of which 
movement they support and at the level of which strategies are to 
. be pursued? Or does ~he obligation give any pnd every liberation 
movement a right to everyone's support? As far as choice regarding 
support is concerned, it is evident that once there are several 
liberation movements, then a bystander should be at liberty to 
choose. Otherwise a problem arises that, on different days of the 
week, she might be coerced into supporting conflicting political 
goals. However, it must be recalled that the principle authorises 
support for activities, and not for movements as such. As a 
result, the crucial question for bystanders is not whether or not 
to support a movement ,but which activity to support, regardless of 
whether the demand is from an individual, one movement or several. 
Question (d) is also about perceptions regarding strategies 
and tactics. Is an individual justified in mapping out his own 
strategies of liberation? This will be remembered to be a problem 
particularly for the nervous cooperators who are essentially 
morally conscious people. They are willing to cooperate through 
participation in the struggle, but remain doubtful that the 
proposed collective action will either take off or be sustained 
successfully. Assuming that this is not mere rationalisation, 
their reluctance is rooted not in ethical or prudential 
considerations regarding the struggle but solely on its efficacy. 
In fact their motives are noble. There is nothing to be gained by 
mindlessly exposing people to se~ere state reprisals without 
anticipation of something worthwhile. The traditional grounds of 
a just war include the insistence that the chance of success should 
not be negligible. If indeed the struggle stands no chance, then 
nervous cooperators are justified in refusing to take part in it. 
Similarly, some who are opposed to the government are nevertheless 
not convinced that, say, staying home on June 16 will make any 
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difference to the overthrow of the system. They may point to the 
fact that white south Africans have learned to live with no work on 
June 16 while business people compare it to a Jewish holiday. What 
then is the moral status of strategy and tactics as far as 
liberation and coercion are concerned? 
Historically, having been launched, revolutions ' suffer 
innumerable initial setbacks. Yet the expectation is that, 
ultimately the oppressed will triumph. It is not clear precisely 
at what point the oppressed should throw in the towel. It is even 
more unclear who should take such decisions for them. In general, 
commentators of various persuasions on the South African political 
scene tend to reflect these assumptions and doubts. When an irate 
group of youths takes to the streets, or workers flex their 
muscles, observers conclude that blacks are about to take over 
political power. As soon as the police gain the upper hand, as 
they have done hitherto, then the conclusion is that the regime is 
invincible. However, whether it is in Pretoria, Vietnam, Beijing 
or the Kremlin, history has shown that even the most monolithic 
structures eventually begin to crack. It is true that this often 
happens only after enormous losses human and material. 
Nevertheless, this illustrates that, even in what appear hopeless 
moments, one should hold out the possibility of victory being 
ultimately gained. Nervous cooperators are correct in principle. 
Their daunting challenge is that their claims can only be confirmed 
at the end of history. Yet they can be refuted during history! 
Their argument would carry some weight where scepticism regarding 
the struggle is widespread, and people remain largely unmotivated. 
still, there are two important lessons gi ven by nervous 
cooperators. Firstly, it is that leaders in the struggle have an 
obligation to prove effectiveness, and keep faith in the struggle 
alive. This will r .equire much more than rhetoric and propaganda. 
Lies and illusion can accumulate only to a point, after which they 
become transparent and collapse under their own weight. Secondly, 
where there are serious doubts about strategies, the nervous 
cooperators seem to have a point. It seems unreasonable to expect 
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a bystander to support a strategy about which he has serious moral 
concerns, or whose effectiveness he greatly doubts. This has been 
particularly the case with school boycotts in South Africa, about 
which something more detailed is said later. There is a twist of 
irony here. In many ways, it was school boycotts which highlighted 
both the educational and political plight of the oppressed in South 
Africa. Many gains have undoubtedly been made. Yet, there were 
concerns that if sacrifices were to be made, these should not be in 
education where the cost would in the long term be prohibitive. 
The educational and social costs of school boycotts are yet to be 
determined. However, it is an open secret that even where formal 
teaching still takes place in South Africa, the actual learning 
environment has collapsed. This raises a 
especially in the light of the harm principle. 
serious question, 
Who harmed society 
more? Was it the free rider who refused to join a school boycott, 
or an activist who not only supported the boycott but also coerced 
others into doing so? 
Strategy is a particularly untidy maze. It is difficult to 
assess the merits of opposing sides, partly because perceptions 
rather than transparent facts which lie behind the conflicting 
jUdgements. Social and human costs are not easily quantifiable or 
comparable. While it is possible to count thousands of bodies lost 
in the liberation war, it is also possible to argue that numbers 
would have been higher had the regime not been overthrown. 
Besides, it is not even clear whether individuals or organisations 
have the · right to decide on strategies. Yet, from another 
perspective, it seems there could be room for political paternalism 
here. Strategists must necessarily be experts, and fighting wars 
in part requires expert leadership by the few. If your strategy 
and tactics are known to all your citizens, they will similarly be 
known to your enemies. 
Yet, it is also true that politicians sometimes know very 
little about what they should be doing. In South Africa, many 
disasters are caused by incompetent political strategists. The 
present economic ruin is a good example. Another instance is the 
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government's counter-revolutionary strategy. For long ordinary 
people knew that guns were not sufficient to subdue the oppressed. 
Yet this realisation only dawned upon government strategic experts 
later, and grudgingly too. There are two main lessons issuing from 
the foregoing discussion. One is that strategy is not the sole 
prerogative of the political leadership. Individuals have a right 
to question its moral basis as well as efficacy. No one is obliged 
blindly to follow costly but worthless tactics. The second lesson 
modifies the first. Although individuals reserve the right to 
assess a strategy, they cannot simply move from their disagreement 
with such a strategy to the belief that they need not participate 
in it at all. They may be wrong in their assessment. There is a 
sense in which individuals as autonomous moral agents have a right 
to take final decisions regarding their actions. However, as Carr 
(1983:473) points out: 
It is only in moral matters that the agent can be assumed 
to have the insight necessary to make possible an 
effective and adequate review of his action. 2 
Further, although liberation is a moral matter it is not 
exclusively that. Generals in the army know better than ordinary 
mortals which war strategy might win, simply because . they are 
, experts' in the area. They are not experts on the question 
whether war is justifiable or not but they are experts in respect 
to whether an air or ground raid would be effective. Similarly, 
economic experts can tell better than priests whether sanctions are 
likely to hurt the government or not. The lesson from the 
foregoing ,should be evident: The liberation struggle is much more 
complicated than is appreciated by the rugged individualist or an 
authoritarian political general. There are important moral and 
social implications. What complicates the matter is that either 
political leaders or a concerned bystander may be wrong on the 
effectiveness of a strategy, and this raises questions about why 
individuals should defer to political leaders, and not the other 
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way round. All in all the problem of who has the right to decide 
on strategy must remain inconclusive. 
such questions bear the emblem of moral high ground. 
Nevertheless, it is an empirical fact that few if any liberation 
struggles can take place if the strategy is going to be debated by 
25 000 000 (or even a 100) individuals. This is worse if the 
organisations should operate underground by force of circumstances. 
No army in the world has ever subjected its tactics to its 
individual soldiers, let alone the nation as a whole. Where there 
is conflict in strategies, everything should mutatis mutandis go 
the way of the political leadership. Indeed, they may be wrong but 
things are likely to be worse if strategies are subject to house-
to-house opinion surveys. Indeed, one cannot expect the liberation 
movements to behave irrationally. Similarly, one cannot expect a 
bystander to behave irrationally and support contradictory 
strategies. still, the danger that political leadership may be 
inept at times is one with which all individuals have to live. 
Individuals have to take into account the views of other 
members of society. People should not simply refuse to participate 
in schemes of mutual importance, each time they find decisions 
unacceptable. Such free entry and exit must undermine the moral 
fibre of society, that is, the expectations people have about the 
durability and stability of their society. In short, people may 
have a moral duty to accommodate themselves to the purposes of 
others, even if this conflicts with their desires. The point is 
underscored by Kant (1965:76) in this telling passage: 
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... even if we imagined men to be ever so good natured a~d 
righteous before a public lawful state of society 1.S 
established individual men, nations, and states can " 
never be ce~tain that they are secure against violence 
from one another, because each will have his own right to 
do what seems just and good to him, entirely 
independently c;>f the opinion of others. Consequently, 
the first decision [one] must make if he does not wish to 
renounce all concepts of justice, is t o accept the 
principle that one must quit the state of Nature, in 
which everyone follows his own judgment, and must be 
united with everyone else ..•. whom he cannot avoid, 
subjecting himself to a public lawful external coercion. 
This leads to the third lesson. At some point a "" strategy 
needs to be coordinated. This is particularly true in the last 
phase of the struggle, where absolute discipline and unity may be 
required. At that point, bickering about tactics while the enemy 
is inflicting blows could be counter-productive. As a general 
observation, it seems likely that disagreements about strategies 
are prone to mount in the early days of the struggle. 
Alternatively, such differences are likely to be pronounced where 
there are numerous factions within the resistance tradition. South 
Africa is a case in point. Where serious strategic differences are 
still glaring, organisations have no moral claim to impose their 
views on the unwilling community. There are parallels with legal 
moralism. It is generally accepted that governments should not 
legislate on moral issues over which the community is sharply 
divided, provided naturally that no public harm is at stake. The 
onus rests on the contending parties to demonstrate that their 
strategy is more effective than that of its rivals. Persuasion, 
rather than coercion, should be the rule of the game. Differences 
about strategies are likely to be intense in the early phases of 
the struggle when there is not cumulative experience to fall back 
on regarding what works and what is ineffective. It is also at 
this time when the goals are fuzzy and people are generally 
inexperienced. There is no suggestion here that the need to 
subject revolutionary policies to the review of public opinion ends 
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as the struggle reaches its climax. On the contrary, evidence of 
mass support for those who are toppling a hateful regime is 
extremely important, and provides some (weak) assurance that the 
successors will not be just as bad. 
There are · other difficult areas for the concept of the 
struggle. 
The struggle - Problems and Disanalogies 
Prisoner's. Dilemma, Public Goods and Liberation 
concerted revolutionary 
proletariat as a group. 
seeks to maximize his 
class, will refrain 
(Buchanan:1979:65-66). 
action is a public good for the 
Yet each proletarian, whether he 
own interests or those of his 
from revolutionary action 
The underlying assumption throughout is that liberation is a 
plausible moral project because autonomy matters. However, if 
autonomy does matter then there could be a problem about autonomous 
people cooperating with ·one another towards liberation. The 
problem is rooted in the fact that liberation costs may be 
materially and humanly prohibitive. Therefore the question arises: 
Why do people who will ultimately benefit from liberation have an 
obligatioI:l to do something about it? This study has proceeded 
along two major routes. Firstly, there is a belief that the mere 
fact of being oppressed gives one a reason to cooperate with other 
oppressed people to overthrow a repressive regime. This was 
demonstrated to be in no manner self-evident. Certainly being 
oppressed gives people some reason to liberate themselves if this 
can be done. However, as the prisoner's dilemma and public goods 
model illustrated, there could be countervailing reasons of a self-
interested kind not to bother about liberation. 
Secondly, there is a theory of a person's doing his fair share 
of those things which, if he does not do them, he contributes very 
seriously to harming other people. If that is correct, what other 
concerns does this theory raise? There is one residual disquiet. 
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Is it not paternalistic to impose this goal upon the community? 
The issue is addressed in the next chapter. For now, it is worth 
mentioning that the absence of the good in question involves harm 
to everyone, or most people, if not achieved. It is not a case of 
a paternalistic imposition of a moral goal. It is no more 
paternalistic than getting people to come to court to give evidence 
in our favour. still, is this kind of goal best treated using 
orthodox notions like public goods? The principle of fair play has 
been stated as extensively as possible. Where feasible a strong 
case was made for it. The purpose of this chapter is to re-examine 
the principle as a whole, and to assess whether liberation is 
readily handled in the language of public goods. The suggestion so 
far has been that it is. At one level the liberation process 
undoubtedly fits the public goods picture. A new government is 
something which if supplied to anybody is supplied to everybody. 
So, in one sense, such a new political system is clearly a pure 
public good. This makes it possible to entertain the possibility 
of a new non-racial, anti-apartheid government in terms of pure 
public goods. There are other legitimate parallels too. 
Common to both public goods and the liberation struggle is the 
demonstration of the irrationality of egoism and of the mindless 
pursuit of narrow self-interest to the exclusion of the interests 
of others. If egoism is the sole moral theory then almost everyone 
is likely to lose and few others to gain. In short what is 
required is unity of action and co·operation. The struggle does not 
require ideological uniformity because cooperation is possible even 
between sworn enemies. If no one participates in the struggle, the 
oppression can only increase. There is no point in pushing ahead 
with the struggle if no one, or only a negligible number, is 
willing to support it. That is courting a disaster. In addition, 
even though people desire liberation, they are not always keen to 
take the heat that goes with it. others might be keen to support 
but only if the rest make their contribution. 
still, there are other elements of the prisoner's dilemma 
which may be overlooked by somewhat idyllic accounts of solidarity. 
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The government's strategies of divide and rule, of creating 
strongly visible economic and social stratification within the 
oppressed community, and of clientage and patronage have resulted 
also in a competitive spirit among some of the oppressed. While it 
is true that there is solidarity, a tendency by the oppressed to 
use one another as stepping stones to privilege persists. This is 
evident from the presence of police spies among the oppressed 
community, or in competition for scarce work opportunities. There 
are clear traits of individualism as well. The description of 
blacks as 'socialists by nature' hardly tallies with reality. 
There is competition between the employed and the unemployed, and 
backbiting within the employed as they struggle for favours and 
promotion. These features are not to be seen as natural traits on 
the part of blacks. These are simply empirical realities common to 
many societies. 
At other levels too, parallels between the struggle and public 
goods seem contrived, and do not neatly fit into the analogy. 
Coercion and moral incentives raise the question of whether there 
is anything special about liberation ' struggles that makes them 
really impervious to analysis in orthodox liberal ways of thinking. 
It would seem so. In particular, liberation is characteristically 
open-ended, such that all talk of costs, benefits and harm easily 
becomes slippery. 
The uncertainty of the Benefit 
The Olson-like (1971) universe is largely based on economic 
theories where the certainty of the benefit is no issue. All 
standard treatments of public goods consider a benefit which all 
those who contribute to its creation can eventually expect to 
enjoy. The possibility of such enjoyment should not be remote. 
After all it is precisely the benefit which is the basis of the 
obligation. The minimum people can expect is that benefit. 
However, future liberation is an uncertainty or even an 
improbability. 
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Of course it is possible to argue that the uncertainty feature 
does not weigh heavily against the theory, especially if one makes 
a distinction between moral and scientific certainty. For example, 
ordinarily weather conditions can be predicted with a reasonable 
degree of scientific accuracy. Moral certainty refers to those 
situations where a person has reasonable grounds for believing that 
something will happen. When people marry honestly they do so with 
moral certainty that the relationship will last. Similarly, 
joining a union does . not guarantee benefits in any absolute 
fashion. The leadership of what looks like a worthwhile union may 
be discovered to be reckless and corrupt. · However, here too one 
has moral certainty that benefits will accrue. This certainty is 
based on the union's track record. In the same manner if the 
spouses have been always faithful this provides moral certainty 
that they will remain so. Moral certainty involves possible 
subsequent refutation or disappointment (incidentally, scientific 
certainty is subj ect to similar limitations!). A union with a 
reputable history may subsequently deteriorate in direct contrast 
to its previous record. Similarly, a good marriage might collapse 
unexpectedly. If this is correct, it follows that similarly the 
struggle may be pursued on the basis of moral certainty. If a 
resistance organisation has a track record of effectiveness, fair 
play and commitment to democracy, these may be sound grounds for 
supporting some of its programmes. Of course there may be 
betrayals but this is common to so many other facets of life that 
it could seem strange that liberation struggles should be singled 
out for rejection on these grounds. 
Still, while this line of argument is reasonable, it also 
ignores a fundamental difference between unions and marriage, on 
the one hand, and the liberation struggle, on the other. In the 
event of ~ pure public evil (that is, the fruits of the struggle 
being disastrous) the consequences are not readily reversible 
within a short time. In principle one can readily withdraw from a 
marriage or union, or dismiss such union's ineffectual leadership. 
If liberation ushers in another dictatorship, then the people's 
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options are severely narrowed. Wi thdrawing from a poli tical 
society is not as effortless as resigning from a union. 
Liberation: The Obscurity of the concept 
The genuine challenge raised by the confused cooperator still 
needs to be addressed. In the prisoner's dilemma the goal is 
crystal clear: how to stabilise an optimal, yet elusive state of 
affairs. The prisoners explicitly want to reduce their jail 
sentences to the minimal. There is no ambiguity. 
they can negotiate without any misunderstanding. 
As a result, 
The costs are 
also explicit. In short, their debate is about coercion towards an 
explicit, attainable, mutually desired goal. The oppressed in 
South Africa have no clear and unambiguous concept of what would 
count as liberation. Liberation is, at the mildest, an untidy 
maze. It is a many-layered, multi-dimensional, and heavily 
ideological concept. It means different things to different 
bystanders. Essentially two broad conceptions of liberation are 
pertinent in South African debates. This became even more evident 
after February, 1990. When the ANC agreed to join the government 
in the negotiation process, it was accused by its left opposition 
of 'selling out' the workers to capitalists and imperialists. The 
resultant settlement, it was argued, would amount to no more than 
an unhealthy alliance between the black and white bourgeoisie. 
Consequently, the argument went, negotiation would not lead to 
'true liberation', but only to a 'sellout settlement'. What then , 
counts as liberation, for the purposes of coercion? 
As it was pointed out in the introduction, there are two broad 
conceptions. One is a minimal definition, according to which 
liberation amounts to a situation in which everyone at least 18 
years old has the vote and is entitled to form a political party. 
There is no reference to race in the laws. This would be a 
mainstream liberal position which largely underlies the Freedom 
Charter. An alternative maximalist view considers liberation as 
the establishment of a socialistic order. It mayor may not 
include some features of the minimalist conception. Further, the 
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struggle involves many activities, both within one organisation and 
among the contending groups. For example, the ANC identif ied 
'pillars of the struggle' which include armed struggle, 
mobilisation, and international isolation and economic sanctions. 
The Democratic Party adopted a parliamentary opposition tactic to 
promote the struggle. Inkatha regards as its main contribution its 
rejection of Bantustan independence, and its refusal to negotiate 
with the government until Mandela and other political prisoners had 
been released. O~ the other hand, the National Forum bases the 
struggle on three principles, anti-imperialism, anti-sexism and 
anti-racism. For Black consciousness, ·psychological liberation is 
a sine qua non for the struggle. While the ANC insists on mixed 
membership, Black Consciousness puts emphasis on exclusivity. 
In the light of this, it is evident that the struggle involves 
conflicting versions of liberation, goals and strategies. 
Consequently, to suggest that a bystander is under obligation to 
support the struggle appears to violate the principle of 
reasonableness, since no ?ne should be under obligation to pursue 
obscure and conflicting aims. It is also manifestly unreasonable, 
to put it mildly, to expect capitalists and socialists to commit 
suicide by actively promoting a system inimical to their perceived 
interests~ 
For these reasons, it would appear, no obligation exists to 
support the struggle 'in general', and coercion towards such a 
cause is morally indefensible. While these are strong arguments, 
the problem need not be as insurmountable as it appears. One could 
limit the obligation to the establishment of a climate conducive to 
a democratic practice. This will be referred to as a procedural 
conception. It involves the abolishment of apartheid, the 
legalisation of all political organisations, and the promotion of 
open political canvassing and debate. In the wake of 2 February, 
it will become increasingly ditticult3 to justify any type of 
coercion, provided the state does not use underhand methods to 
undermine opposition organisations. From that moment, the 
socialists and capitalists should begin to fight it out in an open 
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and persuasive rather than coercive forum. The obligation is to 
establish the necessary conditions for democracy, not to impose a 
particular ideology. The political and strategic value of 
negotiations will remain debatable. What is indisputable is that 
those organisations, like the ANC and the National Party, which 
agreed to participate in the negotiation proces$ gained an 
important moral ascendancy. Both demonstrated some form of 
commitment to a democratic solution, however precarious. 
This procedural approach has obvious advantages. It focuses 
on the d~mocratic process rather than on di visi ve ideologies. 
While there is a shared perception of apartheid as an evil, no such 
common perception exists regarding capitalism and socialism. An 
exclusively anti-apartheid struggle does not frustrate pro-
socialist or pro-capitalist positions. Yet an exclusively pro-
capitalist or pro-socialist struggle might frustrate the legitimate 
aspirations of those who do not share these ideologies. Further, 
it makes it unnecessary for the bystander to take sides regarding 
the contending ideologies. Adopting this procedural conception is 
perfectly compatible with the belief that socialism would be the 
best system for the country. Finally, this account does not 
require one to think that the political struggle ends with the 
defeat of apartheid. In many ways the demise of apartheid opens up 
new areas of contest. A self-critical society will continue to 
improve and upgrade its standards. What is maintained here is 
simply that an enforceable obligation is to be restricted to the 
creation of a democratic climate. 
Nevertheless, even if the foregoing concerns were accepted, 
they would only address part of the problem raised by the 'struggle 
in general'. The arguments deal adequately with the confusion 
occasioned by the minimalist or maximalist conceptions of the 
struggle. still they fail to address other problems, such as 
whether sanctions, boycotts, or sabotage advances or retards the 
struggle. For these reasons, 'the struggle in general' does not 
pass the test of reasonable coercion under the principle of fair 
play. 
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Rationality and Liberation 
Do the oppressed in a concrete situation display the kind of 
calculating rationality so central to the prisoner's dilemma? How 
accurate is this model, especially in the South African situation? 
Is it not perhaps more suitable to the trans-national business 
technocrats, politicians, prisoners and a handful of other people? 
In the first place, the prisoner's dilemma is not intended to 
be a descriptive account of black townships, but rather a large 
lens through which specific political reality is examined. It puts 
emphasis on purposive behaviour, as opposed to treating -a person 
simply as a product of socialisation, class, race, or ethnicity. 
Choice, beliefs and optimising behaviour become prominent notions. 
It is possible that these assumptions are gross 
oversimplifications. Yet, this need not be an insurmountable 
problem. It helps sometimes to base assumptions on extreme cases, 
and later refine the model in the light of concrete examples. 
Of course whether the model is illuminating or not depends 
mainly on the use to which it is put. If it is intended to be an 
accurate description of the nature of a person, then obviously it 
runs into difficulties. Consequently, for the purposes of this 
argument, the model served a limited and specific role - namely, to 
facilitate thinking about the free rider problem in the liberation 
struggle. It sees a person as a creature capable of rational 
behaviour. 'Rational' is used in the three senses mapped out by 
Carlson (1973:25): 
i. Efficacious - on the basis of given information, it 
offers optimal prospects of achieving objectives. 
ii. Consistent - a rational decision must not involve 
any logical flaw in its calculation. 
iii. Reasoned or principled - it expresses an evaluative ' 
(though morally neutral) judgement of the form: 'when in 
situation of type C ... Z, the thing to do is X'. 
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In s9me ways everyone at one stage engages in this type of 
deliberation. However, it is plainly untrue to elevate this 
feature as a central characteristic of people allover. Even in 
highly literate societies, intelligent people do take irrational 
political decisions. In fact there is no evidence whatsoever that 
rationality alone plays a significant role in individual political 
decisions such as voting or supporting a political organisation. 
Gender, race, r -eligion, geography, kinship, tribalism, ethnicity 
and social ~tratification play their roles. 
Assessment and allocation of Costs 
It is possible to argue that the share of the liberation 
benefits poses no problem. After all the benefit envisaged in the 
scheme does not extend beyond the establishment of a free political 
climate in which people can make more substantive political 
choices. This limitation is useful because it should be attractive 
to every oppressed person regardless of political affiliation. A 
difficult issue involves calculating and sharing the liberation 
costs. Earlier it was argued against utilitarianism that the costs 
of public goods are not easily quantifiable. The situation is even 
more hopeless in the case of liberation. Even if such costs were 
calculable they would not be equally and mathematically divisible 
for the purpose of sharing. There are various roles to play -
soldiers, teachers, social workers, strategists ad infinitum. The 
risks involved vary according to the role assumed in the struggle. 
One could of course offset all this by insisting that highly risky 
roles should be left for the volunteers. 
In fact this was one of the provisions made in the previous 
chapter. It was suggested that coercive participation is 
justifiable only where bystanders are required to playa common and 
general role, such as marching or boycotting. Here, it would 
appear, the costs are spread equally among the 'drafted'. Once 
more this is not the case. A public demonstration in Cape Town and 
Johannesburg, with foreign diplomats and journalists involved or 
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watching, is less risky than one in the Free state or Northern 
Transvaal where members of the Afrikaner Weerstand Beweginq can not 
wait to attack and injure protesters. Similarly, while a black 
academic at a liberal institution can afford to miss work due to a 
political stayaway, this was not quite as simple for a lecturer at 
the University of the North in the mid-eighties. The price of 
bread looks the Same for a domestic worker and a millionaire. 
However, it i"s only formally so. In reality, it digs deeper into 
the pockets of the poor. It should be emphasised once more that 
the point is not that people should not take risks. All that is 
claimed is that sharing costs equally is not how the ·· struggle 
operates in practice. 
Altruism and rational self-interest 
It is evident that the public goods model is a moderately 
plausible way of dealing with the problem of liberation. However, 
liberation has so many interesting and peculiar aspects that it 
cannot be addressed completely by appeal to public goods. For 
example, the language of duties to oneself or to future generations 
is not explicable in terms of public goods. Liberation could also 
be conceived as a free gift to future generations. It may be that 
the present adult generation has given up on liberation during its 
life time. These adults simply want their children to be 
emancipated because they regard political liberty as a gift , to 
their offspring. This is a genuine motive for the struggle which 
cannot be captured adequately in public goods terminology at all. 
Of course this account may raise questions about costs as 
well. For example, if the process of handing over is such a bloody 
or awfully costly affair, such that handing over is seriously 
distorted by that process, then liberation may be an imprudent and 
immoral thing to do. Yet, this presupposes no -public goods 
framework 'at all - only the obligation to future generations. It 
is a gift to them simply because their forbears care about them. 
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It raises different issues altogether, such as what kind of tactics 
will not taint or poison what is about to be handed over. This is 
a different question from straight obligation questions like paying 
bus fares or not trampling the lawn. If liberation is a benefit, 
then just as it· is necessary to pay bus fares, it is essential to 
pay for the benefit of liberation as well. 
Public goods provides a useful model when setting up the 
problem. It gives a credible picture of people coming together to 
set up a liberation scheme from which they hope to benefit. The 
benefit would be greater than the . cost they would each incur if 
they did not stick together. Here is a useful model of ·· uni ty in 
action, for example, of the oppressed refusing to cooperate with 
the government. In many ways if the oppressed withdrew support for 
the government in areas such as taxes and labour, apartheid would 
simply collapse. If the oppressed made the desired contribution, 
namely non-recognition and non-cooperation, then they would almost 
surely get what they wanted. Such a move clearly outweighs the 
costs. However, the model . also distorts the reality of liberation. 
Pure public goods says little about the down side. Armed police 
can still drag people to work. The struggle can simply amount to 
'death now - liberation later'. 
One requirement for a successful revolution is the acceptance 
of the fact that people are partially altruistic and partially 
self-interested, so that the pure Olson (1971) problem does not 
arise. This is also an explanation of why more public goods get 
produced by voluntary cooperation than one would expect on Olson's 
assumptions. The answer is plainly that Olson's assumptions have 
built into them, straight-forward self-interest. If people are not 
straightforwardly self-interested then they overcome a great deal 
of those problems by contributing anyway; they may feel like 
contributing a bit until the whole thing is started, or they may be 
full of loyal indignation at being taken for a ride so that without 
any need for overt coercion they actually change people's 
incentives. 
Even in a black middle class suburb where arson and murder by 
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neighbours is unlikely, free riders receive an unfriendly glare 
from their neighbours. Free riders may feel that a glare, or even 
a small risk of detection, is bad enough to provide an incentive 
for them to support a boycott, not necessarily out of fear for 
their lives. They simply do not wish to be known as people who 
cannot be trusted. 
To conclude, while it may be laudable to join the struggle, in 
the sense of being a known and committed activist, it is morally 
impermissible in terms of the APF to coerce bystanders into doing 
likewise. In the remaining section, focus will now move to 
specific forms of protest, the education, rent and ·· consumer 
boycotts. 
Education Boycott 
This case is somewhat problematic. An education boycott is an 
example of a tactic which though possibly helpful, is nevertheless 
not a justifiable ground for coercion. Two types of boycotts 
should be distinguished from each other. One is a short-term, 
specific issue-oriented programme, a1m1ng at an identifiable 
concern over which pupils feel strongly. students might boycott to 
demand the dismissal of a racist teacher, or the removal of police 
and army from their school premises. On this level the goals are 
pretty clear. There have been protests against inferior education, 
sexual abuse, corporal punishment and compulsory school uniforms. 
Positively, people wanted improved quality of education, equal and 
free education, and school books and texts. On other levels the 
aims were murky. The demand for relevant and proper education is 
ethically defensible. In fact such an education is a moral 
imperative. This demand cuts across all the political layers of 
the oppressed. In general one could argue that a free, healthy 
national education system is a pure public good. Its denial 
constitutes serious social harm. Such cases constitute, mutatis 
mutandis, possible areas of justifiable coercion. 
Other versions of boycotts have been elevated from being 
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tactics and strategies to .the level of principles. This is an area 
of concern, and the rest of this section deals specifically with 
this version of boycotts. Boycotts typically were prompted by 
specif ic issues, such as police killings, detention of fellow 
students, corrupt principals or poor results. However, since 1976 
they have also assumed a vital political role. There have been few 
boycotts which were not linked to important national political 
questiops, such as parents' representation, accountability and low 
standards for the oppressed. The result is that the goals of the 
boycotts increasingly became unclear. 
People's Education are typical examples. 
Boycotts in support of 
On the prophetic level 
such protests made sense, and raised the level of political 
consciousness; they questioned traditional values of education as 
espoused by the architects of apartheid; they addressed important 
questions such as democracy in education, curriculum development, 
relevant education and accountability. These are issues which 
continue to be focal in both the education and political domain. 
However, what constitutes this education is not clear at all. 
The general principles and goals are pretty clear, but insofar as 
it involves a teaching package it remains a foggy and contested 
area. Even its demand remains strategically unwarranted until 
there is greater clarity about the content of People's Education. 
The greatest merit of the People's Education movement was more in 
terms of general political mobilisation than in the improvement of 
education as such. The movement had a propaganda value which 
conscientised the community and students towards a search for a new 
set of educational values. However, the greatest flaw in the 
People's Education campaign was the transformation of prolonged 
school boycotts from tactics to principles. In addition to this, 
education boycotts contained elements of risk, such as police 
detention, harassment and permanent exclusion . from formal 
education. 
Further, the achievement of these broad general educational 
goals was often not within immediate sight, but the issues 
themselves continue to be pressing. Thanks to the People's 
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Education 'movement, they remain on the agenda. Of course, if the 
aim was solely to raise political awareness, the approach would be 
perfectly legitimate. In that case, the same could have been 
achieved through compulsory seminars in school premises after 
normal school hours. Alternatively, brief one or two-day protests 
could be conducted every semester or term in order to highlight 
those issues. If, on the other hand, it was hoped that the 
boycotts per se would play a crucial role in the actual demise of 
apartheid, then this is a matter of debate. What opponents of 
boycotts feared most was that a government dedicated to poor 
education for blacks could hardly be , threatened by the decision of 
those blacks to boycott schools. In other words, there were 
serious doubts about the effectiveness of such a strategy. 
There were also concerns about possible harm such a strategy 
could do. First, the escalation effect of such a strategy could 
not be underestimated. It produced a generation of young people 
who, subconsciously, had come to denigrate all forms of education. 
Education and liberation were juxtaposed as antithetical, with 
preference going to the latter. Any person who pursued education 
was consequently 'counter-revolutionary'. The fact is that 
people's attitudes cannot be switched on and off randomly like 
electricity. In other words, the seeds of a worrying anti-
intellectual tradition were inevitably sown. One of the 
consequences of education boycotts is a largely illiterate and 
unemployable generation. The effects on the black family were also 
sources of concern. The education strategy could never be 
implemented without breaking down extensively the parent-teacher 
authority, since very few parents would cherish the idea of 
children and teenagers roaming the streets with nothing 
constructive to keep them occupied. 
The positive side to boycotts, however, should not be 
overlooked too quickly. It should be borne in mind that no 
liberation strategy is without costs. For example, with hindsight, 
-it is possible to state categorically that sanctions played a 
sUbstantial role in undermining the government, and forcing it into 
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a negotiation mode. This has damaged the economy, and the 
oppressed have no choice but to pay that price. Further, it was 
also the spectre of violence and the prospects of 'ungovernability' 
which kept foreign investment away from South Africa. This spectre 
was a direct result of the work of the 'comrades' who were either 
unemployed youth, or boycotting students. From this perspective it 
may be argued that, in their own cruel way, the boycotts have 
contributed to the liberation struggle. In addition, the boycotts 
politicised a sUbstantial number of teachers, most of whom were 
tradi tionally devoted slaves of the Department of Education and 
Training. Indeed there is a sense in which teachers also failed in 
their responsibility to the community of the oppressed, by failing 
to exploit the classroom situation by raising the level of 
awareness. wi th corporal punishment the order of the day, teaching 
was also a welcome profession for those who derived sadistic 
pleasure from inflicting pain. Student boycotts and retaliation 
since the mid-eighties put an end to such abuses. 
What can be concluded from all of this? Nothing in this 
discussion should be construed as suggesting that education 
boycotts were worthless. At best, they were problematic and 
controversial. They did not enjoy overall community support (even 
though there was widespread support for . the issues raised by the 
boycott), and resistance organisations themselves were not united 
on the issue of boycotts. As a result, coercion was at its maximum 
on this level, and this alone should raise questions about the 
wisdom of coercion itself. The conclusion is simply this: There 
were benefits and costs to this strategy, the relative weight of 
each against the other is difficult to establish and, consequently, 
coercion is not justified. To emphasise, the conclusion is simply 
that coercion was unjustified, not that the strategy was a failure. 
After all, a violent strategy might be a success, but from this it 
does not follow that bystanders may be coerced into taking arms. 
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Rent and Consumer Boycotts 
These are measures in which coercion seems justifiable. Rent 
boycotts were designed to lower rent and service fees, or to 
pressurise unpopular town councillors to resign. The hopes and 
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aspirations of society were mirrored in these measures. The issues 
were intelligible, and objectives explicit. Rent boycotts are a 
success story. The issues are clear, morally acceptable and of 
concern to people . involved. They are enforced by local leaders 
generally known to the people. Where the government has tried to 
clamp down on the · rent defaulters, the rest of the community 
rallied behind potential victims. As in the prisoner's dilemma, 
these protests required widespread cooperation. They also involved 
risks such as evictions and arrests. still rent boycotts also 
included some addi tional ' in-process' benefits. People were 
gaining financially by not paying for the services they received, 
and also crippling the local town councils that they had come to 
hate. In the process rent. boycotts forced the government to enter 
into gru~ing negotiations with community representatives. These 
goals were not only specific, but also effective. In ,a number of 
instances, the citizens won. The councillors resigned, and often 
the arrears were written off. Naturally, the strategies involved 
some dangers, but such perils were nevertheless not out of 
proportion to the benefits. There were cases where people were 
evicted during mid-winter nights. still, the communities rallied 
behind such victims, and soon they were Ire-instated' into their 
homes by neighbours. It would indeed be difficult to understand 
why any bystander would have serious problems with rent boycotts. 
The risks were nominal, the effects predictable and the financial 
savings concrete. 
Consumer boycotts were in the same league. The black buying 
power has increasingly become a potent political weapon. Where 
substantially supported, boycotts crippled a number of small 
businesses, inducing a change of heart. While they entailed 
hardships, their results were visible a short time after their 
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launch. They provided added pressure on the government, business 
and local white councillors to negotiate with the oppressed. In 
any country, the economy is the most sensitive area. Consumer 
boycotts, too, were tied to specific demands such as the release of 
detainees. They were designed to last for specific periods. 
Unlike education boycotts, consumer boycotts were never indefinite. 
The consumer bystanders could plan their lives during such 
boycotts. 
Consumer boycotts had added beneficial advantages over rent 
boycotts. In the case of the latter, the state could and did try 
to put counter-pressure on communi ties in order to break the 
boycott. These included midnight raids, court actions and 
continuous threats. In other words, communities were caught up 
between the resistance organisations and the state. In contrast, 
there was no manner in which the state could pressurise people into 
buying in town (or anywhere for that matter)! At best, the 
government could only watch in exasperation. Rent boycotts 
involved people in breaking the law" and therefore exposing 
themselves to possible arrest. Consumer boycotts were technically 
illegal, in the sense that it was a crime to call for such 
boycotts. It was never a crime to heed such boycotts as long as 
people did not publicise their intentions. Consequently, the 
motivation to participate should have been higher, and coercion 
here would serve as guarantee to others that 'the struggle 
continues' • 
The consumer boycott had its negative side, namely, 
tremendous inconvenience. This was particularly so because most of 
the bystanders leave the townships very early to go to work and 
return quite late. Their lunch hour was used for Shopping. During 
boycotts they had to buy in the townships where both quality and 
quantity were lower than in the cities. Besides, township prices 
are generally high, and increase even further when demand outstrips 
supply during boycotts. In this respect, from the bystander's 
perspecti ve, rent boycotts had an edge over consumer boycotts. 
Rent boycotts spared the consumer the trouble of abusive petty 
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off icials and long queues in rent off ices. Consumer boycotts taxed 
people's resources to find alternative shopping time and shops. It 
brought to the bystanders added inconveniences at the mildest, or 
greater hardships at worst. Yet, in both cases, no lives were in 
danger. It was generally a matter of inconvenience. consequently, 
here again coercion was justified. 
concluding Remarks 
Rent and consumer boycotts are typically local issues. Such 
issues are easy to identify and to rally people around. Of course 
local issues ultimately have national ramif ications because a 
sUbstantial number of local problems are initiated by the 
government's national policy. This explains why, despite 
geographical distance, many black townships have similar problems. 
Education boycotts belong to what may be termed 'micro issues', 
that is, national problems which are nevertheless not purely 
political in the sense of involving broader constitutional issues 
of the country. As a wide generalisation, it may be stated that if 
the principle of fair play generates obligations, it is likely to 
be in the area of local issues, and vaguely in micro affairs and 
possibly not at all in national issues (broad conceptions of 
liberation). Too much bickering within the resistance organisation 
is likely to be endemic on the national level for some time, and in 
the process, leave people confused. National issues are the domain 
of nation~l organisation. As a result, on the national level the 
principle of fair play is likely to apply in the mature years of 
the struggle where issues have become crystallised and a track 
record of credibility and effectiveness has been established. 
The South African situation - Final Questions 
In the light of the foregoing discussion, it may be possible 
to respond to the second set of questions (i - iv), dealing with 
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the problems of applying the fair play principle in a specific 
context like South Africa. 
i. Does the amended principle of fair play justify, for 
example, the ANC and the PAC, coercing the same 
bystander? 
Assuming that both organisations met all the structural virtues 
outlined above, it is possible that they may be justified in 
coercing the same bystander. This is possible where a specific 
programme is not .in conflict with the conditions for justified 
coercion. Further, there should be consensus across the political 
spectrum on the merits of a proposed programme. Two vivid examples 
here are rent and services boycotts and the economic sanctions 
campaign. These tactics were generally accepted by all national 
resistance organisations. Coercion in regard to rents was minimal 
because, in general, people could identify with the demand. 
However, in the case where the bystander is required to follow 
contradictory demands from the organisations, coercion is 
unjustifiable. Example one (see introduction) on education 
boycotts is a case in point. As was demonstrated, it fails on 
numerous counts as a legitimate terrain of coercion. Groups like 
Azapo were specifically against school boycotts. The result is 
that it would be irrational to coerce a bystander both to take part 
in and boycott the detested educational system. In short, even 
where there is more than one organisation, it does not follow that 
the principle of fair play is inoperative. 
ii. If different movements, or elements in the same 
movement, are running contradictory strategies 
( 'education for liberation' versus 'liberation before 
education'), who in terms of the amended principle of 
fair play is a free rider? And which party may appeal to 
the principle of harm? 
In this case, coercion is likely to be tempting for those who 
believe in 'liberation before education'. After all, in practical 
circumstances ' . resistance organisations were never, ever required 
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to coerce pupils into going to school! NOw, it will be recalled 
that in response to (i), it was pointed out that the 'education 
struggle' was not one of the movements' success stories. It has 
certainly raised the level of political awareness and activism, but 
whether these were outweighed by the costs of the resultant high 
rate of illiteracy or not, remains a subject of intense debate. 
And it is precisely because of the existence of such doubts, even 
amongst committed activists, that one should question whether the 
education struggle was a genuine terr~in for coercion. As was 
pointed out earlier, such a struggle had . a murky goal, its 
effectiveness was in doubt at the outset, it could hardly be said 
to have represented the hopes and aspirations of society and its 
disruption of the black society will take long to undo. 
At the same time, the politically destabilising effect of the 
youth 'in the streets' is likely to have contributed to anxiety 
wi thin the government. Once the country appeared unstable to 
potential foreign investors, this, more than the sanctions 
campaign, .may have undermined the national economy. Ultimately, it 
is impossible to quantify the implications of either strategy. In 
short, it is not poss ible to identify the free rider. The 
principle of fair play does not apply at all in this case, and 
consequently any reference to a free rider would be inappropriate. 
1.1.1.. Given that (a) there is more than one movement, and 
(b) that there are contradictory strategies, how do the 
arguments deal with the bystander who appeals to her 
obligation to be rational and therefore to make her own 
choice? 
Once more, it should be emphasised that the existence of more than 
one movement does not necessarily imply that there is no consensus 
on any issue. This was evident from both (i) and (ii) above. As 
a matter of principle, where there is conflict, then the bystander 
should ex~rcise her option of choosing which strategy to support. 
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iv. Given the principle of harm, who harms society: the 
person who adopts the principle 'education for 
liberation', or the one who acts on 'liberation before 
education'? 
Essentially, the issue is: Who is entitled to use the principles 
of harm and fair play, when the leadership disagrees on whether 
schools should be attended or boycotted? It is to this last 
question that attention should be focused. As the answer to (iii) 
indicates, it is either impossible or difficult to give a definite 
answer. This is largely due to the fact that one cannot quantify 
the consequences of each of these strategies. Further,.· even :If 
such quantification were possible, one might still assign differing 
normative values to these consequences. After all, a ton of coal 
might still be worthless compared, say, to a pound of gold! still, 
from the fact that one cannot give a decisive answer in this case, 
it does not follow that such an answer is impossible in all cases. 
For example, in the event of a march against rent hikes or police 
. brutality, it might prove -less difficult to isolate free riders. 
All in all, what the above questions achieve is simply to 
underline that, in certain circumstances, it is impossible to apply 
the principle of fair play. To conclude, two issues need to be 
emphasised. They do not demonstrate that the principle of fair 
play is totally inapplicable. To illustrate that a principle runs 
into grey areas at times hardly marks a major theoretical advance. 
Finally, it is worth repeating: The foregoing discussion was not 
designed to juxtapose useless and useful strategies. It was solely 
meant to identify which measures met the requirements of the APF 
and which fail to do so. 
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liMBS 
1. In South Africa the term "moderate" may be pejorative when 
understood as referring to collaborators with the government. In 
this context it is used technically to refer to a 'mean between two 
extremes' . 
2. Emphasis added. 
3. The emphasis is important because the principle of fair play 
could be employed to justify coercion even after legalisation of 
the parties. However, such coercion . should be preceded by 
democratic consultation and debate. 
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The Problem of Paternalism 
In the light of the prime concern of this study, it is 
tempting and legitimate to pose the following question: If all 
that matters is the type and scope of coercio~, and not the 
organisation per se, why then was so much made out of the 
covertness of orga"nisations? It seems that the principle of fair 
play makes it possible for anyone, including legal political 
parties to adopt coercive measures. It should apply even where 
consent was possible, but people voted 'wrongly'. In other words, 
where people, unwittingly or deliberately, harm themselves, then 
they could be forcibly restrained from doing so in terms of the 
principle. This looks like the worst form of paternalism. The 
principle of fair play proves too much; it makes it possible for 
anyone, including legal political parties to adopt coercive 
measures. 
To address the first part of the question: Why the obsession 
with covertness when the principle applies to cases even where 
consent was possible, where debate and discussion have or could 
have taken place? It should be recalled that the question was 
raised against the background of liberal theory, where consent is 
a cardinal feature of political and moral life. At its barest 
conception, such consent is understood to involve openness, debate, 
elections and mandates. Given these assumptions, covert 
organisations present moral problems. As it was pointed out 
earlier, such organisations are inherently undemocratic, not by 
desire but force of circumstances. In short, covert organisations 
raise problems for those who take consent seriously. The 
significance of covertness lies in the fact that, in this case, 
people can hardly debate. Discussion is made impossible for them 
ab initio. Chapter three seriously undermined the claims of 
consent theory. Nevertheless, it was emphasised that it was the 
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formulation of the theory that presented problems. The values it 
pursued were important, and had to be accommodated even in the 
alternative principle of non-consensual obligation. This was done 
in terms of substantive consent in the previous chapter. The moral 
importance of open discussion is that it could lead to informed 
consent. In other words, openness remains a central requirement of 
democracy. 
This chapter pursues the problem of paternalism and addresses 
the challenge raised by the confused cooperator. Given the 
undemocratic nature of political resistance, who will be assigning 
moral importance to goals and strategies? Amongst . numerous 
objections, is a claim that the principle of fair play could lead 
to political paternalism by entrusting a group of people with the 
right to decide the political goals and means, and to impose such 
schemes on the rest of society. In other words, as a partial 
consequence of this principle people could be 'forced to be free'. 
Worse still, who decides whether a given act constitutes fighting 
for liberation? The very presumption in favour of liberty, which 
is the point of departure adopted, implies that because liberation 
is a good thing it will be imposed upon all and sundry, regardless 
of their personal inclination. What happe~s, for example, if the 
oppressed prefer to live under 
alternative system? To what 
paternalism morally justified? 
apartheid, rather than under an 
extent, if any, is political 
There are two possible general responses to 
One is a denial that any paternalism is involved. 
this objection. 
Alternatively, 
one can admit paternalism, but argue that in any case no account of 
liberty, not even Berlin's 'negative liberty' (1969), is altogether 
devoid of paternalism. In other words, paternalism is not always 
objectionable. Before these claims and counter-claims are 
assessed, it is necessary to spell out what paternalism means. 
Briefly, it will be argued that while people are free to harm 
themselves, if their self-inflicted harm involves harm for others 
as well then they could be restrained. Here there is no question 
of paternalism. If someone (x) wishes to commit suicide by driving 
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recklessly in a car in which someone else (y) is also a passenger, 
then (y) is perfectly justified in restraining (x). 
What is Paternalism? 
Paternalism is the view that it is sometimes the business of 
society to compel autonomous adults to engage in activities which 
promote their own good. Alternatively the state or society has a 
right to limit individual liberty in order to protect a person from 
self-inflicted harm. In this context, paternalism is the belief 
that the oppressed may be compelled to end their oppression - in 
their own interest. This notion relies upon the distinction 
between 'self-regarding' and 'other-regarding' acts ( 'the 
distinction'). other-regarding acts are, so to say, directed at, 
and have direct implications for others. To assault, steal from, 
or injure others, for example, is to engage in other-regarding 
acts. Harmful other-regarding acts are forbidden in terms of the 
harm principle discussed earlier. In contrast, self-regarding acts 
essentially 'have no effect on others against their wishes; they 
only affect the agents and consenting adults' (Ten:1980:10). 
Common examples are taken to be drug taking, the use of car seat 
belts, adultery and homosexuality between consenting parties, 
drinking heavily in private, and suicide. In this context, one 
would presumably include the right to be a slave. Opponents of 
paternalism insist that society should. not intervene in self-
regarding acts because, by definition, such acts do no public harm. 
The distinction is queried largely on the basis that in 
practice ultimately every action has some implications for others. 
All of the examples cited above have an impact beyond the immediate 
agent. Drug addicts might impose intolerable burdens on their 
families; they might draw heavily on society's limited health 
resources. Similarly, an adulterous affair could have deleterious 
implications for the respective spouses of the part~ers and their 
family life. In fact there are very few significant actions which 
have no implications for others. The result is that any moral 
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doctrine, like anti-paternalism, based on such grounds is 
meaningless. It might not guarantee the individual's right to 
privacy, precisely because it fails to give a satisfactory and 
concrete criterion of a self-regarding act. In addition, it has 
been shown that even the right to remain a slave has some 
implications for society as a whole, including those who wish to be 
free. strictly speaking, the objection based on the empirical 
impossibility of self-regarding acts misses the point. In fact 
behind such objections lies an assumption that i£ in fact there 
were 'self-regarding' actions, then paternalism would be wrong. 
The objection demonstrates, not that 'self-regarding' actions are 
logically impossible, only that in practice they are difficult to 
come by. It shows that although paternalism is a rare occurrence 
it remains ne~essarily wrong where it does occur. 
There is another basic objection to 'the distinction'. 
According to Wolff (1968:25) and Ten (1980:11) it is based not on 
facts, but on value. What belongs to the individual's private and 
public sphere is not discoyered, but invented by a complex network 
of social norms and rights. Self-regarding acts would then become 
those with which only an individual has a right to concern himself, 
while other-regarding acts imply that others have a legitimate 
interest in them. On this score, what makes an action 'self-
regarding' is its failure to affect 'the interests of others' 
(Rees:1966) - that is, not merely its failure to affect others.! 
Even this reformulation fails to di.spose of the problem. 
While judgements about how people are affected are purely 
descriptive, those regarding how people's interests are affected 
are normative. The distinction is now subject to the whims, -
influence and reactions of others. People may be affected by a 
myriad of considerations - including non-rational factors. This in 
turn widens the concept of interests to the extent of eliminating 
self-regarding acts altogether, or reducing their moral 
significance. In short, once people's emotions playa role, they 
are likely to tilt the scales towards invasion of what might have 
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been generally accepted as private domain: 
Now suppose that Joe is a devout Calvinist or a 
principled vegetarian. The very presence in his 
community of a Catholic or a meat-eater may cause him 
fully as much pain as a blow in the face or the.th~ft of 
his purse. Indeed, to a truly devout Chrl.stl.an a 
physical blow counts for much less than the blasphemy of 
a heretic (Wolff:1968:24). 
If the distinctio~ is to hold at all, it has to be based upon a 
non-normative basis. This has been demonstrated to be impossible. 
A Case for political Paternalism 
A distinction is generally made between strong and weak 
paternalism. strong paternalism authorises, or indeed prescribes 
intervention by third parties in private individual affairs, even 
if the agent deliberately, voluntarily and i~tentionally desires 
otherwise. Weak paternalism appeals to a defective decision-making 
process on the part of the agent. If there is reason to believe 
that an agent's judgement might be impaired, by whatever cause, 
then such a person should be restrained from doing what he wants. 
For example, if a passenger boarded an aircraft not knowing that it 
contained explosives, he may be dragged out of it prior to an 
explosion. However, such interference is -strictly temporary. If, 
with the full knowledge of the facts, the passenger insists on 
boarding, then no person should prevent him. The obvious 
implication is that even though apartheid is harmful to blacks, if 
some of the oppressed voluntarily and deliberately opt for the 
status quo, then it would be wrong to restrain them. W e a k 
paternalism recognises the need for a temporary restraint · upon 
individual liberty. This is particularly so when consent is not 
full and free. Essential to weak paternalism is the distinction 
between what a person wills on the one hand, and. what he desires on 
the other . (Wolff:1976:50). To will is to achieve whatever goal a 
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person has set out to perform. If the outcome is different from 
what he had set out to do, then he fails to achieve what he wants. 
A person might swallow cyanide under an erroneous impression that 
this would cure a stomach pain. He wills to swallow the poison, 
although he wants to get well. Preventing him from swallowing 
cyanide is a weak form of paternalism. Strictly speaking, you are 
not preventing him from getting what he wants. He does not want to 
die. On the contrary, he wants to cure his pain. This fact makes 
it possible to maintain of any person, that he may not necessarily 
be the best judge of his own welfare. An athlete might be more 
concerned about his success, but his trainer might be " a better 
judge of what is required for that success. Naturally, there must 
be a close connection between a person's wants and interests. As 
Rescher (cited in Kleinig:1978:31) puts it, 'the determination of 
welfare interests is a matter of judgment and some expertise, and 
though a person's own feelings and interests are not to be left out 
of account, they are not decisive'. This point has been made 
already in the discussion of strategies and tactics in chapter 
eight. 
The means-end continuum is important here. The agent wills 
the means but wants the end. Weak paternalism presumes a discord 
between means and end. Expertise and knowledge are important here. 
There is . no debate about the goal or ends. They are pretty 
straightforward. The goal is not defined for the 'victim'. 
Indeed, the victim is being helped towards his goal, from which 
'liberty' will distract him. On the basis of this analysis, it is 
possible to conclude that sometimes a person may not know what he 
really wants, and that others may know better. This means that he 
may be prevented from employing means at variance with his goals. 
This is possible only if the individual places instrumental, 
rather than moral value upon the means he chooses. This in turn 
implies that the means are acceptable to the extent that they lead 
to the achievement of the goal. Without this qualification, 
unacceptable means may be imposed upon people 'for their own good'. 
Freedom and choice clearly involve more than simply doing what one 
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wants. A host of factors impinge upon free choice, for example 
insufficient relevant knowledge, lack of self control and undue 
influence such as fear (Ten:1980:110-112). 
It is not in respect of weak paternalism that ethical problems 
are encountered. The reason is obvious. Weak paternalism seems to 
be a cure to temporary blindness. It respects the goals 
individuals have mapped out for themsel ves. Intervention is 
designed precisely to promote those goals. strong paternalism is 
a different issue altogether. Here the wisdom of the individual's 
goals is at issue. Alternative goals are introduced and imposed 
upon an unwilling person. Someone is playing God. . This is 
precisely what the principle of fair play seems to be endorsing. 
As both Nozick (1971) and Dworkin (1986) have pointed out, a 
benefit is imposed, regardless of the attitude of the beneficiary. 
Liberty and Paternalism 
Are people free to choose slavery? It will be argued that if 
the principle of fair play is indeed paternalistic, it is only 
because there is no worthwhile account of liberty which is non-
paternalistic. It is interesting that even a steadfast liberal 
like Mill (1972: 158) accepts strong paternalism in the case of 
liberty: 
By selling himself for a slave, he abdicates his liberty; 
he forgoes any future use of it beyond that single act. 
He therefore defeats, in his own case, the very purpose 
which is the justification of allowing him to dispose of 
himself. • • The principle of freedom cannot require 
that he should be free not to be free. It is not freedom 
to be allowed to alienate his freedom. 
Why does Mill object to the voluntary loss of freedom here? After 
all, to incur obligations is partly to sell personal liberty. 
Similarly, could a potential slave not sacrifice freedom for other 
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comforts and material benefits (Ten:1980:118)? Mill objects to 
voluntary slavery be<?ause in such a case freedom is given up 
permanently and completely and irrevocably. What Mill (1972) 
claims is thematic in social contract theories, particularly in 
respect of Rousseau (1973) and Locke (1966). The very basis of 
society is liberty, justice and security. Unless a political 
system can guarantee this minimum, it is no better than the state 
of nature. In fact, for some, the state of nature might even be 
better than an unjust, unfree and insecure civil society. At least 
in the state of nature, people are at liberty to resort to 
deviousness and discretionary use of force, something a state was 
designed to eliminate. 
conceptions of Liberty 
Behind the debate about paternalism lie deeper and conflicting 
conceptions of liberty, commonly known as positive and negative 
liberty. According to Berlin (1969:7), negative liberty entails 
'the area within which persons should be left to do what they want 
without interference by others': 'I am normally said to be free to 
the degree to which no human being interferes with my activity. 
Political liberty in this sense is simply an area within which a 
man can do what he wants. ,2 In short, it is freedom from external 
obstacles. To be more specific: In the political arena, negative 
liberty is the doctrine that I may choose my politics. In 
contrast, positive liberty consists of rational self-determination. 
It results from the determination by a person to be in full self-
control. Such a person's life must not depend on external forces, 
but his life and decisions must depend only on him and not on 
others. This view of liberty is based upon a certain conception of 
a person. A free person lives according to that image. Plato's 
tripartite division of a person in The Republic is designed to 
demonstrate that an irrational person would be unfree. He is under 
the influence of passions, rather than [ideally] under the guidance 
of his intellect. Similarly, for Rousseau (1973), those who pursue 
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particular individual wills, as opposed to the 'general will', are 
not free. There are classical objections to both versions. 
Against negative liberty, it is argued that it impoverishes the 
concept of liberty, by almost reducing it to isolation. A starving 
peasant can be free only in the cynical sense that nobody 
interferes with his destiny with certain death. In contrast, 
Berlin considers positive liberty paternalistic. It is allegedly 
based on a dubious notion of an ideal person, or ideal society to 
which all should conform. Non-freedom then simply becomes a matter 
of failing to conform to this ideal. However, 
ideal is not a metaphysical or empirical given. 
suspiciously value-laden notion. Hitler had a 
for Berlin this 
Rather; it isa 
notion of ideal 
society in which there would be no Jews. Similarly, utopias in 
Kampuchea turned out to be a ~ight~are for ordinary people who may 
have been previously 'forced to be free'. In the same way, the 
oppressed in South Africa may find themselves fighting for dubious 
ideals, such as the 'workers' state', which may have been presented 
as an ideal by a handful of people. 
That this is a gross oversimplification of the differences 
between the two accounts has been illustrated by MacCallum (1967). 
He challenges the very feasibility of making the distinction, and 
presents instead a triadic notion of freedom. The elements of this 
triad are the moral aqent (x), the intended action (y), and the 
obstacle (z) to that action. What separates negative from positive 
freedom is not that one is freedom from an obstacle, while the 
other is freedom to do something. The differences run much deeper 
and are based largely on the nature and conception of a person, as 
well as the obstacles to their freedom. For MacCallum, ultimately 
all disputes about liberty are reducible to discrepancies over the 
pertinent ranges of one or more of the x, y and z variables 
(1967:320)~ 
MacCallum's account is not without its problems. However, it 
highlights the necessary conditions for any discourse about social 
freedom. For example, for positive liberty, education and good 
health are examples of liberty. To be free is (positively) to have 
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opportunities of education and good health. Yet this can also be 
expressed negatively as absence of illiteracy or massive ignorance, 
and poor health. Denoting one type positive and another negative 
is therefore not particularly illuminating. This is not to deny 
that there are differences. On the contrary, those differences, as 
it was seen, were largely based on the conception of a person. As 
it was noted, Berlin (1969) considers certain types of positive 
liberty too normati ve and ideological, as opposed to a more 
descriptive and less doctrinaire negative approach. 
correct assessment? It would seem not. 
Is this a 
If, indeed, liberty simply meant the absence of ·· external 
constraints in the crude Hobbesian mould, then the implications 
should be embarrassing even to supporters of negative liberty. For 
example, one would be freer or less free accor~ing to the frequency 
of such interference. This means that to assess freedom or its 
absence, one would have to undertake only a quantitative evaluation 
of interference - to moni tor how many times interference has 
occurred. This means a man who had a wife chosen for him by 
tradition or lot would be freer than a person who was thrown out of 
a neighbour's house twenty times. Taylor (1979:183) develops a 
powerful argument to demonstrate the inadequacy of negative 
liberty: 
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Consider the following diabolical defence of Albania as 
a free country. We recognize that religion has been 
abolished in Albania, whereas it hasn't been in Britain. 
But on the other hand there are probably far fewer 
traffic lights per head in Tirana than in London. (I 
haven't checked for myself, but this is a very plausible 
assumption.) Suppose an apologist for Albanian Socialism 
were nevertheless to claim that this country was freer 
than Britain, because the number of acts restricted was 
far smaller. After all, only a minority of Londoners 
practise some religion in public places, but all have to 
negotiate their way through traffic. Those who do 
practise a religion generally do so on one day of the 
week, while they are held up at traffic lights every day. 
In sheer quantitative terms, the number of acts 
restricted by traffic lights must be greater than that 
restricted by a ban on public religious practice. So if 
Britain is considered a free society, why not Albania? 
This is a kind of argument whose merits almost all would rightly 
refuse to consider. This is so because freedom of religion 
occupies a more fundamental place in the moral order than a 
prohibition imposed by traffic lights. 'Indeed, it is even dubious 
that traffic lights are an issue for freedom at all. Although both 
involve external constraints (to crossing a street or attending 
religious services), in terms of importance stopping at a street 
sign is seen as an inconvenience. Such an inconvenience is offset 
by a more .fundamental gain - namely, the preservation of life and 
property. On the other hand, religious intolerance violates a 
value which carries enormous social and psychological costs. 
If this is correct, then clearly there is more to freedom than 
merely non-interference. Freedom entails the ability to make a 
qualitative assessment of motives, where such assessment need not 
always be the sole prerogative of the agent whose freedom is in 
doubt. What is the basis of such a qualitative discrimination? It 
is ultimately based upon a certain conception of a person and 
society. It is not a value-free, 
factual data about society and people. 
descriptive enumeration of 
In this context, freedom to 
be a slave is ranked lower than freedom to pursue an autonomous 
life. It would then appear that if positive liberty leads to 
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paternalism, so would negative liberty. 
In short, arguments against paternalism are often based on 
dubious grounds. Firstly, it was shown that the belief that a 
factual, rather than normative distinction can be made between 
self-regarding and other-regarding actions. Secondly, it 
presupposes wrongly that negative liberty is ideology-free, that 
is, that it objectively and simply refers to non-interference. 
Both contentions have been shown to be erroneous. The position 
defended here is · not that paternalism of any sort is morally 
indifferent. All that is m~intained is that the notion of a free 
society or a free person is inseparable from certain pre-existing 
shared community conceptions ofa good person or a good society. 
This is why, for example, a distinction is made between freedom and 
license. 
If this line of argument is accepted, then the nature of the 
debate changes substantially. The issue no longer is whether or 
not there is paternalism, but rather the type or degree of 
paternalism which is reasonable. This in turn involves a 
qualitative evaluation of the actions. This qualitative evaluation 
might take various forms. The most common is ranking rights and 
liberties in a hierarchical form. This is done sometimes by 
figuring which right is more fundamental than the other, that is, 
which right presupposes the existence of another. The right to 
life, for example, is a necessary condition for the right to 
property, to speech and so on. Similarly, one could argue, liberty 
is a necessary condition for exercising other social and political 
rights. A society indifferent to liberty is less likely to pay 
attention to other rights. 
The immediate implications are two-fold. Firstly, it is 
futile to argue that an action is wrong simply because it limits 
somebody's freedom. Social freedom by definition involves trade-
offs. Stopping at traffic lights entails a trade-off between 
convenience on the one hand and the protection of a higher value -
physical integrity of motorists and pedestrians. No serious person 
would face a dilemma between the two options. Secondly, if someone 
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complains of external obstacles to his desire to be a slave, this 
should provoke little sympathy. The desire to be a slave ·provokes 
the kind of reactions produced by Albania's apologist. Finally, 
the foregoing debate about paternalism focused on coercing people 
into action beneficial to them. This is the thrust of the 
traditional version of the principle of fair play. It is worth 
reiterating that the version defended here has only one aim - to 
prevent harm to others. This harm is immanent, though not 
necessarily actual in free riding. It is true that paternalism 
could have been an issue, if the principle defended here were based 
solely on the enjoyment or acceptance of benefits, as Hart (1967) 
and Rawls (1971) maintain. Paternalism, as it was pointed out, is 
the belief that a person may be compelled to do things for his own 
benefit, or to prevent self-inflicted harm. It has been argued 
(Chapter seven) that the benefits only constitute an additional 
consideration, not the raison d'etre for coercion. In other words, 
it is not necessary to prove that freedom is good for the 
individual or for society for the position to be sustained. All 
that needs demonstration is the fact that, in the process of 
refusing to participate in certain areas in the struggle, the free 
rider stifles the entire effort. If in the process of opting for 
enslavement enthusiastic slaves harm others, then they should be 
di verted from that path. In other words where people choose to 
harm themselves, but in the process also harm others, they may 
justifiably be restrained. Assume that a vaccine , was discovered 
which could wipe out the threat of Aids. However, the only way 
this could be done was when every person has been inoculated. 
Suppose further that there was a group of people who did not 
believe in the germ-theory, or who obj ected to inoculation on 
religious or superstitious grounds. If the consequences could be 
confined to them only, there is a case for leaving them. However, 
if in the process they harm others, then they could be restrained .• 
It is true, as I have argued earlier, that religious intolerance 
violates a value which carries enormous social and psychological 
evils. still, there is a distinction between intolerance . arising 
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out of general hatred for religion, and that designed to protect 
society from physical definite harm, when such harm can be traced 
directly to a religious practice. Of course parallels with 
revolutionary coercion are not straightforward. For one thing, the 
germ problem 'depends on empirically verifiable realities. 
Speculation, rather than prediction, is central to revolutionary 
coercion. 
To conclude, the charge of gratuitous paternalism levelled at 
the principle of fair play does not hold. Even .if it did, that in 
itself would not provide conclusive grounds for rejecting the 
principle. 
concluding Remarks 
This study began by establishing the link between obligations 
and rights on the one hand, and coercion on the other. It was 
argued that rights and obligations are prima facie grounds for 
justified coercion. Neyertheless, it was also argued that 
obligations as such were neither necessary nor sufficient 
conditions for coercion. In chapter two, it was demonstrated that 
although membership of the oppressed class per se creates no 
obligation within that class, the oppressed may contingently have 
obligations to cooperate in their liberation. The basis of such 
obligation would be harm. Consent fails to account for any 
obligation bystanders may have to liberate themselves. In a 
climate of secrecy and oppression, a democratic process becomes 
increasingly difficult to sustain. Nevertheless, an account of 
obligation which took consent into account was necessary. 
Substantive or hypothetical consent was introduced to fill this 
vacuum. Ultimately, obligations to support the struggle were 
derived from the Amended Principle of Fair Play. 
The principle of fair play is not an indisputable model for 
obligations to support liberation efforts. still it illuminates 
the dynamics of the struggle in a more useful fashion than any 
other liberal theory, like consent. It demonstrates that either in 
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principle obligations can arise, or where no such obligations 
exist, people can be coerced into doing things they are not obliged 
to do. There are bound to be problems and questions associated 
with this conclusion. However, there are similarly serious 
problems with the claim that people may take part in the liberation 
effort only if they feel like doing so, or only if they are 
convinced that they should. If consent does not legitimise even 
the best of governments on this planet, it is not clear why 
liberation movements should be expected to pass that test. 
certainly, there are important values underlined by the consent 
theory and liberation movements should meet or at least aim at some 
of them. 
To conclude, respect for personal liberty and autonomy should 
form the basis of a civilised moral system. Further, coercion 
should be avoided, and employed only as a last resort. 
Nevertheless, coercive participation in the liberation effort 
cannot be dismissed solely by moral and metaphysical fiat, 
especially where all that can be shown is that coercion violates 
personal liberty. More argument is required than simple appeal to 
hackneyed · phrases like rights and liberty. Where respect for 
individual rights and liberty leads to greater individual and 
social harm, then a re-evaluation is called for. No moral or 
political system should be treated as though it were more important 
than the people it serves. 
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limBS 
1. This view is attributed by Rees to Mill. It reads like a wrong 
interpretation of Mill, but for the purposes of this work the 
debate is immaterial. 
2. Berlin subsequently modifies this definition, but for the 
purpose of arguments here it is not necessary to delve into that 
debate. For a detailed analysis of, and amendments to Berlin's 
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